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ABSTRACT
Peters, Jeﬀrey C. PhD, Purdue University, May 2016. Electric Power and the Global
Economy: Advances in Database Construction and Sector Representation. Major
Professor: Thomas W. Hertel.
The electricity sector plays a crucial role in the global economy. The sector is
a major consumer of fossil fuel resources, producer of greenhouse gas emissions,
and an important indicator and correlate of economic development.

As such,

the sector is a primary target for policy-makers seeking to address these issues.
The sector is also experiencing rapid technological change in generation (e.g.
renewables), primary inputs (e.g.

horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing),

and end-use eﬃciency. This dissertation seeks to further our understanding of the
role of the electricity sector as part of the dynamic global energy-economy, which
requires signiﬁcant research advances in both database construction and modeling
techniques. Chapter 2 identiﬁes useful engineering-level data and presents a novel
matrix balancing method for integrating these data in global economic databases.
Chapter 3 demonstrates the relationship between matrix balancing method and
modeling results, and Chapter 4 presents the full construction methodology for
GTAP-Power, the foremost, publicly-available global computable general equilibrium
database. Chapter 5 presents an electricity-detailed computational equilibrium model
that explicitly and endogenously captures capacity utilization, capacity expansion,
and their interdependency – important aspects of technological substitution in the
electricity sector. The individual, but interrelated, research contributions to database
construction and electricity modeling in computational equilibrium are placed in the
context of analyzing the US EPA Clean Power Plan (CPP) CO2 target of 32 percent
reduction of CO2 emissions in the US electricity sector from a 2005 baseline by 2030.

xviii
Assuming current fuel prices, the model predicts an almost 28 percent CO2 reduction
without further policy intervention. Next, a carbon tax and investment subsidies
for renewable technologies to meet the CPP full targets are imposed and compared
(Chapter 6). The carbon tax achieves the target via both utilization and expansion,
while the renewable investment subsidies lead to over-expansion and compromises
some of the possibilities via utilization. In doing so, this dissertation furthers our
understanding of the role of the electricity sector as part of the dynamic global
energy-economy.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

The electricity sector is crucial to the global economy. Electricity production and
consumption have been identiﬁed as important indicators and correlates of economic
development. Payne (2010) provides a comprehensive survey of research in individual
countries related to the causality between electricity production and economic growth.
The electricity sector is also a major consumer of fossil fuels. In fact, national
electricity sectors are major drivers of energy exports for some resource-intensive
countries (especially natural gas and coal exporters). The electricity sector also
accounts for roughly 40% of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the United States
and 30% worldwide. It is no surprise then, that many countries have targeted the
electricity sector with policies meant to achieve both economic growth and GHG
mitigation targets. The sector is also experiencing rapid technological change in
generation technologies (e.g. advances in renewable energy), energy inputs (e.g.
horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing of shale deposits), and end-use eﬃciency.
Many important questions in global economic analysis revolve around the electricity
sector.

How can we answer electricity-related questions when the surrounding

technology and economy are evolving at such a rapid pace? The speciﬁc question
investigated here is: how does the electricity sector respond to a carbon tax versus
regulation? A tax is known to be economically eﬃcient, but political intractability
has instead led to alternative strategies (e.g. the Clean Power Plan). What does this
mean for the electricity sector? This is just one of the many possible applications of
the body of work presented here.
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1.1 Electric Power and the Global Economy
Electricity production and consumption have been linked as important indicators
and correlates of economic development. In a survey of over 100 countries representing
99% of the global economy, Ferguson et al. (2000) conclude that as a country’s wealth
increases, the proportion of electricity use to total energy use increases as well. They
also show that there is a stronger correlation between electricity use and wealth than
between total energy use and wealth. Beyond correlation, Payne (2010) provides
a comprehensive survey of research in individual countries related to the causality
between electricity and economic growth. Apergis and Payne (2011) show that for
low-income countries there is a unidirectional correlation from electricity production
to economic growth and a bidirectional causality in higher income countries. Because
of the evidence supporting this link, electricity production, sources, and access are
used as economic and environmental indicators by the World Bank (2012).
Most of the electricity growth internationally has come from developing countries.
The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that electricity output has
increased 81% worldwide from 1990 to 2010, and growth was higher in non-OECD
countries compared to OECD countries, 152% and 42% respectively (IEA, 2011) (see
Figure 1.1). Rapid electricity growth in developing countries increasingly relies on
coal, while natural gas has increased in industrialized countries as a result of fuel
switching eﬀorts (Quadrelli and Peterson, 2007). In the United States, fuel switching
to gas has been driven to a large extent by falling domestic gas prices. In light of
the wide range of electricity generating technologies available, these trends are likely
driven by cost and policy considerations (i.e. relatively low costs of these fuels as
compared to other types of generation).
While electricity itself is largely produced and consumed domestically, the fuel
inputs (e.g. oil, coal, gas) are increasingly traded internationally (See Figure 1.2).
Petroleum only accounts for a small share of electricity generating fuels but is the
foremost traded commodity globally in US$ (United Nations, 2012). ‘Hard’ coal
accounts for about 40% of global electricity production and is increasingly being
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Figure 1.1.: Growth in electricity consumption worldwide. The circle diameter is
based on absolute growth, and color intensity is based on percentage growth. Source:
EIA (2015)

traded internationally (Haftendorn and Holz, 2010; United Nations, 2012). Also,
recent developments in shale oil and gas extraction have instigated serious discussions
around the world centered on expanding global trade and the resulting implications
for economic growth, GHG policy, and energy security (Egging et al., 2008; Paltsev
et al., 2005).
Environmental policies in the electricity sector and technological improvements
in energy production may result in changes in global electricity fuel trade. Many
developed countries have taken a stance against high carbon emitting (namely
coal-ﬁred) generation or for renewable generation technologies. McCollum et al.
(2014) show that climate mitigation policies may impact fossil-fuel consumption,
trade, and prices over time. For example, despite having the largest share (28%)
of global coal reserves (EIA, 2015), the United States recently reduced the ceiling
on allowable carbon emissions of new power plants (Obama, 2013; EPA, 2015),
eﬀectively ensuring no new coal plants are constructed unless currently uneconomic
carbon capture and sequestration measures are implemented. Thus, the inescapable
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Figure 1.2.: Global trade in energy products have been growing at a faster rate as
compared to non-energy products (in US$ relative to 1995 baseline). Source: GTAPv8
(Aguiar et al., 2012)

question is: where will all the US coal go and what will happen to the stranded
assets? In the United States, horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing has expanded
technically recoverable energy reserves (i.e. oil and gas). This technological shock
allowed the United States to surpass Russia as the world’s top gas producer and is
projected to be the top oil producer by 2020 (IEA, 2011). With US natural gas
prices roughly one-third that of world prices, exports appear opportune (Levi, 2012).
The inescapable question here is: how will the trade of these fuels shift electricity
production in the United States and around the world? These questions are not
limited to the United States; many other countries are facing domestic environmental
policies and shale oil and gas opportunities (Kuuskraa et al., 2013).
A signiﬁcant shift in global trade of electricity fuels may have sweeping
implications concerning global carbon emissions. This requires investigating two
important economic margins of adjustment: bilateral sourcing of traded goods and
substitutability amongst energy inputs to electricity generation. First, disparate
regional allocations, technologies, and prices have an impact on climate mitigation
(Peters and Hertwich, 2008; Chen, 2009; Bushnell and Chen, 2009) when considering
cross border trade. It is necessary to analyze domestic production along with sources
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of imports and exports to capture such global implications. Second, ignoring several
operational considerations, electricity can be considered a homogeneous output with
various heterogeneous input technologies. Substituting fuels requires both economic
incentives and physical potential, which are dependent on the characteristics of the
technologies and operation in the electric power sector (Delarue and D’haeseleer,
2008). In the context of carbon mitigation, emissions from electricity production can
be reduced by decreasing output, increasing carbon eﬃciency of existing electric power
technologies, and/or substituting fuels to production (Soytas et al., 2007; Haszeldine,
2009).
This dissertation aims to further our understanding of the electricity sector as
part of the global economic landscape. The remainder of this chapter reviews relevant
literature and existing methodologies and then proposes speciﬁc research advances to
meet this aim.

1.2 Review of Relevant Literature and Models
Innumerable studies attempt to shed light on the impact of economic shocks on
the electricity sector. The bulk of attention in this particular review is placed on
methodologies which have a detailed representation or focus on electricity as well
as regional-global linkages. Even this subset of the relevant research entails a very
extensive literature. Models which have received recent attention in the context
of the research objectives of this study include: “bottom-up”, input–output, and
computable general equilibrium (CGE) models. The remainder of this section is
devoted to describing the structure, relevant research, advantages, and limitations
of each approach. It is easily seen in this review that climate change and carbon
mitigation are the primary foci for researchers studying global impacts of electricity
trade and policy.
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1.2.1 “Bottom-Up” Versus “Top-Down” Models
The distinction between “bottom-up” and “top-down” models is best described
by visualizing a hierarchy of the economy with the macro-economy at the top and
individual decision makers (e.g. agents, ﬁrms) near the bottom (see Figure 1.3).
Similarly, Hourcade et al. (2006) describe an “ideal” energy-economic model as having
the following three characteristics: i) technological explicitness, ii) macroeconomic
completeness, and iii) microeconomic realism (Hourcade et al., 2006, Figure 1).
Bottom-up models have the ﬁrst two characteristics by pursuing detail at the
technology level and building up to analyze the macroeconomic impacts. Top-down
models have the latter two characteristics by starting with the macro-economy
and economically-consistent linkages between aggregate economic agents to analyze
impacts on the various sub-sectors (e.g. electric power).
Bottom-up models, also termed engineering (partial equilibrium) models, use a
wide array of information, technological parameters, and discrete decision-making to
explicitly represent both the demand and supply patterns in a particular sector. Such
detail for electricity includes, but is not limited to the following dimensions of electric
power supply and demand:
• electric appliance-level (e.g.

refrigerator, air conditioning, electric vehicle)

consumption speciﬁcations,
• time-of-use (e.g. night/day, seasonal) changes in demand load patterns,
• dynamic capacity, technical, and resource availability constraints in supply load
patterns,
• base, peak, and intermediate power proﬁles,
• transmission and distribution costs and power losses, and
• cost and technology paths for existing and new technologies which reﬂect
learning, location, speciﬁc regulations/policy, and other information (Neij, 2008;
Lanz and Rausch, 2011).
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All of the above factors inﬂuence the selection of inputs and technologies used for
the ultimate production of electricity. The optimal selection is based on some given
objective (e.g. cost minimizing, welfare maximizing). This type of activity-based
analysis contrasts with the more aggregated production functions utilized in the
top-down models. In top-down models, the aggregate implications of cost-minimizing
behavior are summarized based on cost shares and elasticities of substitution amongst
inputs or aggregate technologies.
There are two basic types of bottom-up models: optimization and simulation.
Optimization models attempt to uncover the least cost or maximum surplus path of
producing electricity in a partial equilibrium framework (i.e. given exogenous input
prices). The MARKAL model oﬀers a representative example of these models (Loulou
et al., 2004). Alternatively, simulation models attempt to capture the behavior of
individual economic agents (e.g. consumers, ﬁrms) involved in production explicitly
and may, or may not strictly follow speciﬁc economic assumptions (e.g.

proﬁt

maximization). In any case, they do not aim to maximize aggregate economic surplus
in the same way as do the optimization models. Examples include models which aim
for behavioral realism (Jaccard et al., 1996) and models which connect disparate
engineering-type systems via market mechanisms (Hodge et al., 2011).
Bottom-up models provide a great deal of sector-speciﬁc information, which
make them a powerful tool in modeling the electric power sector. However, they
typically have limited ability to capture economy-wide interactions, notably the lack
of endogenous price eﬀects. Further, the models are often not linked to global trade,
which has been cited as an important aspect in analyzing economic shocks related
directly or indirectly (via energy inputs) to the electric power sector and the impact
of electricity production (e.g. CO2 emissions). For instance, Bataille et al. (2006)
highlights the importance of endogenous price feedbacks from market equilibrium
which may be ignored in strictly bottom-up models. Also, Chen (2009) and Bushnell
and Chen (2009) use a simulation model to show emission leakage across borders
in the context of carbon trading schemes. While bottom-up models may capture
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some trade pattern-related issues, other sectors which consume the energy inputs and
electricity are largely not considered and bilateral sourcing ignored, limiting the ability
to determine several economy-wide impacts. As trade in electricity fuels increases,
these eﬀects may become increasingly relevant.
Top-down models incorporate regional diﬀerences and trade eﬀects in determining
the impact of economic shocks in the electricity and energy sectors, sacriﬁcing
operational detail for intersectoral, interregional, and economy-wide consistency.

1.2.2 Input–Output
Input–output (I–O) analysis is widely used to analyze inter-sectoral interactions.
They typically have limited economic detail (e.g. ﬁxed input–output coeﬃcients,
exogenous input prices, unlimited factor supply); however, they can provide a rich
description of how diﬀerent sectors of the global economy are interrelated. Peters
and Hertwich (2008) use the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database for
87 countries and 57 industries to drive a multi-regional input–output table (MRIO).
They use this to conclude that emissions involved in trade have signiﬁcant implications
in participation and eﬀectiveness of global climate policies due to diﬀerent regional
trade and emission impacts from speciﬁc policy designs. Yunfeng and Laike (2010)
explore CO2 emission leakage in China using I–O analysis and conclude that developed
countries transferred a large amount of pollution by oﬀshoring manufacturing and
other carbon-intense industries to China. Although the study does not speciﬁcally
focus on electricity, they claim that every unit of energy used in China results in
more CO2 emissions than in developed countries because of coal-intensive electricity
generation (≈ 80% of total production). Weisser (2007) investigates electric power
speciﬁcally using life-cycle assessment, a variant of I–O which attempts to capture
GHG emissions over the production supply chain (resource exploration to electric
power production to waste management). Signiﬁcant emissions (e.g. up to 25%) upand downstream of domestic electric power production process may occur outside of
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legislative boundaries, oﬀsetting policy eﬀectiveness. These three studies show the
importance and eﬀectiveness of MRIO analysis in regional boundary considerations
by capturing the electric power supply chain and oﬀshoring of energy-intense industry.
I–O does a good job of capturing intersectoral and interregional characteristics of
the global economy in terms of quantities. In fact, West (1995) describes I–O models
as “bread and butter” models for regional economic impact analysis. However, I–O
models also have signiﬁcant limitations in the case of electricity production and global
fuel trade including the use of linear functions and exclusion of price eﬀects (similar
to bottom-up models). Various extensions of MRIO models overcome some, but not
all, of these limitations (e.g. full price eﬀects). These limitations are signiﬁcant in the
electric power sector, due to the extent of energy use and substitutability of energy
inputs.

1.2.3 Computable General Equilibrium (CGE)
Limitations of bottom-up and I–O models point to CGE models to include a
detailed representation of electricity with regional-global linkages.

CGE models

determine both price and quantity changes endogenously in the wake of a given
exogenous shock to the global economy. They are built on I–O databases and therefore
capture intersectoral and interregional linkages; however, unlike I–O models, supply
and demand are equated through a market clearance condition. Production can be
characterized in a multitude of ways including nested Cobb-Douglas, CES, or Leontief
functions (as opposed to only Leontief-type in I–O) which can add sector-speciﬁc
details such as substitutability of inputs (West, 1995). CGE also allows for full
price eﬀects (e.g. exogenously determined input prices) whereas bottom-up and
I–O typically assume prices are exogenous. Hazilla and Kopp (1990) and Bergman
(1991) conclude general equilibrium impacts, such as input prices, output prices,
and allocation of resources in the economy, can be “signiﬁcant and pervasive” in the
context of environmental policy – a highly relevant ﬁnding in light of the theme of this
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dissertation. Substitutability of inputs, unique production structures, and strength
in capturing global trade patterns highlight CGE as an ideal foundation for many
applications related to global impacts focusing on the electricity sector.
However, DeCanio (2003) oﬀers sobering critiques of CGE models used in climate
change analysis (although debate remains in regard to the gravity of these concerns
(Rutherford, 2005; Koomey, 2005)). First, CGE models require many parameters
and data (e.g.

elasticities, value shares) which are diﬃcult to estimate beyond

“best guesses” of experts. Many researchers question the reliability of CGE models
because of their sensitivity to these parameters. Second, CGE models are rarely
validated against past experience, leading many researchers to perceive these as
merely illustrative and not predictive tools. Beckman et al. (2011) compare historical
and GTAP-E (an energy-environmental CGE model) based predictions of petroleum
price distributions and conclude that the original, not econometrically estimated,
GTAP-E parameters were too elastic. This leads them to incorporate more recently
econometric estimations of energy demands, after which the model’s performance
is signiﬁcantly improved. Third, the top-down nature of CGE models precludes
incorporating detailed information at the sector level. Considerations of the electric
power sector (e.g. technological feasibility, resource availability, dynamic operations),
which are explicitly incorporated in bottom-up models, are only implicitly addressed
in CGE models (Williams et al., 2012).
For example, the GTAP database is the predominant database for global CGE
modeling; however, there is only a single electricity sector which encompasses
production, collection, and distribution.

Several researchers have independently

disaggregated the sector into various generating technologies and incorporated
specialized production structures for the electricity sector to mimic bottom-up electric
power considerations into the top-down nature of global CGE models (e.g. Burniaux
and Truong (2002), Paltsev et al. (2005), Wing (2006), Pant (2007), Château et al.
(2014)). Unfortunately, the disaggregation methods remain largely undocumented
and sector-speciﬁc detail untested against real-world observations. The foremost
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challenges in modeling electricity in the CGE framework are: i) data and methods
to construct an electricity-detailed CGE database, ii) a way to explicitly and reliably
incorporate key sector-speciﬁc considerations, and iii) methods for model validation.

1.2.4 Integrating Top-Down and Bottom-Up
As mentioned above, CGE modelers have increased the detail (and complexity) of
their production structures for certain commodities to capture unique technological
considerations of the sector. To support these eﬀorts, insights from bottom-up models
can be used to enhance both the parameters and data. On the parameter side, Schäfer
and Jacoby (2005) adjust parameters in a top-down CGE model to reﬂect behavior
predicted by a bottom-up model (MARKAL). Similarly, Kiuila and Rutherford (2013)
demonstrate that estimates of elasticities of substitution from historical data may not
be valid under potential technological and policy changes. They propose methods for
approximating the elasticity of substitution between technologies from step functions
characteristic of bottom-up models.
Other researchers have explored methods to explicitly combine bottom-up and
top-down models in a single framework. The MARKAL-MACRO model (Manne
and Wene, 1992) combines the technological detail of the energy sector in the
MARKAL model (Loulou et al., 2004) with a simple general equilibrium from the
MACRO model (Manne and Richels, 1992) via exchange of energy output and energy
cost variables between the respective models. Similarly, Schäfer and Jacoby (2006)
create a single framework by exchanging prices, demand, and modes shares from
a CGE model with substitution elasticities from the MARKAL model. Böhringer
and Rutherford (2008) describe a complementarity formulation of the energy sector
which combines bottom-up technological detail and top-down economic considerations
within a single mathematical model.

Because of complexity issues which may

make the approach intractable, Böhringer et al. (2009) decompose the original
complementarity formulation into separate top-down and bottom-up models, which
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are solved independently, and uses an iterative process termed “sequential calibration”
to obtain convergence of results from the two models.

1.3 A Path Forward: Adding Electricity-Detail in Computational Equilibrium
The primary purpose of this research is to advance our understanding of the
role of electricity in the global economic landscape by focusing on: i) economic
and technological considerations of the electricity sector, namely the substitutability
between speciﬁc generation technologies and ii) economy-wide linkages.
While bottom-up models have been enormously successful in the former goal, the
lack of price feedbacks and global trade rigor/richness leads to limitations in analyzing
intersectoral, interregional, and economy-wide eﬀects. Also, by not capturing full
price eﬀects or substitutability of generation technologies, input–output analysis
suﬀers from an inability to capture speciﬁc economic and technological considerations.
These limiting factors compromise the ability of both models to adequately model
the global economic implications of regional shocks considering electricity (e.g. trade
shifts, welfare changes, energy security perspectives).
CGE models capture full price eﬀects with the intersectoral and interregional
linkages necessary for analyzing the stated goals of the research. Rigor and richness
in trade patterns (e.g. bilateral sourcing) provide an ideal platform for understanding
global impacts such as GHG emissions. Adding ﬁrst-order sector-speciﬁc detail would
allow for greater credibility to CGE models without sacriﬁcing their beneﬁts.
Thus, the aim of the dissertation is to construct a model with a technologically-rich
representation of the electricity sector which can comprise part of a global
CGE model with fully endogenous prices and production (i.e.
dynamic energy economy).

This involves two main steps:

feedbacks in the
i) constructing a

technologically-rich electricity sector within a “top-down” economic database and
ii) development of a computational equilibrium model which captures important
operational characteristics of the electricity database in a manner consistent with
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existing global economic analysis.

These two broad steps and their individual

contributions to literature are discussed in detail in Chapters 2–4 and 5, respectively.
In Chapter 6 the computational equilibrium model is used to answer the question:
how does the US electricity sector respond to a carbon tax versus regulation? Chapter
7 concludes.
Detailed in Chapters 2–4, the database construction step, is a disaggregation
of the electricity sector in the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database,
an applied general equilibrium database of the world economy constructed from
national input–output tables, trade, macroeconomic, and trade protection data from
several sources.

As discussed earlier, the main GTAP database, however, only

has one sector which encompasses the production, collection, and distribution of
electricity. This aggregate electricity sector is disaggregated into the following new
sectors: transmission and distribution (T&D), nuclear, coal, gas, oil, hydroelectric,
wind, solar, and ‘other’ power technologies.

Gas, oil, and hydroelectric power

are further diﬀerentiated by load type: base and peak.

Chapter 2 introduces

the engineering-level data to inform the disaggregation and a novel method that
best preserves economic information considering speciﬁc aspects of the electricity
disaggregation problem. The method is useful for applications outside electric power
as well. Chapter 3 discusses the linkages between various matrix balancing methods
and modeling results and concludes that preserving certain economic relationships
implied by the engineering-level data is of utmost importance, which lends conﬁdence
to the methodology. Chapter 4 documents additional components of the complete
GTAP-Power disaggregation.
Chapter 5 presents a model that uses the GTAP-Power database as a starting point
and characterizes how electricity generating technologies might evolve in response to
technological advances and policies. Substitution between electric power generating
technologies results from two distinct mechanisms: i) constructing new capital,
termed capacity expansion, and/or ii) increasing or decreasing operations of existing
capital, termed capacity utilization. Long-term returns on capital investment in
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electric power technologies drive expansion, while utilization is the substitution of
production from existing capacity, also called fuel-switching, in response to prevailing
economic conditions, namely fuel prices. The two mechanisms are interrelated in that
capital rents partly depend on how much generation is produced per unit of capacity
(i.e. capacity factor) and short-term utilization changes may be counterbalanced
by long-term expansion. The model posed here integrates these two mechanisms
of electricity generation within a partial equilibrium framework conducive to
extension into a full computable general equilibrium framework. Importantly, this
representation of the electricity sector is validated against observations. A corollary
contribution to the economic modeling literature is a novel implementation of a
variant of the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production speciﬁcation which
ensures the quantity of aggregate electricity production (i.e. GWh) is equal to the sum
of the input quantities (i.e. GWh from individual technologies) (van der Mensbrugghe
and Peters, 2015).
Chapter 6 uses the validated partial equilibrium model described in Chapter 5 to
analyze policy pathways outlined in the US Environmental protection Agency (EPA)
Clean Power Plan (CPP). A baseline projection to 2030 shows that coal capacity
retirements, combined with fuel switching from coal to gas power in response to low
gas prices and continued expansion in renewables, lead to a CO2 emission reduction
of almost 28% in the US electricity sector. This means that the 32% reduction goal of
the CPP can nearly be met without any policy intervention. Still, there is a need for
some small interventions to meet the stated goal. The CPP describes three building
blocks, one of which focus on capacity utilization (building block 2) and another on
capacity expansion (building block 3). Therefore, the model detailed in Chapter 5 is
ideally suited for analyzing policies given the CPP’s building block framework.
Two policy alternatives, a carbon tax and an additional investment subsidy for
wind and solar, are presented and compared to a baseline for 2030. The carbon
tax reduces CO2 by fuel-switching from coal to gas (building block 2) and by
expanding renewables due to reduced returns to fossil-fuel capacity (building block
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3). On the other hand, wind and solar investment subsidies increase returns for
renewable (speciﬁcally wind and solar) capacity (building bloack 3), but the capacity
expansion crowds-out utilization and actually increases emissions from fuel-switching
(building block 2) as compared to the baseline. This is an important consideration for
pursuing an investment subsidy policy as opposed to the economically-eﬃcient, but
less politically tractable carbon tax. We also observe that wind and solar investment
subsidies crowd-out returns to capacity for other renewable options (e.g. nuclear,
hydro, geothermal, biomass). Finally, because the investment subsidy case does not
penalize returns to coal capacity (the largest contributor to emissions), coal capacity
retires at a slower rate. These insights provide speciﬁc guidance in designing policies
within the CPP policy framework.
Chapter 7 reviews the advances in database construction (Chapters 2–4) and the
representation of the electricity sector in computational equilibrium models (Chapter
5) and discusses the insights uncovered in the analysis of the US EPA CPP (Chapter
6). The chapter then describes two future steps. First, the computational model can
be integrated into a CGE framework to analyze the CPP in terms of welfare and other
economy-wide impacts. Second, the role of the US electricity sector as part of the
global economy can be studied by integrating regional trade ﬂows to study important
global trends like international carbon policy and possibilities for US energy exports.
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CHAPTER 2. MATRIX BALANCING WITH UNKNOWN TOTAL COSTS: A
NOVEL METHOD FOR GTAP-POWER

Global economic analysis, speciﬁcally computable general equilibrium, relies on
an underlying database that describes the inter-sectoral and inter-regional linkages
in an economy.

This type of database is typically constructed from national

input–output tables, trade, macroeconomic, and trade protection data from several
sources. However, due to the aggregate nature of the data, the sectoral resolution
tends to be quite coarse. For instance, the GTAP database, which is the predominant
database for global CGE analysis, has only one aggregate electricity sector which
encompasses production, collection, and distribution.

The database identiﬁes

fuel inputs, but is blind to the actual technologies used to produce electricity.
It is particularly non-informative for non-fuel based technologies (e.g.

nuclear,

hydroelectric, wind, solar), which encompass roughly 32% of the global electricity
sector.

Technology-speciﬁc advancements and policies motivate a more detailed

representation of electricity generation in CGE databases.
In the GTAP-Power database, described in the Chapters 2–4, the aggregate
electricity sector in GTAP is disaggregated into the following new sectors:
transmission and distribution (T&D), nuclear, coal, gas, oil, hydroelectric, wind,
solar, and other power technologies. Gas, oil, and hydroelectric power are further
diﬀerentiated by load type: base and peak (henceforth designated by “BL” and “P”
suﬃxes, respectively).1 The intent of the split between base and peak load is two-fold.
First, total generation data comes in the form of fuel inputs (e.g. GWh generated
from natural gas); however, several diﬀerent technologies (e.g. combustion turbine,
steam turbine, combined-cycle) convert the fuels into electricity. These technologies
1

Chapters 2 and 3 show matrix balancing methods and their implications on modeling results using
disaggregations with less technological detail for clarity.
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Figure 2.1.: Shares of global electricity generation by technology. About 32% comes
from non-fuel-based technologies and would be represented as a portion of total capital
in an aggregate electricity sector.

have cost structures that must be diﬀerentiated, and in a typical case where a modeler
wishes to re-aggregate these into a single fuel-based sector (e.g. gas power) using this
database this is important.2 Second, connecting the data to modeling, base and peak
load are distinct types of generation. Without diﬀerentiating electricity production
by these operational considerations, a model can have a technology like solar taking
over the entire generation, which is not realistic in the modern electricity system (i.e.
without storage for time arbitrage).
The objective of the electricity sector disaggregation is to include as much
engineering-level data as possible and preserve the economic relationships that
they imply subject to the constraint imposed by the aggregate electricity sector.
Chapters 2–4 all make individual, but related contributions to the construction of an
electricity-detailed computable general equilibrium database. The relevant data are
reviewed in Section 2.1 and the remainder of the chapter introduces a novel matrix
balancing method that best preserves important economic relationships (i.e. relative
2

In the long-run speciﬁc technologies such as combined-cycle, combustion turbine, and steam turbine
gas would provide a better idea of costs, but the modeling issues of how each of these technologies
compete from an operational perspective is still unclear. Therefore, a simple aggregate base and
peak load diﬀerentiation balances operational considerations and data availability.
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contributions to input demand across technologies (termed “row share”) and cost
structure). Later Chapter 3 shows that these economic relationships translate directly
into modeling results and reinforce the strength of the matrix balancing method in the
ﬁnal GTAP-Power database. Speciﬁc details of the full GTAP-Power disaggregation
are highlighted in Chapter 4 along with some summary results.

2.1 Engineering-level data4
The foundations of the bottom-up economic data are: i) electricity production (in
GWh) by technology (IEA, 2015, 2014) and ii) levelized capital, fuel, operating and
maintenance (O&M) costs for each technology (IEA/NEA, 2010). Levelized costs of
electricity (LCOE) are annualized unit costs (US$ per GWh).7 Electricity production
is represented as the matrix Qg with elements qtg where t is the index for the new
sector. Levelized costs are represented as the matrix L0 with elements lit0 where i
is the index for the input cost. The super-script 0 indicates that this is reported
data. The ﬁnal levelized costs, L, are the balanced costs. The base years for this
disaggregation are 2004, 2007, and 2011. These data sources are constructed from
the reported data along with some elementary assumptions – e.g. missing costs are
ﬁlled in the manner outlined in Peters (2015).
It is worth noting that levelized costs of electricity are notoriously misleading
estimates of the value of electricity. First, each individual levelized cost is derived
from a number assumptions that are unobservable ex ante (e.g. depreciation rate,
7

The use of levelized capital costs requires some caveat for general usage in disaggregations of
the electricity sector. Additional care and manipulation may be required to capture the ﬁnancial
structure of the sector based on the research question at hand. For instance, a large portion of
the value in capital costs are construction costs which likely have taken place in previous years.
This can be problematic for some I–O analysis and especially life-cycle analysis where construction
embodied in levelized capital costs are excluded (Marriott, 2007; Lindner et al., 2013). Methods in
Marriott (2007) can be used to create an initial matrix A for construction-speciﬁc costs rather than
capital in the application presented here. Levelized capital costs are useful in disaggregating social
accounting matrices and computable general equilibrium databases. The application here is for
GTAP, a SAM/CGE database, so we use levelized capital costs to allocate capital in the database.
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Table 2.1.: Total electricity production by technology in the United States in 2011,
Qg (in TWh) and shares. Results may not sum due to rounding. Source: IEA (2014,
2015); Peters (2015).
Nuclear Coal GasBL GasP Oil Hydro Wind Solar Other Total
TWh

821.4

1,872.2

445.1

611.4 31.4

321.7

120.8

6.2

96.3

4,326.6

Share

19.0%

43.3%

10.3% 14.1% 0.7%

7.4%

2.8%

0.1%

2.2%

100%

Table 2.2.: Levelized cost for electricity production by technology in the United
States, lit0 (2011 US$/MWh). Source: IEA (2014, 2015); Peters (2015).
LCOE

Nuclear Coal GasBL GasP Oil Hydro Wind Solar Other

Capital

27.4

19.7

9.2

5.9

11.3

89.3

60.4

202.9

23.5

O&M

22.9

8.8

3.7

4.6

22.8

13.3

16.6

17.2

20.2

Coal

-

20.2

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Gas

-

-

50.8

68.6

-

-

-

-

-

Oil

-

-

-

-

214

-

-

-

32.2

project lifetime). Second, the value of electricity varies over time, space, and contract
type (Joskow, 2011; Hirth et al., 2014).
Despite the deﬁciencies of levelized costs in estimating the value of power
generation, Table 2.2 shows how they can capture important economic diﬀerences
between the technologies. For example, wind, hydroelectric, and solar power have no
speciﬁc fuels costs, but have high capital costs. As such, their costs are not sensitive
to fuel shocks, but are sensitive to the cost of capital, which motivates support for
renewables via investment tax credits in the United States.
There are only limited input cost data, but the I–O component of the GTAP
database comprises 63 diﬀerent input costs to the electricity sector. The vector of
63 inputs is aggregated to map to available aggregate input cost categories (capital,
fuels, and O&M) to create the row constraints, ui . This results in the row constraint
for aggregate inputs to the new electricity industries where each row sums to ui .
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The matrix of initial estimates, A, can be constructed from the economic data.
The estimates for ait are as follows:

lit0 · qtg


ait =
·
ui
g
0
i
t lit · qt
i

(2.1)

where lit0 is the levelized cost for cost i for technology t, and qtg is the GWh production
for technology t. The bottom-up costs are normalized to the total value in the original

electricity sector (i.e. i ui ).
Table 2.3.: Target matrix, A, for the United States (in millions of 2011 US$) derived
from levelized cost and production data compared to the GTAP totals (U).
T&D Nuc. Coal GasBL GasP Oil Hydro Wind Solar Other Total
Cap.

24,770 22,481 36,880 4,101

O&M 43,676 18,811 16,542 1,658
Coal

-

37,884

-

Gas

-

-

-

Oil

16

-

-

-

3,627 356 28,736 7,303 1,248 2,263 131,763 129,967
2,826 716
-

22,625 41,957
-

U

-

4,286

2,011

106

1,944

92,575 133,139

-

-

-

-

-

37,884 61,781

-

-

-

-

-

64,582 48,361

6,724

-

-

-

3,103

9,843

7,758

The ﬁnal two columns of Table 2.3 show that the totals implied by the bottom-up
data do not match that of the corresponding costs in the original GTAP electricity
sector.8 Therefore, the target matrix A must be balanced to meet the accounting
consistency constraints in the GTAP database, U. The remainder of this chapter
details a novel matrix balancing method speciﬁcally designed for the electricity
disaggregation problem and available data.9 Similar to bottom-up and top-down
8

Levelized costs try to capture the annualized cost of production while considering data such as
overnight capital costs, depreciation rate, fuel costs averaged over the year, heat rate, and other
technological factors. Top-down data comes from the reporting of ﬁnal reported costs in broad
categories which may encompass a wider breadth of costs than the bottom-up data (e.g. transmission
and distribution, insurance services, customer service, litigation). These diﬀerent perspectives oﬀers
some insight on the origin of the discrepancies between the two data types.
9
Both Chapters 2 and 3 use GTAPv8 data with a base year of 2007 and an alternate scheme that only
includes the following technologies: nuclear, coal, gas, oil, hydroelectric, wind, and solar. The intent
is for clearer analysis of the properties of the matrix balancing techniques shown and discussed in
Peters and Hertel (2015b,a). The full estimates shown in Table 2.3 are used for the full GTAP-Power
disaggregation in Chapter 4. The data is otherwise identical.
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modeling discussed in Chapter 1, levelized cost (L0 ) and production quantities (Qg )
are bottom-up data that must be balanced to conform to ﬁt the top-down totals (i.e.
U). In this way, the gulf between the two modeling philosophies is drawn slightly
closer together.

2.2 Matrix Balancing with Unknown Total Costs
Systems of national accounts (e.g. supply and use tables, input–output (I–O)
tables, social accounting matrices (SAM), and computable general equilibrium (CGE)
models) are commonly used for multi-sectoral, multi-regional economic analysis. The
I–O table comprises the core of industry production information within SAM and
CGE databases, yet it often has insuﬃcient detail for addressing speciﬁc issues - for
example, regulating CO2 emissions from the electric power sector. This section on
the disaggregation of an I–O industry in the unique situation where information on
total costs of the new sectors are either unknown or deemed less “trustworthy” than
the component costs (e.g. levelized input costs for each technology).
In the disaggregation problem, detailed sub-sector information must be balanced
with the aggregate sector using a matrix balancing method. In a survey of these
methods, Huang et al. (2008) recommends RAS (a biproportionate cross-entropy
method)10 and the improved normalized squared diﬀerences (INSD) method
(Friedlander, 1961) for balancing I–O tables. Similarly, Temurshoev et al. (2011)
analyzed prevailing methods for projecting supply and use tables and concluded that
RAS, INSD, as well as Kuroda (1988) perform better than the alternatives explored
in these works.11
However, Kuroda’s method (with some minor modiﬁcation discussed later) is the
only one of these capable of addressing the case where total costs are unknown and/or
where the researcher does not wish to impose ﬁxed conditions on the total costs.
10

RAS has many variants to improve upon its various limitations, notably GRAS (Lenzen et al.,
2007). The reference to “RAS” in this work is general to the variants as they are basic cross-entropy
formulation. Our example only considers a positive matrix, so GRAS is not required.
11
Kuroda’s method was not included in Huang et al. (2008).

23
With no hard constraint on total costs, both RAS and INSD reduce to the pro rata
distribution which only considers relative contributions to input demand and ignores
cost structure of the technologies.
While RAS and INSD target the individual elements, Kuroda’s method targets the
economic relationships of cost structure and relative contributions to input demand.12
As will be shown, both of these economic relationships are critical in determining
the economic outcomes of studies involving policies bearing on the sector being
disaggregated. The cost structure is of importance in the face of an input (e.g. fuel)
price shock. The row share has direct implications in terms of modeling substitution
between the disaggregate sub-sectors. If the ordering of relative input shares in the
reported data (e.g. capital share to each sub-sector) is not preserved, the substitution
between the technologies may be distorted and even reversed (McDougall, 1999).
These two economic relationships are non-trivial when the database is implemented
in even the simplest of models. They also play a key role in designing an objective to
balance a matrix with unknown total costs.
In this section, we slightly adjust the Kuroda method so the column constraint
(termed Kuroda-NC) can be removed, and we propose the share preserving
cross-entropy (SPCE) formulation which attempts to preserve cost structures and
row shares without any constraint on total cost. The cross-entropy (CE) formulation
complements the sum squared error (SSE)-type approach of Kuroda.13 We also show
that the SPCE solution reduces to the RAS solution when a total cost constraint is
imposed.
The motivating example for this research on unknown total costs is found in the
United States where policymakers have turned to regulations, taxes, and subsidies on
speciﬁc electric power sub-sectors to limit CO2 emissions. An aggregate electric power
12

Henceforth, we will refer to cost structure interchangeably with “column shares.” The relative
contributions to input demand across industries will be referred to as “row shares.” The latter
refers to the share of input use by a given sub-sector in overall input use (e.g. capital employment
in diﬀerent electricity technologies). Alternatively, the row share can be thought of as the
production-weighted input intensity across industries or “sales share.”
13
It is important to note that we do not wish to determine the virtues between cross-entropy, sum
squared error, or other objectives. These largely remain the preference of the individual researcher.
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sector, as is typically found in I–O tables, is insuﬃcient for capturing the eﬀects of
technology-level policies where diﬀerent technologies have signiﬁcantly diﬀerent cost
structures and substitute for one another in the ultimate production of electricity.
Total costs of electricity production from diﬀerent technologies are largely unknown,
and the price of electricity diﬀers across generating technologies due to operational
realities (e.g. “base” versus “peak” power). However, there exist economic data
regarding the generating technologies (i.e. cost structure and row share) which can
inform how these technologies may respond in the face of technological, economic,
or policy shocks. Despite this, previous work on electricity disaggregation has not
focused speciﬁcally on these dual relationships (Lindner et al. (2013); a detailed
discussion is presented later). In this example, the relative component costs are
deemed more “trustworthy” than the summation. The lack of proper total cost
data renders most existing formulations impotent, with the exception of SPCE and
a variant of Kuroda’s method.
While the electricity sector motivates the disaggregation problem which seeks to
preserve economic relationships where total costs are unknown, the proposed solution
can be applied to other aggregate sectors which employ diﬀerent technologies to
produce slightly dissimilar end products preventing a simple assignment of a uniform
price across the technologies (e.g. services, biofuels). In addition, the methods
discussed in this work are also not exclusive to the sector disaggregation problem
and can be used broadly across other matrix balancing problems.
This section is organized as follows. The structure of the disaggregation problem
and important features of the electricity application are outlined in Section 2.3.
The importance of cost structure and row share in application are detailed with
a simple set of equations in Section 2.4. Next, the modiﬁed Kuroda-NC and the
novel share preserving cross-entropy approach that is well-suited for the unknown
column sum problem, termed SPCE, are formulated. The SPCE objective returns
the RAS solution when a column sum constraint is imposed and should outperform
RAS when the constraint is removed because the constraint becomes unnecessarily
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restrictive.

Section 2.6 analyzes RAS, SPCE, Kuroda, and Kuroda-NC with a

practical application to the electric power generation sector using a simpliﬁed
disaggregation of the 126 regions in GTAPv8 and compares their performance with
respect to various performance indicators. A comparison between RAS and SPCE
and between Kuroda and Kuroda-NC shows how performance can be improved by
relaxing the total cost constraint. Comparing SPCE and Kuroda-NC shows how the
two diﬀerent deﬁnitions of closeness (entropy versus SSE, respectively) perform.

2.3 The Structure of the Disaggregation Problem
I–O industries are often characterized by aggregate sectors due to the lack of
speciﬁc sub-sector information. However, policies and technological advances are
often related to speciﬁc technologies/sub-sectors and may not be applicable to the
aggregate sector. Disaggregating the aggregate industry in I–O tables is an important
step in reconciling bottom-up technological detail with top-down economy-wide
modeling (Sue Wing, 2008; Lenzen, 2011). The disaggregation problem presented
here focuses on how to transition from an aggregate sector to several sub-sectors when
the total costs of the new industries are unknown - all while preserving important
economic relationships within and across the sub-sectors.

2.3.1 The Disaggregated I–O table
The fully disaggregated supply-side matrix is constructed by disaggregating a
particular sector (e.g. electricity) into sub-sectors while the other sectors remain
unaﬀected. The balanced disaggregation is deﬁned as matrix X with elements xit
where i is an input in the same vector of inputs as those in the full GTAP database,
and t is a new industry within the set of new industries (or technologies) which are
inserted in place of the aggregated sector. By way of example, xit might refer to
capital inputs into the solar power generation sub-sector. In order to perform this
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Sum
(xi•, ui)

Inputs (i)

Technologies (t)

Sum
(x•t, vt)
Figure 2.2.: The I–O table for the disaggregated industry (X)

disaggregation, an initial matrix A is constructed from economic and/or technological
information about alternative technologies (e.g. Equation 2.1 in the previous section).
The disaggregation problem is to minimize the distance between the elements of
X and A subject to a set of constraints imposed by the I–O structure (Schneider
and Zenios, 1990). In particular, the sum of xit over all t (row sum) must equal the
original employment of input i in the aggregate sector deﬁned as ui (i.e. xi• = ui

where xi• ≡ t xit ).14 The majority of methods also impose a column sum constraint
on the sum of xit over all i for each t must equal some given value vt (i.e. x•t = vt

where x•t ≡ i xit ). However, this constraint is not strictly required for consistency
since the earlier row sum restriction will ensure that total value in the disaggregate
matrix will equal that of the aggregate industry. Therefore, it is preferable to avoid a
potentially restrictive column sum constraint when information on the column sum,
vt , is unknown or of less reliability than the component costs (reinforced later in
Chapter 3).
The disaggregated industry matrix (X) replaces the aggregate industry in the
full matrix to construct a complete GTAP-Power database containing the new
disaggregated electricity industries along with those in the GTAP database.
14
Throughout this work, summations are assumed to range over the entirety of the dimensions unless
otherwise stated.

27
2.3.2 The Nature of Economic Data for an Electricity Disaggregation
As discussed in Section 2.1, the fundamental economic data which can be
reasonably be obtained are: i) data on total generation from each technology in
gigawatt-hours (GWh), ii) the input costs to each generation technology (US$ per
GWh), and iii) the original employment of inputs in all electricity generation, ui (in
US$). In this case, available input cost data consist of capital, fuel, and operating
and maintenance (O&M) levelized cost (i.e. annualized cost per GWh) data reported
with diﬀerent error distributions for each category of input. Total cost data for
generating technologies are not available because national accounts do not generally
report on detailed technologies. Because national accounts are constructed from
plant-level data, sub-sector total cost data exist in theory; however, in practice,
depending on the region, this type of data can be proprietary, unreliable, and
unpublished. Constructing detailed national accounts from plant-level data would
obviously overcome the unknown total cost problem.
Matrix balancing approaches would normally advise to construct artiﬁcial column
totals using the available data. One way to construct total costs of generation is
to impute a uniform price of electricity from the original values and GWh produced
(Lindner et al., 2012; Shrestha and Marpaung, 2006); however, in reality unit costs
of electricity diﬀer, sometimes greatly, between generation types due to operational
realities (e.g. “base” versus “peak” power, vintage of the power plants, etc.).
Alternatively, assuming the cost data are complete (which is often not the case),
column sums could be derived from summing component costs for a technology and
normalizing to ﬁt the total value in the original I–O data.15 However, fundamentally
diﬀerent methods of measurement and assumptions are used to construct the levelized
15

Robinson et al. (2001) highlights the importance of known column sums in CE, and oﬀers the use
of weighted errors in total costs as a powerful tool where column sums are uncertain. As proposed,
simple summing up the reported input costs has implications for the error distribution of the column
sum when the individual cost errors are dependent in the cost structure or across industries (which
is likely in the case of data from the same source). This complicates a simple “cost totals with error”
measure, especially in the case with several weighted error on various constraints in the model. The
intent here is to avoid the additional unnecessary constraint altogether.
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input costs than are used to create the aggregate national accounts.16 Thus, this
approach unnecessarily imposes a total cost constraint that is derived from two
or more disparate data sources. Furthermore, the development of these column
constraints also requires complete knowledge of input costs, which may not be
available.
It is more intuitive, and most general, to preserve the economic relationships in the
input data rather than construct total cost data from incomparable sources solely to
ﬁt into an existing method, especially when the presence of a constraint unnecessarily
restricts the result.

2.4 The Importance of Preserving Economic Relationships in Modeling
The two economic relationships we consider here are cost structure and row share.
Both appear often in economic modeling using I–O, SAM, and CGE-type analysis.
Cost structure and row share are deﬁned, respectively, as:
cit ≡

xit
x•t

and rit ≡

xit
xi•

(2.2)

To illustrate their importance, consider Equations 2.3–2.8 which provide a
linearization of a generic, competitive, long-run partial equilibrium model (in the
spirit of ORANI (Dixon, 1982)) with two activities (A and B) which substitute
imperfectly for one another in the supply of electricity to the grid, with elasticity
of substitution in use, σ. These sectors could be nuclear-powered (high capital cost)
and gas-powered electricity generation (lower capital cost) where the aggregate output
of electricity is produced by substituting between nuclear and gas-power. This local
approximation to the percentage change in demand for each type of power generation
may be written as a function of the percentage change in total electricity production,
16

Levelized costs are annualized costs of production which consider data such as overnight capital
costs, depreciation rate, fuel costs, heat rate, and other technological factors. National accounting
data comes from the reporting of ﬁnal reported costs in broad categories which may encompass
a wider breadth of costs (e.g. transmission and distribution, insurance services, customer service,
litigation).
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pA , pB ), relative
qely , as well as the change in price of each individual type of power (
to the change in the average cost of electricity, pely :
qA = qely − σ · (
pA − qely )

(2.3)

pB − qely )
qB = qely − σ · (

(2.4)

When the two types of power are highly substitutable (σ  0), large swings in
the source of power generation can be expected. When they substitute poorly in
use, we can expect nuclear and gas-powered generation to rise and fall, more or less
in tandem with changes in total power demand, qely . Assuming either average cost
regulation or competitive entry and exit of generating technologies in the long run,
we can derive a zero proﬁt condition for each sub-sector, as well as for the industry
as a whole. These equations simply state that the sub-sector output price change
in long-run equilibrium will be determined by the cost-share weighted sum of input
price changes.
pA =



ciA · piA

(2.5)

ciB · piB

(2.6)

i

pB =


i

pely = θA · pA + (1 − θA ) · pB

(2.7)

where pit is the percentage change in the price of input i used in technology t and
θt is the share of technology t in total electricity cost. We will assume for the time
being that the price change of input i is identical across technologies (i.e. piA = piB ).
From the zero-proﬁt conditions, Equations 2.5 and 2.6, it can be seen that the
cost share of an input for a given activity will have important consequences for the
power sector’s long run response to a change in the price of that input. Consider,
for example, the case in which the price of a common input, say capital, rises by
20%. The intensity of input i in each productive sector t, (i.e. column coeﬃcient
in the I–O context, cit ), determines the size of the two relative price changes for

30
activities A and B, with the relative price of the more capital intensive sector (let
us assume this is A) rising more. Faced by a relative price rise for activity A, the
power sector will substitute toward activity B so that qA < 0 and qB > 0. However,
if, in the process of disaggregating the power sector, the relative capital intensity of
activity A is not preserved, i.e. now, ciB > ciA , then the direction of quantity change
is reversed when the cost of capital rises. This is very problematic in cases where
the ordering of column shares is not necessarily preserved. In fact, the minimum
sum of column cross-entropy (MSCCE) posed by Golan et al. (1994) and studied by
Robinson et al. (2001) has been shown to ﬂip the ordering of input intensity across
sectors McDougall (1999), which highlights a danger in preserving only one of these
economic relationships. Simply removing the column constraint in the RAS and INSD
formulations reduces both methods to the pro rata distribution which preserves only
the row share.
Now turn to the related question of row shares. For the sake of simplicity, we will
assume that the input demands in the individual activities change in ﬁxed proportion
to output levels (e.g. no capital-labor substitution in the individual technologies used
to generate power). We then can add one more equation to the model which serves
to determine the change in total use of input i (e.g. capital), qi , in the aggregate
electricity industry. This can be written as the quantity share-weighted sum of
sub-sector output changes. Since both sectors face the same input prices, the quantity
and value-shares are identical, so that:
qi = riA · qA + riB · qB

(2.8)

Recall riA represents the row share of sector A in the total use of input i. From
this, it is easy to see that if sector A (e.g. nuclear power) is relatively more capital
intensive than B (gas generation), then a shift from nuclear to gas will lessen the
demand for capital in the power sector. Reversing this row share relationship can
result in misleading estimates of the total input requirements for the power sector
following an exogenous price shock or policy intervention.
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Clearly, both the cost structure and relative contributions to input demand
are important when it comes to economic analysis of a sector comprising varied
individual technologies. Targeting these economic relationships, rather than the
values themselves, can allow the relaxation of a total cost constraint.

This is

illustrated further later in this dissertation.

2.5 Possible Approaches for Unknown Total Costs
Huang et al. (2008) and Temurshoev et al. (2011) compare various matrix
balancing methods and reach similar conclusions: RAS (e.g. Lenzen et al. (2007)),
INSD (Friedlander, 1961), and Kuroda (1988) are preferred methods. Therefore, we
conﬁne our analysis to these three alternatives, although there is a large and diverse
literature on matrix balancing and other reasonable alternatives might exist.
The motivation for this research is in the case of unknown total costs or when
the total cost constraint is thought to be unreliable compared to other aspects of
the initial data used to construct the matrix A. If the corresponding constraint
is removed from RAS and INSD formulations, they both will reduce to a pro rata
distribution which only considers row share and ignores cost structure. This leaves
us with Kuroda as the only preferred option capable of the case with unknown or
unreliable total costs. The Kuroda objective directly targets cost structure and row
shares so that the total cost constraint can be removed without compromising the
intent of the method.
However, many researchers prefer the information-theoretic cross-entropy
approach (see Shannon (1948) and Kullback and Leibler (1951) for an in-depth
information-theoretic treatment).

To the authors’ knowledge there is no such

approach which allows the ﬂexibility of removing the total cost constraint without
adversely impacting the biproportional intent of the method. We therefore propose
such a novel entropy-type approach to complement the sum squared error (SSE)-type
Kuroda approach for the case of unknown or unreliable total costs.
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Accordingly, the Kuroda, Kuroda without a total cost constraint (Kuroda-NC),
and the novel share preserving cross-entropy (SPCE) are formally introduced as
constrained optimization problems in this section.

2.5.1 Kuroda’s Method without a Total Cost Constraint (Kuroda-NC)
Temurshoev et al. (2011) reviews three diﬀerent weighting schemes for the original
Kuroda objective function, but the original Kuroda (1988) weighting scheme of “equal
percentage change” is determined to perform best. The objective function is

2 
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x
x
it
it
1
/ui
/vt
min
−1 +
−1
0
xit 2
rit
c0it
t
i

(2.9)

where
c0it ≡

ait
a•t

and rit0 ≡

ait
ai•

(2.10)

which correspond to the row share and the cost structure of the target matrix A,
respectively. Elements ui and vt are the exogenous target row and column totals for
the balanced matrix, X, respectively. The objective essentially minimizes the sum
squared percentage error in both row share and cost structure. For matrix balancing
this objective is typically subject to both row and column constraints.


xit = ui

for all i

(2.11)

xit = vt

for all t

(2.12)

t


i

So that the Kuroda method is described by Equations 2.9, 2.10, and 2.11. To
relax the total cost constraint the necessary modiﬁcation to the Kuroda objective is
straightforward. The Kuroda-NC objective can be written as:
1 
min
xit 2
t
i



xit/ui

rit0

2
−1


+

xit/x•t

c0it

2 
−1

(2.13)
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where the column sum in the balanced matrix, X, is no longer exogenously given by
vt , but rather endogenously determined by x•t . Thus, the Kuroda-NC method can
be described by Equations 2.11 and 2.13. The result is identical to the Kuroda result
when the column constraint, Equation 2.12, is also included.

2.5.2 RAS and Share Preserving Cross-Entropy (SPCE)
To the authors’ knowledge there is no previously documented entropy-theoretic
approach which is capable of relaxing the total cost constraint (i.e. Equation 2.11)
while preserving both row share and cost structure. For example, the commonly-used
RAS approach reduces to the pro rata distribution when the column constraint is
removed.
Therefore, this section presents the share-preserving cross-entropy (SPCE)
objective - an alternative entropy objective function speciﬁcally designed to preserve
economic relationships (i.e. cost structure and row share) in the face of unknown
column sums but known component costs. The component costs might represent
economic aggregates for which data are available (e.g. operating and maintenance
costs, labor, fuels). The result can then provide estimates of column sums of each
of these economic aggregates which can subsequently be used with traditional CE
methods, like RAS, to derive values from sub-components (e.g. unskilled and skilled
labor costs derived from an aggregate labor cost) while still preserving the economic
relationships in the original data as best as possible.
The interpretation of cross-entropy is the divergence between the a priori
(unbalanced) and the a posteriori (balanced) distribution. The RAS objective in
its simplest form is as follows
min
xit


i

t

xit · ln

xit
e · ait

(2.14)
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where e is the base of the natural log.17 The RAS method encompasses Equation
2.14 subject to both the constraints given in Equations 2.11 and 2.12.
Cross-entropy methods, such as RAS, are built on information-theoretic
foundations.

Kullback and Leibler (1951) denote the mean information to

discriminate between two hypotheses given some observation; the discrete distribution
version of which, applied to our two-dimensional problem, is given by
D (p : q) =

   xit 
i

where

xit/x••

t

x••


· ln

is the a posteriori distribution and

xit/x••



ait/a••

ait/a••

(2.15)

is the a priori distribution

of values. Given that a•• is non-negative and constant (i.e. exogenous) and some
constraint imposes x•• to be constant as well (e.g. Equation 2.11 or 2.12), it is
straightforward to show that minimizing cross entropy is equivalent to minimizing the
Kullback and Leibler (1951) measure of information needed to discriminate between
two discrete distributions, although the objectives are not identical.
In information-theoretic terms, minimizing cross-entropy is equivalent to
minimizing the entropy information gained (i.e.

extraneous information) from

imposing the balancing constraints on the a priori distribution. Alternatively, Junius
and Oosterhaven (2003) interpret this as the information loss from the a priori
distribution due to the matrix balancing process. The interpretation of the RAS
objective in Equation (2.14) considers the elements of matrix A to be the relevant a
priori distribution.
Instead the SPCE objective considers both cost structure and row share in the
matrix A to be the a priori distributions. As such the objective is deﬁned as follows

min
xit

17


i


αi





 xit  xit/xi• 
 xit  xit/x•t 
+
ln
βt
ln
0
x
r
x
c0it
i•
•t
it
t
t
i

(2.16)

The RAS objective function is sometimes written without the base of the natural log shown
in Equation 2.14. Subject to any constraint that ﬁxes x•• (e.g. Equations 2.11 and 2.12), the
minimization of the RAS objective function with and without the base of the natural log are
equivalent.
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where αi and βt are arbitrary weights on the row share cross-entropy and the cost
structure cross-entropy, respectively. With an endogenous weighting scheme of α =
xi• and β = x•t , the SPCE objective becomes

min
xit


i

t


xit · ln

xit/xi•

rit0

·

xit/x•t


(2.17)

c0it

Appendix A in Peters and Hertel (2015b) discusses the ﬁrst order conditions and
a method performance check to show that imposing the row and/or column totals
directly from A as constraints returns the full matrix A. The column constraint can
be relaxed while still preserving the important economic relationships, and the SPCE
would then comprise Equations 2.11 and 2.17. This objective also allows the row
constraint to be relaxed instead of the column constraint (i.e. Equations 2.12 and
2.17); however, the practical use of this is unclear.
Another important feature of this objective formulation is that if the column
constraint is also included (i.e. Equations 2.11, 2.12, and 2.17) the result is identical
to the RAS solution (see Appendix B in Peters and Hertel (2015b)). This makes the
solution especially attractive for comparison purposes and for practitioners who are
most conﬁdent in the RAS solution.
There may be some concern regarding the endogenous weighting scheme which
leads to Equation 2.17. It is important to note that if the row total constraint
is imposed (Equation 2.11) then αi is in fact exogenously given by ui , and if the
total column constraint is imposed (Equation 2.12) then βt is exogenously given
by vt . However, in the context of unknown total costs we assume that the total
column constraint is not imposed and βt is in fact endogenous and may lead to
some circularity. Thus, we compare the SPCE (Equations 2.17 and 2.11) result with
βt = x•t (endogenous weighting) against the RAS results as well as two alternate


exogenous weighting schemes in Equation 2.16: βt = a•t ( i ui/a•• ), termed SPCE-1,

and the uniform weighting scheme βt = 1/m i αi , termed SPCE-2. Figure 2.3 shows
a frequency chart of the absolute percentage deviation of xit from ait for capital and
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Figure 2.3.: A frequency chart of absolute percentage deviation of the balanced values
from the a priori values show that the endogenous weighting scheme of the SPCE
formulation is comparable to other exogenous weighting schemes.

O&M across each technology and region. We see the deviations of the endogenous
weighting scheme (SPCE) are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than RAS or the exogenous
weighting schemes.

From this, we can conclude that the endogenous weighting

appears robust in most cases.
The following section compares the Kuroda, Kuroda-NC, RAS, and SPCE
formulations with an application to the electricity sector where component costs
are deemed more reliable than their totals. In other words, the preservation of
economic relationships between component costs is deemed more important than
strictly adhering to the implied total costs.

2.6 An Example in a Simple Electricity Sector Disaggregation
The motivating application of this speciﬁc formulation is the disaggregation of an
aggregate I–O electricity sector into sub-sectors which include distinct generating
technologies.

The I–O table itself can be used for a number of purposes (e.g.

understanding economic structure, I–O analysis, life-cycle analysis, CGE modeling).
Electricity technologies are highly substitutable. Therefore, as reinforced later in
Chapter 3, preserving the associated economic relationships is of utmost importance
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when undertaking economic analysis of policy interventions.

Failing to preserve

the economic relationships should be seen as a serious limitation in the context of
electricity sector disaggregation eﬀorts meant to include generating technologies.
One major criticism of previous work aimed at power sector disaggregation is that
the I–O construction methodology is not always transparent, perhaps due to ad hoc
methods (e.g. Han et al. (2004); Limmeechokchai and Suksuntornsiri (2007)). This is
especially true in large-scale CGE and IAM research where documentation is copious
and technical details are all too often omitted. Weakly-documented studies are likely
suspect for use beyond the immediate research purpose, because no conclusions can
be made whether the models will be able to adequately capture the impacts of
substitution between inputs and substitution of technologies in electricity production.
Several works have pursued the electricity disaggregation problem without using
any information regarding input costs to various generation technologies. Lindner
et al. (2012) disaggregate the electricity sector in China using a random-walk
algorithm with only electricity output (GWh) known. Since they do not use data
on input costs, their method assumes a uniform cost of electricity to arrive at column
sums, neglecting important operational realities of the sector (Hirth et al., 2014).
Similarly, Shrestha and Marpaung (2006) disaggregate based solely on electricity
production data.
Other electricity disaggregation eﬀorts use available component cost data, but
only leverage one aspect of the underlying economic relationships. Marriott (2007),
Arora and Cai (2014), and Lindner et al. (2013) focus on row shares by allocating
input costs across new technologies based largely on production (GWh) and basic
assumptions (e.g.

water transport is exclusive to coal-ﬁred power and pipeline

transport is split between gas and oil power). In these cases, there is no speciﬁc
attention paid to the ﬁnal cost structure of the technologies. These are essentially pro
rata distribution-based methods. Furthermore, these are ad hoc methods and do not
present a systematic way of introducing additional information as in the constrained
optimization formulations.
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Sue Wing (2008) presents a positive mathematical programming approach to
incorporating cost structure and detailed engineering data (e.g. thermal eﬃciency,
GWh production).

The formulation does quite well in introducing the detailed

technological data, but neglects speciﬁc attention to preserving input intensities (i.e.
row shares) across the new technologies.
The discussion in Section 2.4 emphasized the necessity of preserving both cost
structure and row shares in the electricity disaggregation, especially when substitution
of technologies is important, as is the case for electricity generation. Given that the
input cost data exist for the disaggregation task at hand, both relationships should
be considered.
The example presented in this paper focuses on a disaggregation of the electricity
sector in 126 regions in the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) version 8 database
(Aguiar et al., 2012). The United States data are presented in detail here due to the
availability of reliable economic estimates in this region. The GTAP database is
widely-used in the multi-region I–O, SAM, CGE, and IAM modeling communities;
however, electricity is represented as a single sector which includes production,
collection and distribution. Here, the original sector is disaggregated into seven new
electricity sectors: nuclear, coal, gas, oil, hydro, wind, and solar power. Preserving the
economic relationships in the electricity sector is necessary in this context, because
such a database will be used for CGE analysis where the electricity technologies
substitute as in the economic model outlined by Equations 2.3–2.8 above.

2.6.1 Economic Data for the Simple Disaggregation
The foundations of the bottom-up economic data used for disaggregation are:
i) electricity production (in GWh) by technology (IEA, 2014, 2015) and ii) levelized
capital, fuel, operating and maintenance (O&M) costs for each technology (IEA/NEA,
2010). Levelized costs of electricity (LCOE) are annualized unit costs ($ per GWh).
The base year for this disaggregation is 2007. These data sources are constructed from
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the reported data along with some elementary assumptions. For example, missing
values of LCOE are ﬁlled in the manner outlined in Peters (2015) based on regional
and technological similarity.
The target A matrix is constructed in a similar method as in Section 2.1 but only
for a subset of the technologies for simplicity and clarity.
The balanced matrices X are constructed for each of the 126 regions in the GTAP
database from the initial matrices A using the Kuroda, Kuroda-NC, RAS, and SPCE
approaches. Only the supply-side is considered in this work. The new sub-sectors
can be treated as activities in the supply of an electricity good where demanders are
agnostic to the technology (e.g. perfect substitutes in demand). Alternatively, the
electricity demand for each technology can be allocated based on the proportions of
total cost revealed in the SPCE procedure. The results are compared using a diverse
set of performance indicators from literature described in the following section.

2.6.2 Performance Indicators
It is generally useful to compare diﬀerent matrix balancing methods against a
variety of performance indicators, because the indicators are often highly similar to
the objective function, and therefore, any individual indicator will likely be biased
in favor of the associated approach (e.g. minimum percentage deviation or entropy
distance). We test the four methods against four diﬀerent performance indicators
in the spirit of Temurshoev et al. (2011). Two of these measure percentage changes
(akin to Kuroda) and two apply information metrics (akin to cross-entropy methods).
Because there is no observed matrix to benchmark the balanced matrices against, each
performance indicator estimates some distance between each estimated elements zit
of the matrix Z and the a priori elements, zita , of the matrix Z a . Benchmarking
with the a priori matrix, as opposed to some observed matrix, is an inherently weak
test; however, the absence of an observed matrix is the primary motivation of the
disaggregation problem. Possible alternatives are discussed in the conclusion.
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(1) Mean absolute percentage error (Butterﬁeld and Mules, 1980):

M AP E =

1   |zit − zita |
· 100
mn i t
zita

(2.18)

The scalars m and n are the dimensions of i and t, respectively. This gives an
average percentage deviation between the estimated and target value.
(2) Weighted absolute percentage error (Mı́nguez et al., 2009):
   |z a |  |zit − z a |
it
it
W AP E =
·
· 100
a
a
z
z
••
it
t
i

(2.19)

This is similar to M AP E but gives a weighted percentage deviation based on the
relative size of the a priori element.
(3) Phi statistic (Smith and Hutchinson, 1981):

φ=


i

t


zita

· ln

zita
zit


(2.20)

This statistic is similar to the information gain statistic given by Kullback and
Leibler (1951) and entropy. For a given zita , a zit twice as large returns the same error
as a zit half as large.
(4) Psi statistic (Kullback, 1959; Knudsen and Fotheringham, 1986):
 a
 
1  a
zit
zit
ψ= a
|zit | · ln
+ |zit | · ln
z•• i t
sit
sit

(2.21)

where sit = 12 (|zita | + |zit |). Knudsen and Fotheringham (1986) ﬁnd both the phi and
psi statistics to be some of the most accurate performance metrics.
For each of the M AP E, W AP E, and φ there are four diﬀerent statistics: with
no superscript zita = ait and zit = xit ; with superscript r zita = rit0 and zit = rit ; with
superscript c zita = c0it and zit = cit ; and with superscript s zta = vt and zt = x•t .
The statistics are trivially modiﬁed for analyzing column sums so the summations
do not range over the row dimension. In this way we can analyze the performance
for the total matrix, row sum, cost structure, and the deviation from the implied
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total costs, respectively. However, the deviations compared to the implied total costs
(i.e. superscript s) should be considered less reliable in the context of this particular
problem since we believe the implied total costs to be unreliable.

2.6.3 Comparison of Methods
A total of 13 statistics for each of the 126 regions provides wide coverage in
evaluating the performance of the four alternative matrix balancing methods. Each
region is independent of one another, so these are essentially 126 diﬀerent instances
of the electricity sector disaggregation. There is no clear dominance between the
measures (i.e. no one performance metric always dominates another with respect to
any of the statistics). Therefore, we rank the performance of each method (i.e. RAS,
SPCE, Kuroda, and Kuroda-NC) for each region and average them across the 126
regions (a ranking of 1 is the best performing for that region and 4 is the worst).
This ranking system provides more accurate and comprehensive information than an
average of the performance indicator values themselves since the regions are truly
diﬀerent disaggregations. This average ranking scheme is applied to each of the 13
performance statistics. A lower score indicates better performance with respect to
that particular statistic. The average rankings for each method and statistic are
shown in Table 2.4 below.18
As one would expect based on the altered objective, SPCE consistently ranks
better than RAS for the column and row-speciﬁc metrics (i.e. superscripts c and r,
respectively). There are mixed results for the individual element error (no superscript)
with SPCE performing better according to M AP E and φ and RAS performing better
for W AP E and ψ.
Opposed to RAS and SPCE, Kuroda and Kuroda-NC share an objective which
targets column and row shares explicitly. Regardless and still as expected, relaxing the
column constraint in Kuroda-NC generally shows better performance for the column
18

The complete set of 13 x 126 statistics for each method is included in the supplementary material.
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Table 2.4.: Average rankings of performance indicators for each method. A ranking
of 1 is best. Italics show better performing method based on objective type (entropy
and SSE-type). Bold shows overall best performing. No superscript, superscript r,
and superscript c indicates the metric for deviation from the individual elements, cost
structure, and row shares, respectively. The superscript s is the deviation from the
uncertain total cost constraint that must be imposed in RAS and Kuroda. Therefore,
the metric is only used for SPCE and Kuroda-NC.
Percentage change-based performance indicators
Method

MAPE MAPEc MAPEr MAPEs WAPE WAPEc WAPEr WAPEs

RAS

3.18

3.52

2.14

-

1.31

2.88

2.27

-

SPCE

3.10

2.97

1.95

1.41

1.48

2.40

1.87

1.35

Kuroda

1.75

2.31

2.98

-

1.85

3.17

3.02

-

Kuroda-NC

1.83

1.06

2.79

1.56

2.96

1.40

2.70

1.63

Information-based performance indicators
φ

φc

φr

φs

ψ

RAS

2.54

3.37

2.04

-

2.13

SPCE

2.33

2.60

1.66

1.35

2.54

Kuroda

2.73

2.72

3.02

-

2.02

Kuroda-NC 2.25

1.16

3.13

1.63

3.10

Method

and row-speciﬁc metrics. However, Kuroda seems to perform better for all of the
individual element errors with one exception. This is likely due to large swings in
the column sums when the constraint is relaxed in Kuroda-NC. In fact, we see larger
swings in total column sums for Kuroda-NC than with SPCE.
The large column sum swings in Kuroda-NC also greatly increases the performance
in preserving cost structure; Kuroda-NC greatly outperforms all other methods.
However, this seems to have some expense on the individual element error as well
as the row share. SPCE performs better than Kuroda-NC for row share. It is also
worth noting that Kuroda-NC outperforms SPCE with respect to individual elements
for the M AP E metric, while SPCE outperforms Kuroda-NC when the error values
are weighted by the values of the cells (i.e. the W AP E metric). This suggests that
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Figure 2.4.: A frequency chart of gains from relaxing total cost constraint in CE and
SSE-type objectives in terms of diﬀerence in W AP E r and W AP E c .

the Kuroda-NC method allows larger changes for cells with initially larger values.
Temurshoev et al. (2011) reached a similar conclusion when comparing (generalized)
RAS with Kuroda, which is also supported empirically here.
It is not clear if any of the four methods performs better for individual elements;
there is no clear distinction. However, we can see that SPCE outperforms RAS
on 8 of the 10 measures (excluding the column sum measures, superscript s, which
RAS outperforms by deﬁnition). We can also observe that SPCE performs better for
preserving cost structure and row share, while RAS performs better at total cost via
the hard constraint. The same is true for Kuroda and Kuroda-NC. Of course, the
motivation for the work is that this hard constraint is less reliable.
There is a clear trade-oﬀ between the perfect accuracy for total costs of sub-sectors
using RAS and Kuroda and best preserving important economic relationships in the
bottom-up data by relaxing the column constraint with either SPCE or Kuroda-NC.
Figure 2.4 and 2.5 illustrate this trade-oﬀ.
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While there are clear gains (i.e. diﬀerence in W AP E-based metrics) by relaxing
the total cost constraint, there are losses in terms of the column sums as deﬁned by
the constraint.19 The losses can be quite large.
However, if there is either no information on the total costs or the information
is unreliable, as is the case described in this work, the losses shown in Figure 2.5
are largely meaningless. That is, how are we to evaluate error metrics if the true
value is unknown and the a priori sums considered unreliable? The burden is on the
individual researcher to evaluate which information exists, which information is more
reliable, and which relationships in the economic data is most important to preserve
in the balanced matrix.
It is worth noting that column constraints can still be placed on one or more of
the sub-sector totals in Kuroda-NC or SPCE without compromising the methods. In
this way, they are more general than their respective counterparts.

2.7 Conclusions
Matrix balancing methods are well-studied, highly eﬀective, and eﬃcient ways
to estimate matrix elements given incomplete or even conﬂicting information.
However, a majority of popular methods are unable to trade-oﬀ important economic
relationships (i.e. industry cost structure and relative contributions to input demand)
in the case where total industry costs (i.e. column sums) are unknown or unreliable.
One exception is Kuroda’s sum squared error-type approach, but there exists no
complementary entropy-theoretic approach for this speciﬁc case. In this work we
formulate a novel entropy approach to handle the case of unknown or unreliable total
cost information, termed share-preserving cross-entropy (SPCE).
The SPCE formulation allows the column sum constraint to be relaxed in a
constrained optimization formulation which preserves both cost structure and row
shares. Previous research for incorporating additional information in the literature
19

The W AP E is used for these ﬁgures since it seems to be the most balanced indicator between the
four methods. The same insights appear using the other performance indicators as well.
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are easily integrated. This formulation does not replace existing formulations. This
is especially true considering the limitations of the performance evaluation using the
a priori matrix as the benchmark for comparing against existing formulations. These
formulations could potentially be evaluated against an aggregation of an observed
I–O where the original observed I–O could be used as the “true” benchmark. This
is outside the scope of this section because an unknown electricity-detailed matrix
motivates this particular work. Instead of replacing existing formulations, this work
builds on the previous work in this ﬁeld and demonstrates the ﬂexibility of the
constrained optimization form of CE in situations where the data type and application
preclude the more traditionally cited approaches for estimating matrix elements.
Beyond this extension, this paper implicitly advocates for the use of formulations
which are designed for the speciﬁc problem at hand; the gains can be considerable, as
demonstrated by the electricity disaggregation example. The formulation described in
this paper could be applied seamlessly to other matrix estimation problems involving
unknown column sums or where column sums have been previously constructed from
simple summation. Ultimately, the preferred disaggregation method is inseparable
from both the data available and the intended research objective.
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CHAPTER 3. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MATRIX BALANCING AND
MODELING

The previous chapter discussed an improved matrix balancing method for the
case where the component costs (i.e. levelized cost of electricity) are deemed more
important than the total column sums.

The method relaxes the total column

constraint which improves the closeness of the balanced data to the original bottom-up
data.
This chapter shows that the choice of database reconciliation methodology has a
signiﬁcant impact on modeling results. Four commonly used disaggregation methods
are compared: i) an pro rata method used by Marriott (2007), Lindner et al. (2013),
and Arora and Cai (2014), ii) minimum sum of column cross-entropy (MSCCE)
(Golan et al., 1994; Robinson et al., 2001), iii) RAS (e.g. Lahr and De Mesnard
(2004)), and iv) SPCE described above. The experiments use identical bottom-up
data to create diﬀerent balanced matrices and are then taken as input to a simple
partial equilibrium (PE) model which allows us to analytically trace how diﬀerent
disaggregation methods impact modeling results.
The modeling analysis focuses on three contemporary economic shocks. The ﬁrst
is a technology-speciﬁc capital subsidy (e.g. an investment tax credit). This is useful
since it will highlight the value of preserving the cost structure in the sub-sectors. The
second example involves a shock to the price of natural gas (e.g. a result of the US
shale gas boom). Finally, a sector-wide capital tax (e.g. removal of a sector-wide tax
credit) is considered. This experiment illustrates the importance of preserving row
shares in the reconciled database. Model results are shown to be highly dependent
on the balancing methods used to construct a CGE database and ﬂow directly from
the mathematical features of the algorithms.
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In current practice, the database construction methods used in IAMs are, at
best, not adequately documented.

This point will only increase in importance

with the increasing demand for more highly resolved analysis of critical sectors in
IAMs. The results shown in this article advocate for greater introspection at the
database-modeling nexus. More broadly, the results should redirect attention back to
the validation of new and innovative CGE and IAM extensions. Finally, the results
provide evidence that the appropriate selection of matrix balancing methods can
reduce the overall deviation between bottom-up and top-down modeling.

3.1 Some Matrix Balancing Methods
The methods for disaggregation fall into two broad categories: ad hoc and
constrained optimization. Ad-hoc methods employ straightforward algebraic rules
to allocate the aggregate values across the diﬀerent technologies.

Constrained

optimization methods minimize a speciﬁc distance metric with respect to important
economic relationships, such as: i) cost structure (i.e. the share of an input cost
in total production cost of a sub-sector, cit ) and ii) relative contributions to input
demand from the sub-sectors, rit .
Constrained optimization methods deﬁne the “closeness” metric explicitly via
the objective function - seeking to ﬁnd a new matrix X which satisﬁes the column
and/or row totals while coming as close as possible to the original column and/or row
shares. Ad hoc methods target these shares implicitly. The most relevant constrained
optimization methods minimize entropy distance: i) MSCCE ii) RAS, and iii) SPCE.1
The most popular ad hoc method, and thus the one explored here, allocates value
in the matrix based on row share alone. This is also termed a pro rata distribution
method and can also be produced by removing the column constraint in the RAS
formulation (Temurshoev, 2012). Other ad hoc methods may be equally prevalent,
1

In addition to entropy methods, Temurshoev et al. (2011) studies a number of alternate measures of
deviation. For consistency and clarity in comparison we only study cross-entropy based objectives.
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but are rarely publicly documented. Henceforth, ad hoc methods are synonymous
with the pro rata distribution.

3.1.1 Pro Rata Distribution
Despite the ubiquity of well-studied matrix balancing methods, ad hoc approaches
remain very popular in practice. The most prevalent of these is the pro rata-based
allocation (Marriott, 2007; Lindner et al., 2013; Arora and Cai, 2014). Here, the
matrix A is comprised of the implied value from the bottom-up, engineering-level
data (L0 and Q0 ) described in Section 2.1 and U is the input employment in the
original aggregate sector. The pro rata method allocates the original input value in
the aggregate sector by the following equation:
xit =

ait
· ui
ai•

(3.1)

or equivalently, to demonstrate the uni-proportionality:
xit = rit0 · ui

(3.2)

Of course, this is a simpliﬁcation of the pro rata-based methods used by Marriott
(2007), Lindner et al. (2013), and Arora and Cai (2014). Their disaggregations include
more detailed inputs than the illustrative ones presented here. Basic assumptions on
fuel inputs (e.g. coal to coal-ﬁred power) and even more detailed assumptions on other
inputs (e.g. water transport is exclusive to coal-ﬁred power and pipeline transport
is split between gas and oil power) are easily made. However, the general intuition
is the same: row share-based allocation in the cases where no exact assumption of
values on X can be made. Two key points are: i) cost structure is not speciﬁcally
considered in the pro rata method and ii) there can be no total cost or any other
informational constraint.

These can be readily implemented in the context of

constrained optimization methods to follow.
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3.1.2 Minimum Sum of Column Cross-Entropy (MSCCE)
The minimum sum of column cross-entropy (MSCCE), as proposed by Golan et al.
(1994) and extended by Robinson et al. (2001), focuses on cost structure, but does
not speciﬁcally focus on row shares. The constrained optimization problem, in its
most simpliﬁed form, is as follows:
min



cit

cit · ln

t

i

cit
c0it

(3.3)

subject to:


cit · vt = ui

(3.4)

t



cit = 1

(3.5)

0 ≤ cit ≤ 1

(3.6)

t

where c0it is the original cost structure implied by A and where ui and vt are the given
row and column sums, respectively, which ensure consistency with the top-down data.
The optimal cit result can be readily be transformed to xit by multiplying them by
the value of output for a given technology.
A key weakness of MSCCE is that the ordering of relative input intensities between
technologies (i.e. row shares) is not always preserved (McDougall, 1999). This can
have adverse consequences for economic modeling, as detailed in Section 2.4.

3.1.3 RAS
The biproportionate adjustment (RAS) method attempts to preserve both
economic relationships (i.e. cost structure and row share) by targeting the elements
of matrix A, speciﬁcally. RAS is not always treated as a constrained optimization
problem, but can be formulated with Equations 2.14, 2.11, 2.12.
This reﬂects a “true” cross-entropy formulation and is related to MSCCE as a
weighted sum of column cross-entropy. While the divergence between X and A
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may be greater than in MSCCE, the basic RAS solution preserves the ordering of
input intensity (McDougall, 1999). Robinson et al. (2001) acknowledge that the RAS
approach may be better suited to cases where both cost structure and row shares are
important, as is generally the case for CGEs and IAMs.

3.1.4 Share Preserving Cross-Entropy
The MSCCE and RAS approaches both require column sum constraints (Eq.
2.11 and Eq. 2.12, respectively), whereas the pro rata approach has none. These
constraints ensure a ﬁt to an observed total cost for each sub-sector when such
an observation exists.

When data on the total cost associated with individual

technologies does not exist, or where targeting relationships rather than totals is
judged to be of more importance, the column sum constraint may unnecessarily
restrict the problem (Peters and Hertel, 2015b). One convenient comparative feature
for this exercise is that the result collapses to RAS when the column constraint
is included. Recall, the formulation can be given by Equations 2.17 and 2.11 and
explicitly balances both cost structure, cit , and row share, rit . This formulation is
easily compared with both the pro rata and constrained optimization approaches
because SPCE does not require any assumption on total cost for the sub-sectors.

3.2 Comparison of Construction Methods
In summary, there are two primary considerations when selecting a matrix
balancing method: i) an objective which seeks to preserve important economic
relationships (i.e. row share and/or cost structure) and ii) required constraints (i.e.
total input employment (row) and/or total cost (column) constraints). Here, the
required constraints are independent of additional informational constraints and refer
only to requirements of the method itself. Table 3.1 shows how MSCCE, RAS, SPCE,
and the pro rata approach ﬁt into these categories.
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Table 3.1.: Mathematical considerations for comparing matrix balancing methods
Consideration

MSCCE

RAS

SPCE

Pro rata

-

Row share

Row share

Row share

Cost structure

Cost structure

Cost structure

-

Total row

Total row

Total row

Total row

Total column

Total column

-

-

Objective
Required
Constraints

Because of the interdependent relationships between the objective, the constraints,
and disparities in data sources, it is diﬃcult to reach general conclusions about an
algorithm’s usefulness. However, some expectations from this investigation can be
formed (all of which assume no additional informational constraints and required
constraints are the identical if required).
If the total cost constraint values for RAS are the same as those implied by the
pro rata method, then the RAS result is equivalent to the pro rata result. However,
it is worth noting that, despite this equivalence, both the RAS and SPCE allow for
additional information via the constraint set. Also, as mentioned before, it is not
necessary, but a total cost constraint can be imposed on SPCE. If the optional total
cost constraint on SPCE is the same as the required constraint on RAS, the two
methods are equivalent.
The objective function determines whether the balancing method preserves row
share, cost structure, or both. The MSCCE objective considers only cost structure
while sacriﬁcing row share, and the pro rata method considers only row share, while
neglecting cost structure. The RAS and SPCE objectives attempt to preserve both,
but in doing so sacriﬁce both (although likely to a lesser degree than MSCCE and
pro rata).
Required constraints may prevent an algorithm from preserving economic
relationships. The row total constraint is required in all cases for CGE consistency;
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however, the total cost constraint can be relaxed.2 MSCCE and RAS require total
cost constraints; pro rata and SPCE do not. Imposing total cost constraints may
prevent the algorithm from preserving the cost structure objective because the total
cost is not ﬂexible to preserve the economic relationship of the individual elements.
The row constraints impact the overall possible “closeness” of the balanced top-down
data to the unbalanced bottom-up data. These constraints increasingly prevent
preserving economic relationships as the constraints become increasingly restrictive
(i.e. increasing disparity between bottom-up and top-down data).
Assuming no additional constraints beyond those required, the objective and
constraints imply a certain ordering of how well each algorithm preserves both row
share and cost structure. Here, ordering is only relevant when viewing the entirety
of the matrix; ordering may not hold for individual elements. First, the pro rata
methodology perfectly preserves row share while MSCCE makes no consideration
whatsoever of the row shares. Therefore, SPCE and RAS lie somewhere in between.
Second, SPCE will preserve cost structure better than the pro rata method, given
that SPCE explicitly considers this in the objective function. Also, MSCCE should
perform better than RAS with respect to cost shares, since there is no trade-oﬀ
with preserving row share. These expectations are summarized later, along with the
numerical results in the following sections, in Figure 3.4.

3.3 Disaggregated Matrices and Numerical Comparison
As

mentioned

previously,

many

researchers

attempt

to

disaggregate

CGE-consistent databases using detailed economic or technological data.

If

the bottom-up technical data and the aggregate economic data match perfectly, the
balancing problem is moot; however, in practice the two data sources invariably
diﬀer, sometimes by a large margin.

For example, the top-down GTAP data

estimates less capital, coal, and gas employment and more O&M employment in
2

The total row constraint also constrains the total value in the balanced database to the original
value in the top-down data (i.e. the sum of row constraints equals the original total sector value).
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the total electricity sector than the unbalanced matrix assembled directly from the
bottom-up data, A (Table 2.3). Therefore, the ensuing diﬀerences between the
matrix balancing algorithm results can be attributed to both the balancing method
(the focus of this work) and the magnitude of discrepancy between the bottom-up
data and the top-down economic data.
In this section, pro rata, MSCCE, RAS, and SPCE-based disaggregations are
constructed for the 129 GTAPv8 regions using the type of data outlined in Section 2.1
(i.e. annual GWh production and levelized costs ﬁt to the GTAP input employment
data). Table 3.2 shows the results for the United States for each balancing method,
and Table 3.3 shows the average deviation (in absolute value) from the bottom-up
data for each matrix balancing method - again for the United States.
The disaggregated electricity sectors for the United States (Table 3.2) show three
main points. First, the unbalanced, bottom-up matrix, A, has diﬀerent total input
employment values in the sector (row totals shown in Table 3.2) than the balanced
matrices, all of which conform to the top-down data. However, as discussed in Section
2.3, the input employment for the balanced matrices must match that of the original
electricity sector in the GTAP data. This is a major source of deviations shown in
Table 3.3.
Second, expanding on the previous point, the total input employment of fuels
from the bottom-up and top-down do not match. The fuel inputs are speciﬁc to a
technology (i.e. coal to coal power, gas to gas power, and oil to oil power). This drives
some of the deviations for the methods which attempt to preserve the cost structure
of the technology because the fuel input value is inﬂexible.
Third, both MSCCE and RAS require a total cost constraint for each of the
disaggregated technologies and are constrained to match the values in implied in A.
However, the pro rata and SPCE methods do not require such a constraint and, in
some cases, deviate greatly from the bottom-up data. This is especially true for the
gas sector, a fuel-intensive technology, where the total costs of the sector are much
lower for the unconstrained methods (pro rata and SPCE). SPCE has ﬂexibility to
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Table 3.2.: Disaggregated electricity sector for the United States using diﬀerent approaches
(A, pro rata, MSCCE, RAS, and SPCE) in 2007 US$
A
Nuclear

Coal

Gas

Oil

Hydro

Wind

Solar

Total

Capital

33,985

61,938

9,744

1,313

33,091

3,103

504

143,679

O&M

16,487

27,782

5,816

2,642

4,936

855

43

58,560

Coal

0

63,625

0

0

0

0

0

63,625

Gas

0

0

84,065

0

0

0

0

84,065

Oil

0

0

0

24,823

0

0

0

24,823

50,472

153,345

99,626

28,778

38,027

3,958

546

Total

Pro rata
Nuclear

Coal

Gas

Oil

Hydro

Wind

Solar

Total

Capital

28,137

51,280

8,067

1,087

27,397

2,569

417

118,955

O&M

39,869

67,185

14,066

6,390

11,936

2,067

103

141,615

Coal

0

42,782

0

0

0

0

0

42,782

Gas

0

0

47,288

0

0

0

0

47,288

Oil

0

0

0

24,111

0

0

0

24,111

68,007

161,247

69,422

31,588

39,333

4,636

520

Total

MSCCE
Nuclear

Coal

Gas

Oil

Hydro

Wind

Solar

Total

Capital

32,641

32,447

8,901

1,350

39,017

3,949

649

118,955

O&M

32,388

83,151

11,147

3,746

9,978

1,150

55

141,615

Coal

0

42,782

0

0

0

0

0

42,782

Gas

0

0

47,288

0

0

0

0

47,288

Oil

0

0

0

24,111

0

0

0

24,111

65,029

158,380

67,337

29,207

48,995

5,100

704

Total

RAS

Capital

Nuclear

Coal

Gas

Oil

Hydro

Wind

Solar

Total

25,991

48,392

7,039

705

33,517

2,753

558

118,955

continued on next page
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Table 3.2.: continued
O&M

39,038

67,206

13,009

4,391

15,478

2,347

146

141,615

Coal

0

42,782

0

0

0

0

0

42,782

Gas

0

0

47,288

0

0

0

0

47,288

Oil

0

0

0

24,111

0

0

0

24,111

65,029

158,380

67,337

29,207

48,995

51,00

704

Total

SPCE
Nuclear

Coal

Gas

Oil

Hydro

Wind

Solar

Total

Capital

25,991

48,392

7,039

705

33,517

2,753

558

118,955

O&M

39,038

67,206

13,009

4,391

154,78

2347

146

141,615

Coal

0

42,782

0

0

0

0

0

42,782

Gas

0

0

47,288

0

0

0

0

47,288

Oil

0

0

0

24,111

0

0

0

24,111

65,029

158,380

67,337

29,207

48,995

5,100

704

Total
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Table 3.3.: Percentage deviation (mean absolute percentage deviation across inputs
and technologies) between the economic relationships before, A, and after balancing
for the United States. Ordering in parentheses.
Cost structure deviation

Row share deviation

Cell deviation

0

0

0

Pro rata

0.344 (4)

0 (1)

0.341 (3)

MSCCE

0.201 (1 )

0.129 (4)

0.232 (1)

RAS

0.336 (3)

0.072 (3)

0.378 (4)

SPCE

0.315 (2)

0.044 (2)

0.326 (2)

A

preserve the cost structure where the value of gas input implied by the bottom-up
data is higher than the gas input value in the GTAP data. Table 3.3 shows the mean
absolute percentage deviations (Butterﬁeld and Mules, 1980) from cost structure and
row share for the diﬀerent methods.
The ordering of mean absolute percentage deviation between the bottom-up data
and the data after balancing is consistent with the expectations outlined previously.
MSCCE dominates RAS and SPCE, which in turn dominate pro rata in cost structure
preservation. The pro rata method perfectly preserves row share and both RAS and
SPCE dominate MSCCE on this metric. Also as expected, SPCE outperforms RAS in
both cases, because SPCE does not require a possibly restrictive total cost constraint.
The pro rata and SPCE methods may outperform the MSCCE and RAS methods
in either economic relationship if the total cost constraint is highly restrictive. As
McDougall (1999) suggests, MSCCE generally preserves the original cell values better
than the others.
The ordering shown for the United States in Table 3.3 generally holds for all 129
regions. Figure 3.1 shows percentage error for each region (averaged across inputs
and technologies, in absolute values) between the cost structure (Figure 3.1a) and
row shares (Figure 3.1b) in the balanced data and those implied by the bottom-up
data for each method.
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(a) Cost structure
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Figure 3.1.: Histograms of percentage deviation between bottom-up and balanced
data in each region for both cost structure (a) and row share (b) - where deviation
is the absolute percentage deviation averaged across inputs and technologies in each
region.

The results across the 129 regions show numerically that the deviation between
row share, rit and rit0 , are generally ordered from least to greatest deviation as follows:
pro rata (zero by deﬁnition), SPCE, RAS, MSCCE. The ordering for the deviation
between cost structures, cit and c0it , is somewhat reversed: MSCEE, SPCE, RAS,
followed by pro rata. This ordering is not necessarily identical in each region, but
indicates a general tendency that is again consistent with the expectation from the
mathematical structure of the matrix balancing methods.
The speciﬁc example of the United States shows what the deviation between the
bottom-up data and balanced data might look like in terms of values and magnitude
of deviation. The ordering of the dominance between balancing methods across the
129 regions in GTAP shows that these results are consistent with the expectations
from the mathematics of the methods.
The next section demonstrates how these deviations manifest in the ensuing
economic analysis based on these diverse databases. It illustrates the importance
of preserving both the cost and row share economic relationships in order to ensure
the model results using balanced data are as consistent as possible with the model
results using bottom-up data. The shocks chosen for the simulations represent the
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type of technological (e.g. shale gas extraction) and policy shocks (e.g. investment
tax credits) prevalent in the electric power sector and commonly investigated using
IAMs.

3.4 Economic Implications of Alternative Database Construction Methods
This section explores common energy and environmental-related shocks in the
context of a model which is broadly representative of those employed in IAMs,
but tractable enough to follow how economic relationships in a database map to
modeling results. Therefore, a simple partial equilibrium (PE) representation of the
electricity sector is presented in this section. It is for illustration only and is not
an adequate representation of the electricity sector for use in a full-blown IAM, nor
is it representative of the current state of electricity research.3 Rather this model is
designed to clearly identify where and how diﬀerences in cost structure and row shares
evidence themselves in modeling results for the electric power sector. The simple
model implemented here assumes there is no trade in electricity, so the equations
can be written for each region separately. Therefore, the regional index is dropped
for clarity and conciseness without loss in generality. The simulations focus on the
United States because of the availability of quality bottom-up data, but could be
readily extended to other regions.
The model is represented in linearized form in order to highlight the role of key
economic relationships, including key row and column shares. The ‘hat’ notation in
Figure 3.2 refers to percentage changes in the associated levels variables. It is solved
as a non-linear, initial value problem using the GEMPACK software suite (Harrison
et al., 2014). The price responsiveness of electricity demand is represented via a single,
aggregate demand elasticity, μ (Eq. PE1), which aggregates the demand responses of
retail, commercial and industrial activities. The electricity sector production process
3

There are numerous studies on the electricity sector using partial equilibrium analysis which capture
a vast quantity of engineering-economic interactions. The purpose here is to precisely show the
interaction between the balancing methods and model results, rather than the precise sectoral
interactions.
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is characterized by a quantity-preserving constant elasticity of substitution (QCES)
production function which aggregates power generated from diﬀerent technologies
based on the CES parameter, σ, which yields a set of derived demands for electricity
produced from speciﬁc technologies (Eq. PE3). Each individual power generating
technology demands fuel, O&M and capital in ﬁxed proportion to generation (i.e.
Leontief production) (Eq. PE5).
Prices for electricity produced by each technology and the aggregate electricity
good are assumed to cover costs, leaving no excess economic proﬁts (Eq. PE4 and
Eq. PE2, respectively) which is consistent with average cost pricing in a regulated
market. Exogenous price shocks enter into the model by shifting the supply price of
the input to electricity generation (Eq. PE6). The supply of inputs to the generating
technologies is assumed to be perfectly elastic in this simple model (Eq. PE7).
This simple framework is used to demonstrate the eﬀect which diﬀerent supply
shocks, 
tit , have on the model economy. Again, the bottom-up data and the PE
model (Eq. PE1–PE8) are identical across the experiments. Therefore, all variation
in results comes from the balancing method.

3.4.1 Simulation to Highlight the Role of Cost Structure in Modeling
Cost structure preservation comes into play when there is a shock to a particular
input to a particular technology (e.g. investment tax credit for a certain technology,
fuel price). In order to show the importance of preserving cost structure within each
individual technology, a price shock is applied to only one sector. Table 3.4 shows the
capital intensity of each generating technology in the bottom-up data (A) and after
balancing using each method described above. The capital share in the cost structure
of gas power is highlighted with a dashed box. The ﬁrst simulation applies a -30%
shock to the cost of capital for gas-ﬁred power only (
ti,Gas = −30).4
4

This serves as the most straightforward example; a more relevant example in the context of IAM
is presented subsequently (i.e. a negative price shock to gas as result of the shale gas extraction
technology).
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Table 3.4.: Capital intensity in the cost structure of technologies after matrix
balancing procedures for the United States (sVk,t )
sV
k,t
Technology

A

Pro rata

MSCCE

RAS

SPCE

0.673

0.414

0.502

0.400

0.416

Coal

0.404

0.318

0.205

0.306

0.316

Gas

0.098

0.116

0.132

0.105

0.096

Oil

0.046

0.034

0.046

0.024

0.034

Hydro

0.870

0.697

0.796

0.684

0.699

Wind

0.784

0.554

0.774

0.540

0.557

Solar

0.922

0.802

0.921

0.792

0.803

Nuclear

62
Production Nest

Description
Final electricity demand

No.
(PE1)

Final electricity price – zero profit,
average cost pricing

(PE2)

ෝ ௧ ൌ ݁ݍ
ෞ௧ െ ݁
ݐݍ
ෞ െ ߪ ή ሺݐ
ෞሻ

CES derived demand for individual
technologies

(PE3)


ෞ௧ ൌ  ݏǡ௧
ݐ
ή ݏ
ෞǡ௧

Price of generating technology – zero
profit, average cost pricing

(PE4)

Equation
݁ݍ
ෞ ൌ ߤ ή ݁
ෞ

݁ݍ
ෞ

ொ

݁
ෞ ൌ  ݏ௧ ή ෞ
ݐ௧

ߪ

ݍොଵ

ݍොǥ

௧

ݍො்



ෝ௧
ݍොǡ௧ ൌ ݐݍ

Leontief derived demand for inputs
Supply price for generating
ݏ
ෞǡ௧ ൌ Ƹǡ௧  ݐƸǡ௧
technology
Ƹǡ௧ ൌ Ͳ
Infinite factor supply elasticity
Total input employment in electricity
ݍ
ෞ  ൌ  ݍොǡ௧
sector
௧
The hat accent designates a variable measured in percent change.
݁ݍ
ෞ is the percent change in total electricity production.
݁
ෞ is the percent change in price of electricity.
μ is the elasticity of demand for total electricity.
ொ
ݏ௧ is the quantity share of production from technology t in the electricity sector.
ෞ௧ is the percent change in price of electricity from technology t.
ݐ
ෝ ௧ is the percent change in GWh production from technology t.
ݐݍ
σ is the quantity-preserving CES parameter.

ݏǡ௧
is the value share of input i in technology t.
ݏ
ෞǡ௧ reflects the supply price for input i faced by technology t.
ݍොǡ௧ is the percent change in input i used in technology t.
Ƹǡ௧ is the percent change in price for input i for use in technology t.
Ƹ is an exogenous shock to price.
ݐǡ௧
ݍ
ෞ  is the total employment of input i in the electricity sector.
ݍොଵǡ௧

ݍොǤǤǡ௧

ݍොூǡ௧

(PE5)
(PE6)
(PE7)
(PE8)

Figure 3.2.: Production structure for the simple PE model of the representative
electricity sector
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MSCCE is generally closer than the other methods to the capital share values
implied by the bottom-up data with the exception of gas power and coal power where
the deviation is comparatively large. This raises questions regarding the MSCCE
method’s ability to preserve cost structure despite (and probably a result of) focusing
only on this in the objective.
Focusing on gas power, both the capital cost share in the RAS and SPCE
approaches are closer to the bottom-up data than the pro rata approach because
the pro rata method has no speciﬁc objective to preserve cost structure. The SPCE
approach outperforms the RAS in this case because SPCE does not require a total
cost constraint which allows additional ﬂexibility to conform to the bottom-up data.
Table 3.5 shows that the results ﬂow directly from the deviations from the
bottom-up data. The pro rata, MSCCE, and RAS methods overestimate capital
intensity (sVk,gas ) in the gas power sector, thereby overestimating the price of gas power
 gas ) in Eq. PE4 and overestimating production changes (qt
 t ) for all technologies
(pt
in Eq. PE3, while the SPCE underestimates only slightly.
Table 3.5.: Targeted technology policy: a -30% shock to the price of capital for gas
power in the United States
 t)
Percent change in production (GWh) by technology (qt
Technology

A

Pro rata

MSCCE

RAS

SPCE

Nuclear

-3.317

-3.957

-4.517

-3.550

-3.254

Coal

-3.317

-3.957

-4.517

-3.550

-3.254

Gas

13.017

15.531

17.730

13.934

12.770

Oil

-3.317

-3.957

-4.517

-3.550

-3.254

Hydro

-3.317

-3.957

-4.517

-3.550

-3.254

Wind

-3.317

-3.957

-4.517

-3.550

-3.254

Solar

-3.317

-3.957

-4.517

-3.505

-3.254

These results can be attributed to the deviation for this particular cell, (sVk,gas ) of
the balanced matrices. The results may not deviate for shocks to other cells; however
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the implication is the same: deviations should be minimized for each cell in the matrix
balancing method.
The shock to the price of capital in gas power in the United States is shown because
the connection from cost structure to model results is transparent and tractable.
However, the price of capital for gas is not terribly relevant in the context of energy,
electricity, climate, and other policies that IAMs have proven useful for - although a
similar shock on diﬀerent sector might be more relevant (e.g. investment tax credit
for renewables). Therefore, another relevant example is the glut of gas in the United
States due to shale oil and gas extraction technology. Wellhead gas prices in the
United States dropped roughly 67% from 2007 to 2012. If natural gas export terminals
are constructed, then the rest of the world may also enjoy lower gas prices. A 40%
decrease in gas price is applied to each of the 129 regions in the GTAP database
(
tgas,gas,r = −40). Figure 3.3 shows a frequency chart of the absolute percentage
deviation of each matrix balancing method result as compared to the bottom-up data
(A).5
The MSCCE and RAS results are identical because the share of fuel in gas power
is given by the employment of gas in the total electricity sector and the total cost
is constrained. The total cost is ﬂexible for the pro rata and SPCE methods, so
the fuel shares may diﬀer. The results clearly demonstrate that the SPCE, RAS,
and MSCCE, which consider cost structure in their objectives, dominate the pro rata
method, which does not. However, it is diﬃcult to discern any dominance between the
SPCE, RAS, and MSCCE methods. The average across technologies of the absolute
percentage deviations for each balancing method are 22.83% for ad-hoc, 19.66% for
RAS and MSCCE, and 18.47% for SPCE. The same results (i.e. SPCE, RAS, and
MSCCE dominating ad-hoc) are found in other simulations, such as a capital subsidy
for solar and wind power and a simple carbon-based tax on coal power and gas power,
5

Due to the simple nature of the PE model, the magnitude of the price shock does not have any
signiﬁcant impact on the percentage deviations between the balanced and bottom-up data (e.g.
Figure 3.3). That is, the frequency chart looks almost identical regardless of the magnitude of the
price shock applied in each region (regions are independent from one another).
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Figure 3.3.: Histogram of absolute percentage deviation from bottom-up model results
and balanced data model results from a -40% shock to the price of gas in each of the
129 GTAP regions.
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but to varying magnitudes. The general conclusion is that pro rata model results are
less consistent with the bottom-up data model results than methods which explicitly
preserve cost structure.

3.4.2 Simulation to Highlight the Role of Row Shares
Row share preservation primarily applies to a shock to an input shared by multiple
technologies (e.g. investment tax credit across multiple technologies, labor taxes).
Recall that Table 3.4 shows that MSCCE deviates from the bottom-up data for cost
structure of capital in gas power and coal power. Another way to see this discrepancy
for gas power and coal power is by capital employment across technologies (row share)
in Table 3.6 below.
Table 3.6.: Capital employment across technologies (i.e. row share) after matrix
balancing procedures for the United States
Share of total capital employment in electricity sector
Technology

A

Pro rata MSCCE

RAS

SPCE

Nuclear

0.237

0.237

0.274

0.218

0.286

Coal

0.431

0.431

0.273

0.407

0.413

Gas

0.068

0.068

0.075

0.059

0.052

Oil

0.009

0.009

0.011

0.006

0.009

Hydro

0.230

0.230

0.328

0.282

0.215

Wind

0.022

0.022

0.033

0.023

0.023

Solar

0.004

0.004

0.005

0.005

0.003

Total

1

1

1

1

1

As expected, the pro rata method perfectly preserves the row share relationship.
RAS and SPCE deviations are relatively similar which indicates the total cost
constraint in RAS may not be overly restrictive in this particular case. Here, MSCCE
shows a switch of ordering in row share between nuclear and coal power (shown in
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bold in Table 3.6). A numerical simulation of a capital tax across all technologies
is provided in Table 3.7 by implementing a uniform capital price shock of 10% (
tit ).
A capital price shock is representative of a tax or subsidy on electricity generation
investment. Investment tax credits for renewable generation is a widely used policy
tool to promote renewable energy and crowd-out investment in carbon-intensive
generation. Here the policy is applied to all generation types to make the connection
between matrix balancing and model results clear and tractable.
Table 3.7.: Shared input policy simulation: 10% shock to the price of capital in the
United States electricity sector
 t)
Percent change in production (GWh) by technology (qt
Technology

A

Pro rata

MSCCE

RAS

SPCE

Nuclear

-13.607

-5.885

-11.3

-5.779

-6.231

Coal

-0.951

-1.298

2.882

-1.266

-1.417

Gas

14.476

8.730

6.511

8.723

9.511

Oil

17.217

12.933

10.886

12.854

12.683

Hydro

-22.307

-18.800

-24.318

-18.772

-19.107

Wind

-18.557

-12.419

-23.384

-12.300

-12.755

Solar

-24.517

-23.362

-29.535

-23.464

-23.638

The positive price shock, 
tit , increases, ps
 it (Eq. PE6). The ensuing impact of
 t depends on the input share sVit (Eq. PE4) which is where the diﬀerences
ps
 it on pt
in matrix balancing method enter the model. The matrix balancing methods aﬀect
 t , via the substitution between technologies base on relative
the result of interest, qt
 t (Eq. PE3).
cost of technology, pt
The results indicate that the large deviation in row share for coal power using
the MSCCE method is translated directly to the deviation in model results. The
direction of change is opposite those implied by the bottom-up data. The major
implication is that, in the case of a uniform input price shock (e.g. tax break for capital
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investment for renewable power) with substitutability between sectors, MSCCE can
lead to opposite interpretations of model results even with the simplest of models.

3.5 Discussion
Divergent results from bottom-up and top-down modeling are well-known (Grubb
et al., 1993), and there is constructive research regarding the relative merits and
reducing divergence between both approaches (e.g. Böhringer (1998); McFarland
et al. (2004)). The important takeaways here pertain to the reasons the results of
diﬀerent top-down models might diverge even in the case of identical bottom-up
data. The divergence is the result of two primary factors: i) disparate bottom-up and
top-down data and ii) the preservation of economic relationships (i.e. row share and
cost structure) after the matrix balancing method which ﬁts the bottom-up data to
the top-down data. Of primary interest to this study are the discrepancies caused by
the matrix balancing methods.

3.5.1 Disparate Bottom-Up and Top-Down Data
Moving to a CGE/IAM framework requires that the engineering data conforms to
data on the circular ﬂow of the economy, which are important in certain analyses. For
example, Hazilla and Kopp (1990) and Bergman (1991) conclude general equilibrium
impacts, such as input prices, output prices, and allocation of resources in the
economy, can be “signiﬁcant and pervasive” in the context of environmental policy.
Unfortunately, the two data sources tend to diﬀer, sometimes by large margins. The
bottom-up data is constructed from levelized (i.e. annualized) costs of electricity by
technology and total production while the top-down data is constructed by targeting
prices of electricity, cost structure, and production data (where available) in GTAPv8.
The sources and type of data are disparate.
For example, Table 2.3 shows that the share of O&M is much higher in the
top-down database which draws cost away from capital and fuels. Still, in moving to a
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CGE model, the balanced database must conform to the values in the top-down data
via the total input employment constraint in the balancing methods described above.
The constraint contributes to a large portion of the diﬀerence between the results,
but is none-the-less necessary to move toward a CGE model which may be a more
holistic representation of the economy as compared to the bottom-up representation.

3.5.2 Preserving Cost Structure and Row Share
Section 3.4.1 simulated a technology-speciﬁc capital price shock and a shock to
the price of gas. These simulations demonstrate that preserving the cost structure for
individual technologies can be important. The pro rata model does not speciﬁcally
consider cost structure; inputs are allocated solely based on row share. The RAS
and SPCE approaches, which speciﬁcally consider cost structure along with row
share, conform closer to the bottom-up data and, therefore, the bottom-up model
predictions. It is worth noting that the MSCCE may have large cost structure
deviations for some technologies (e.g. coal-ﬁred power in Table 3.4) which may be
unattractive for policies targeting these technologies.
Section 3.4.2 simulated an electricity sector-wide shock to the price of capital.
The MSCCE method implied an opposite result for one of the technologies. This
can be attributed to the absence of consideration of the row share relationship in
the MSCCE objective function. MSCCE does not speciﬁcally preserve row share, so
when a shock is applied which pertains to relative input employment between sectors
an opposite result may occur. Even if the result does not turn out to be opposite, it
is still less convincing after observing this simulation.

3.5.3 Selecting an Appropriate Matrix Balancing Method
The decision on which matrix balancing method is most appropriate for the
research task at hand depends on several factors and is highly case-speciﬁc. The
initial decision is whether to include a total cost constraint. This depends on the
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available bottom-up data and will drive the selection of matrix balancing method.
Figure 3.4 summarizes the insights from the mathematical structure discussed in
Section 3.2 which then tie this to the modeling results from Section 3.4, and charts
the path to selecting an appropriate matrix balancing method for CGE and IAMs
(Figure 3.5).
If there are no data on input costs to technologies, then total cost may be the only
way to diﬀerentiate sectors. Also, if the researcher wishes only to shock the outputs of
the new sectors (e.g. subsidy on renewable technologies) rather than the input prices
in the new sectors, perhaps total cost might be preserved while sacriﬁcing some of
the component cost detail. In this case, where a total cost constraint is desired,
SPCE and RAS are equivalent. A total cost constraint cannot be imposed on the pro
rata method, thereby rendering it impotent for this particular information set. The
numerical simulations of the RAS/SPCE and MSCCE methods show that there is no
clear dominance in method in the cost structure case. That is, RAS/SPCE performs
better for some sectors while MSCCE performs better for others (Table 3.4). However,
RAS/SPCE performs much better in the case of the row share relevant simulations
(Table 3.6) which implies that the SPCE/RAS might be the best selection when both
relationships are relevant.
Alternatively, if technology speciﬁc input costs are available in the bottom-up
data (e.g. levelized costs as is the case here) and the researcher wishes to shock input
prices in the new sectors, the restrictive total cost constraint can be removed. In this
case the applicable methods are the pro rata and the SPCE approach, because the
basic MSCCE and RAS approaches require a total cost constraint. The mathematical
properties imply and the numerical simulations show that SPCE performs better in
terms of model results in the case of preserving cost structure (Table 3.5 and Figure
3.3) while the pro rata performs marginally better in preserving row share (Table
3.6). On balance, the SPCE seems to outperform the pro rata method when both
relationships are important. It is also worth noting that pro rata methods are unable
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Equivalence
RAS = pro rata
E1
E2

SPCE = RAS

Cost structure preservation
SPCE > pro rata
C1
MSCCE > RAS
C2
C3

SPCE ~ MSCCE

Row share preservation
Pro rata > all others
R1
RAS and SPCE >
R2
MSCCE

- If total cost constraint for RAS is identical to total costs implied by pro
rata, then the two are equivalent.
- RAS still allows for information on total cost.
- If total cost constraint is added as information to SPCE, the two are
equivalent.
- SPCE considers cost structure in the objective.
- RAS sacrifices some cost structure preservation for row share.
- Individual elements may differ in ordering (e.g. RAS result may be closer
than the MSCCE for certain elements), but as a whole MSCCE > RAS.
- The level of restriction from the total constraint required by RAS and
MSCCE will determine ordering.
- Pro rata perfectly preserves row shares.
- MSCCE has no consideration of row shares.

Figure 3.4.: Considerations for selecting an appropriate matrix balancing method
– insights from algorithms. These only hold when no additional informational
constraints are present.

Total cost
constraint?

Restrictions and
equivalence

Cost structure
important?

Row share
important?

No

- RAS not possible
- MSCCE not possible
- SPCE = RAS (E2)
- pro rata not possible

- SPCE > pro rata (C1)

- pro rata > SPCE
(R1)
- RAS/SPCE >
MSCCE (R2)

Yes

- RAS/SPCE ~
MSCCE (E2, C3)

Both
relationships
important?
SPCE > all
RAS/SPCE > all

Figure 3.5.: Considerations for selecting an appropriate matrix balancing method Insights from modeling. The corresponding insight from the algorithm (Figure 3.4)
are in parentheses
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to leverage the vast research on incorporating additional information and reliability
of information in constrained optimization (Lahr and De Mesnard, 2004).
It is more than likely that both cost shares and row shares will eventually be of
importance in most CGE/IAM projects. While researchers may have a particular
shock or set of shocks in mind initially, the models are often subsequently used for
simulations for which it was not originally designed. Given this, the SPCE method
is the most ﬂexible method and preserves both economic relationships, thereby
providing results which are the most consistent with the original bottom-up data
over the largest set of shocks.

3.6 Conclusions and Broader impacts
Using a simple partial equilibrium model, the deviation between results with
bottom-up data and balanced data stem from two primary sources: i) diﬀerences
between the bottom-up and top-down data and ii) the matrix balancing methodology
used to conform the dataset when there are disparate data. If the database implied by
the bottom-up data match that of the top-down data, there is no need for the matrix
balancing method at all. Unfortunately, that is rarely, if ever, the case, and the data
balancing methods are necessary. This work shows that the modeling diﬀerences can
be quite large based on the selection of matrix balancing method which necessitates
close consideration, justiﬁcation, and documentation.
This section explored four matrix balancing methods which are commonly
employed to create a consistent CGE/IAM database and the implications each has
on economic modeling. Their mathematical constructions (i.e. the objective and
constraints) provide some insight into how they might perform in relation to two
important economic relationships (i.e. cost structure and row share). The analytical
investigation is supported by numerical examples in a simple disaggregation of the
electricity sector. Identical data is used for each method. The numerical results are
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generally consistent with their mathematical constructions regarding the economic
relationships.
Numerical simulations showed the relevance of these economic relationships
in modeling. The alternative balancing methods, despite identical original data,
diﬀered from the original bottom-up data results depending on their mathematical
constructions and ability to preserve the economic relationships. In these experiments
the original bottom-up data, partial equilibrium model, and simulations were control
variables. The matrix balancing methods directly drove the modeling results.
Selecting an appropriate matrix balancing method will help decrease the
divergence between bottom-up and top-down models. The SPCE method outperforms
the other methods both in ﬂexibility (i.e. it is the only method which can be used
with and without a total cost constraint) and where both economic relationships are
important, which is the most likely case.
The implications for large-scale CGE and IAM modeling are straightforward.
First, the best way to reduce deviation introduced by the matrix balancing methods
is to inform the top-down data with the bottom-up data, and vice versa. Second,
in cases of disparate bottom-up and top-down data, the balancing method matters.
Finally, the database construction eﬀorts, which includes the matrix balancing, should
be considered closely, justiﬁed, and documented. Moving forward data construction
elements of CGE and IAM modeling eﬀorts should be publicly documented with
data and methods posted online to promote continuous improvement at the
data-database-modeling nexus. This is an under-researched, but critical, aspect of
IAM research and critical to the long-run credibility of this important work.
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CHAPTER 4. CONSTRUCTING THE GTAP-POWER DATABASE

This work documents a tractable disaggregation methodology for the regional
electricity sectors in GTAPv9 database which leverages available data and various
matrix balancing techniques. The result is a transparent GTAP-Power database
where speciﬁc limitations and improvements in techniques can be identiﬁed by both
researchers and GTAP community members. The database will be published in
hopes of continuous improvement and greater consistency in the base data amongst
researchers modeling the electricity sector.
The GTAP-Power database is an extension of the GTAPv9 database in that it
includes all of the data included in the GTAPv9 database. Peters (2015) provides
corresponding data ﬁles and GAMS ﬁle ely disagg 2011.gms which performs the
GTAP-Power disaggregation for base year 2011.

4.1 Data
Recall the data used in the disaggregation for GTAP-Power are: i) electricity
production (in GWh) by fuel source (IEA, 2014, 2015; EIA, 2015), ii) total value
of inputs (in base year USD) to an aggregate electricity sector for each source (i.e.
domestic and import), and type (i.e. basic and tax) for base years 2004, 2007, and
2011 (Aguiar et al., 2012), and iii) levelized (i.e. annualized cost per GWh) capital,
operating and maintenance (O&M), fuel, and eﬀective tax costs of electricity for
select generating technologies and regions (IEA/NEA (2010); various sources). These
0
databases are represented as matrices Q0 , U0 , and L0 with elements qf0 , u0iab , and lct
,

respectively. These data are available over an addition index, r, which covers the 140
regions in the GTAPv9 database, but this index is dropped in most of the following
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notation because the regional disaggregations can be performed independently. The
super-script 0 identiﬁes these as original data sources.
The set f is the set of original technologies in the IEA database which are not
diﬀerentiated based on operational characteristics (i.e. base versus peak load). The
matrix, Q0 , with elements qf0 refers to the total electric output by each generating
technology in the IEA database for each region. The EIA database was used to help
ﬁll missed regions in IEA.
The set t consists of the disaggregated sectors, transmission and distribution
and all generating technologies. These are: transmission and distribution (‘T&D’),
seven base load technologies (‘NuclearBL’, ‘CoalBL’, ‘GasBL’, ‘HydroBL’, ‘OilBL’,
‘WindBL’, and ‘OtherBL’), and four peak load technologies (‘GasP’, ‘OilP’, ‘HydroP’,
and ‘SolarP’). The matrix, Qg , with elements qt is the expanded matrix with these
new sectors for the GTAP-Power database. Electricity produced by the transmission
and distribution sector is deﬁned as the total GWh produced in the region.
The matrix U0 with elements u0iab is an alternate representation of electricity
sector in the GTAPv9 database where i is the set of all input costs to production
(see Appendix A for listing), a is the set of sources (i.e. domestic or imported), and
the set b is the type of cost (i.e. basic or tax).1 The GTAP database, U0 , is used to
create constraints in the GTAP-Power disaggregation.
The matrix L0 represents the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) for each type, c
(i.e. investment, O&M, fuel, own-use, and eﬀective tax), for each new sector, t, and
region.
The technologies in the IEA (Q0 ) and IEA/NEA (L0 ) do not encompass all of
the technologies that are in the GTAP-Power database. The GTAP-Power database
includes splits of certain generating technologies into base and peak load technologies.
The intent of the split between base and peak load is two-fold. First, the total
generation data (Q0 ) comes in the form of fuel inputs (e.g. GWh generated from
natural gas); however, several diﬀerent technologies (e.g. combined-cycle, combustion
1

The national version of the GTAPv9 database is created using scripts from the SplitCom application
Horridge (2005). SplitCom takes the full database and creates NATIONAL and TRADE matrices.
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turbine, steam turbine) are used to turn the fuels into electricity. These technologies
have cost structures which must be diﬀerentiated, especially if the modeler wishes
to aggregate diﬀerent technologies.2 Second, connecting the data to modeling, base
and peak load are distinct types of generation. Without diﬀerentiating electricity
production by these operational considerations, a model can have a technology like
solar taking over the entire generation which is not realistic, at least in the current
electricity system (i.e. without storage for time arbitrage).
The GTAPv9 electricity sector data (U0 ) is derived in part from the IEA GWh
data. The IEA GWh data (Q0 ) is mapped to the GTAP regions. In the event where
levelized cost data (L0 ) is not available for either a technology or region, averages of
all available cost data are used. The accuracy of this assumption may raise eyebrows
at ﬁrst glance and is certainly debatable. However, considering there are only a
handful of suppliers for the electricity generating units worldwide, this assumption
may not be as limiting as expected in terms of both capital and O&M costs (at least
for new capacity). To derive levelized costs of own-use, the value of total own-use
in the electricity sector in each region comes directly from own-use in the original
GTAP database, u0iab where i = ‘ely’. The value share allocated to transmission
and distribution is identical to the share allocated to transmission and distribution
for the entire electricity sector (discussed later). The remainder is divided by the
total GWh produced in the region to derive the electricity own-use cost per GWh.
Also, estimated fuel costs, which are generally more variable by region, are derived
partly from the implicit region-speciﬁc fuel prices in the GTAP database. The full
levelized costs data are available in Appendix C of Peters (2015). Increasing the
LCOE coverage is a major opportunity for subsequent versions.
2

In the long-run speciﬁc technologies such as combined-cycle, combustion turbine, and steam turbine
gas would provide a better idea of costs, but the modeling issues of how each of these technologies
compete from an operational perspective is still unclear. Therefore, a simple aggregate base and
peak load diﬀerentiation is a nice balance between operational considerations and data availability.
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4.2 Stage 1: Base and Peak Load Split
As motivated before, this particular eﬀort is unique to many other electricity
sector disaggregations, in that the generating technologies are split into base and peak
load power to reveal important cost structure and operational considerations of the
electricity sector. This suggests a two-stage procedure which ﬁrst identiﬁes the GWh
split between base and peak load for the generating technologies then ﬁlls the full
matrix given the GWh splits. Separating the GWh split into a separate stage makes
the problem more tractable and allows seamless implementation of alternative data
types (e.g. detailed regional technological data) and models (e.g. Wiskich (2014))
without compromising the matrix balancing described later in Stage 2.
The base-peak load split stage minimizes the total O&M and fuel costs of base
load production subject to GWh clearing constraints and an assumption that base
load must account for at least 85% of total GWh produced. This is a simple way to
allocate high capital, low variable cost technologies to the base load and low capital,
high variable cost technologies to peak load. A straightforward improvement would
be to minimize variable costs speciﬁcally; a portion of O&M costs may be ﬁxed. The
formulation is as follows and is repeated for each region, r:
min
q




0
qbl · lO&M,bl
+ lf0 uel,bl

(4.1)

bl

subject to:

bl

qbl ≥ β ·



qt

(4.2)

t

0
qgasbl + qgasp = qgas

(4.3)

0
qoilbl + qoilp = qoil

(4.4)

0
qhydrobl + qhydrop = qhydro

(4.5)
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Figure 4.1.: Shares of global electricity generation from diﬀerent technologies in base
and peak (green cut-out) load.

where qt is the total GWh produced by each generating technology, t. Again, qf0 is
total GWh produced by each fuel type, f , from the IEA Energy Balance data (the
0
dataset does not distinguish base and peak load technologies), and lct
is the IEA

levelized cost data for each generating technology. The set t contains all generating
technologies in the GTAP-Power database, and bl is the subset of t with generating
technologies classiﬁed as base load power. The scalar β is the assumed proportion of
base load generation in total generation (here, 85%).
One important limitation in the above method is that it cannot admit more than
one technology that is both base and peak load. Alternative models which elucidate
the base and peak load split (such as Wiskich (2014)) could be implemented in this
stage; however, there is a trade-oﬀ between model capability, data availability, and
solution improvement.
Figure 4.1 shows the shares of electricity from base and peak load technologies.
Coal, nuclear, wind, and other exclusively provide base load, and solar exclusively
provides peak load. The exclusive technologies have uniform levelized costs; therefore,
the base and peak distinction does not have any implication on the values in the
disaggregate database. Gas provides over half of the peak load. Hydro is more likely
to provide base load than peak load. Conversely, oil is more likely to provide peak
than base load.
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4.3 Stage 2a: Targeting Levelized Cost Relationships
Peters and Hertel (2015a) show that an ideal disaggregation preserves both the
cost structure and “row share” (i.e. relative input employment by technologies)
implied by the economic data (in this case, L0 ). This is especially the case when the
database will be used in a model with substitution between the electricity generation
technologies. We choose to preserve these economic relationships over imposing the
total cost cosntraints. That is, we believe the relationships to be more “trustworthy”
than the total costs.
The fully disaggregated matrix is partitioned to investment, fuel, O&M, own-use,
and production tax costs for transmission and distribution and each generating
technology.

This provides a target matrix, A, based on the levelized cost and

electricity production data; however, it is inconsistent with the GTAP database.
Targeting relationships in levelized cost data, L0 , and ﬁxing the other data implies
that the GTAP values, U0 , as an aggregate measure, and the electricity production
values, Qg , are the more trusted sources. The proposed optimization algorithm ﬁnds
an estimated levelized cost which minimizes deviation from both the derived i) cost
proportionality within a single generating technology (i.e. cost structure) and ii)
relative input employment by generating technologies (i.e. row share) from the target
levelized cost data. In doing so, the algorithm targets relationships between levelized
costs rather than the levelized costs themselves. Tax costs are assumed ﬁxed and
are assigned by the value implied by the tax (L0 ) and production (Qg ) data. The
residual tax value in GTAP are allocated to the new sectors on a per GWh basis.
The objective function is designed to minimize weighted entropy distance from
both the cost structure and row share relationships (Peters and Hertel, 2015b). This is
termed the share-preserving cross-entropy (SPCE) method. Constraints are imposed
to maintain an assumed allocation of value to transmission and distribution and
ensure consistency with the GTAP database.
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The target matrix A, as deﬁned in Section 2.1, is given by:
0
· qt
lct
act =  
· u0•••
0
l
·
q
t
c
t ct

where u0••• =

  
i

a

b

(4.6)

u0iab or the total value in the GTAP electricity sector. The

balanced matrix mathbf X, as deﬁned in Section 2.3 is given by
lct · qt
xct =  
· u0•••
l
·
q
t
c
t ct

(4.7)

0
where lct
is replaced by the balanced levelized costs lct . The values for the linear

constraints are described as
ui =



u0i••

(4.8)

i∈c

Again, the index r is dropped for simplicity since each region is balanced
independently.

The balanced levelized costs lct are determined from the SPCE

objective in Equation 2.17 above and the following constraints for each region, r:


xct = uc

(4.9)

xdt = γ · ud

(4.10)

t


d

The SPCE method is written in terms of X and A to conform to literature and
for sake of simplicity, but are written in terms of lct and qt in the accompanying
GAMS code. The ﬁnal matrix of L is the estimated levelized cost which minimizes
the weighted entropy distance from the economic relationships implied by the target
levelized cost data (L0 ). The ﬁrst natural log component of the objective targets cost
structure, and the second targets row share. The set c consists of all the levelized
costs, and subset d are the levelized costs excluding eﬀective tax. The objective,
Equation 2.17, sums across only d since the eﬀective tax is ﬁxed (discussed in Section
4.4.5).
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The ﬁrst constraint (Equation 4.9) sums over only the costs, i, which are associated
with the particular levelized cost, c (e.g. labor in O&M, coal in fuel). The vector
U0 is the GTAP national input value data for total value of each cost in the original
electricity sector (‘ely’) with dimensions for source, a, (i.e. domestic or imported)
and type, b (i.e. basic or tax). This ensures market clearance of the GTAP values
across each levelized costs; that is, values of the new sectors in GTAP-Power can be
aggregated to the GTAPv9 electricity values.
The second constraint (Equation 4.10) ensures the assumed value allocation to
transmission and distribution where the scalar γ is the proportion of total non-tax
value allocated to the transmission and distribution sector. The γ value does not
have a great deal of literature behind it; examples of values include 4% (Marriott,
2007), 45% (Joskow, 1997), and 65% (Sue Wing, 2008) for the United States.
The non-production operational expenses (i.e. transmission, distribution, customer
accounts, customer service, sales, and administration) for electric utilities in the
United States represent about 21% of total operational expenses (EIA (2015): Table
8.3).3 Therefore, a γ value of 21% is used for all regions in this disaggregation. In
reality, the value may diﬀer regionally which can easily be incorporated provided
accurate data are available.
Additional constraints are imposed to ensure suﬃcient and proportional allocation
of fuels into their associated technologies (e.g. total fuel costs of coal-based generation
are greater or equal to the total coal costs to electricity in the GTAP database).

4.4 Stage 2b: Targeting Levelized Cost Sub-Matricies
Stage 2a returns estimated total column sums for each levelized cost (Table 6)
which overcomes the unknown total costs which motivated the SPCE formulation.
Therefore, RAS can be used to estimate the matrices for each levelized cost. Basic
data and assumptions are used to construct the target matrices (the same A as
3

This does not include electricity loss in transmission and distribution. Here, we are concerned with
the costs and values.
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deﬁned in Section 2.1) for each levelized cost separately. The notation is identical to
the generic disaggregation problem in Section 2.3 and pertains to the relevant section
only. That is, A is not diﬀerentiated by any form of notation in the O&M and capital
disaggregations in the following sections. They are independent disaggregations.

4.4.1 Operating and Maintenance Costs
The O&M sub-matrix disaggregation focuses on constructing a highly-detailed
target matrix A for the 58 costs which fall under the broad umbrella of O&M.
This involves taking expert assumptions on the probability of each O&M cost,
j ∈ O&M , entering T&D or generation (GEN) (P z ) and entering a particular
generation technology, t, given the cost is classiﬁed as generation (Ptg ). The O&M
sub-matrix targets are deﬁned as:
ajt = P z · uj for z = T&D and j ∈ i = O&M
lit · qtg
ajt = P z · Ptg · 
g · uj for z = GEN and j ∈ i = O&M
t lit · qt

(4.11)
(4.12)

The target matrix is balanced using the RAS method. Assignment of probabilities
allows the expert to integrate a great deal of speciﬁc cost-level information in a
systematic manner. The ﬁnal result can be seen in Table 4.4. For example, water
transport is a cost only incurred by ‘CoalBL’. ‘NuclearBL’ is more skilled-labor
intensive than fossil fuel technologies such as ‘CoalBL’. Also, T&D is highly
service-labor intensive. The actual probabilities used in constructing this table are
available in Peters (2015).

4.4.2 Fuel Costs
There are ﬁve sectors in the GTAP database which correspond to fuel costs: coal,
gas pipeline, distributed gas, oil, and petroleum and coal products (‘coa’, ‘gas’, ‘gdt’,
‘oil’, and ‘p c’ in GTAP, respectively). These are allocated using basic assumptions
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and conditionals when those assumptions break down. The original GTAP coal sector
is allocated to ‘CoalBL’. Both pipeline and distributed gas are allocated to ‘GasBL’
and ‘GasP’ based on the relative levelized cost between the technologies and in a
manner where the proportion of types of gas are equal for each technology. The equal
proportions technique is also used for oil and ‘p c’ in ‘OilBL’ and ‘OilP’; however,
petroleum-derived products do not strictly enter oil technologies (e.g. lubricants,
gasoline for company vehicles). The excess ‘p c’ is used to meet the levelized fuel cost
column sum constraints for the other sectors.
Conditionals may come into play where there are fuel inputs to electricity in the
original GTAP database, but there is no directly corresponding generation for a region
(e.g. coal input to electricity in GTAP, but no coal generation in the OECD GWh
data). The source of these residuals is case and region-speciﬁc, but may arise as
a result of sectoral aggregation in GTAP, non-exclusivity of fuel use for electricity
production (e.g. gas for heat in the facility), and the balancing algorithm necessary
for the original GTAP database. In these cases, targets are created based on relative
cost across the new sectors. High conﬁdence in the assumptions for fuel inputs to
generating technologies results in a highly constrained optimization problem.

4.4.3 Capital Costs
Although levelized capital costs only have one associated GTAP sector (i.e.
capital), the diﬀerence in cost type (i.e. basic and tax) are of particular importance
in the electricity sector. For instance, the US has investment tax credits which
subsidize capital investments in some renewable technologies. This is an important
consideration for modeling using the disaggregated database. The targets for the two
type matrices are as follows:
aIjt

lit · qtg
=
g · uj for j ∈ i = capital
t lit · qt

(4.13)
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aX
jt =

aIjt
for j ∈ i = capital
kjt

(4.14)

where aIit is the tax-inclusive target (superscript I), and aX
it is the tax-exclusive target
(superscript X) for capital costs. The set j is a subset of all costs which map to
capital costs (j ∈ i = captial). The scalar kit is the power of the tax on capital for
the electricity sub-sectors.
Entropy is minimized for a tax-inclusive and tax-exclusive matrix subject to
market clearing constraints for both matrices and a total column sum for the
tax-inclusive matrix. This is a similar formulation to one found in McDougall (1999).

min xIjt · ln

xIjt ,xX
jt

xIjt
e · aIjt





+ xX
jt · ln

xX
jt
e · aX
jt


for j ∈ i = capital

(4.15)

xIjt = uj for j ∈ i = capital

(4.16)

X
xX
jt = uj for j ∈ i = capital

(4.17)

t


t



xIjt = vt for j ∈ i = capital

(4.18)

j

where uX
j is the row constraint for non-tax value in the GTAP data and vt is the total
I
X
column cost implied from the SPCE result for capital. The results, xX
jt and (xjt −xjt ),

are the balanced basic and tax matrices in the GTAP data. These are expanded to full
GTAP dimensionality based on the source (i.e. domestics and imports) in the original
GTAP electricity sector proportions to preserve market clearing in these dimensions.

4.4.4 Own-Use Costs
The value of total own-use in the electricity sector in each region comes directly
from own-use in the original GTAP database, u0iab where i = ‘ely.’ The total costs
of own-use for the disaggregated electricity sectors is the estimated levelized cost for
own-use, lown−use,t , multiplied by the total production, qt .
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The individual electricity input costs are allocated to the new electricity sectors
with the assumption that each demands identical shares of transmission and
distribution and generating technologies. This is as though they draw from the grid
and not necessarily the individual plant-type.

4.4.5 Eﬀective Production Tax
The eﬀective production tax in GTAP is labeled ‘PTAX’, which for a generating
technology can be thought of as a tax on a speciﬁc type of generation, while ‘PTAX’
for transmission and distribution can be thought of a tax on electricity provision to
the ultimate users. Tax costs are assumed ﬁxed and are assigned by the value implied
by the levelized tax from the data (L0 ) and total GWh production (Qg ) data. The
residual tax value (that not explained by available tax data) is additionally allocated
to the new sectors on an equal per GWh basis.

4.4.6 Demand and Trade Disaggregation
The electricity mix of exports of electricity are assumed to be identical to the
mix of domestic production. This assumption ﬁlls the complete trade matrix. The
demand-side share allocation for each electricity sector is simply identical to the mix
implied by the sum of domestic production and the net imports.
Presumably, diﬀerent industries and households consume electricity from diﬀerent
sources depending on the sub-region and type of load. For instance, the retail industry
may consume electricity predominantly during peak hours during the middle of the
day. Households may consume more electricity during the peak hours immediately
following school or oﬃce hours. Furthermore, households may demand renewable
sources or even purchase household solar panels. Certain industries may require
electricity and make long-term agreements for base load electricity.
Unfortunately, anything beyond pure assumption is currently unavailable for
this research.

The disaggregation of the demand-side in this work assumes all
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users demand identical shares of transmission and distribution and each generating
technologies.
Alternatively, the transmission and distribution sector could be separated from
generation where generation would be sold to transmission and distribution, and
users would purchase the transmission and distribution. This may make some sense
in terms of how the electricity sector operates (at least in the United States); however,
this type of database construction does not allow for diﬀerent generation demands by
industry. The database construction described above is general enough to allow for
this; although due to data limitations, uniform mixes across industries are assumed
for this particular version.

4.5 Results
The ﬁnal results of the supply-side disaggregation are presented in this section.
The demand-side is less interesting because of the lack of available data. The data
and assumptions explained above are available upon request. This section focuses
on the error between the estimated levelized costs and the IEA/NEA data and how
important features in the original datasets are captured in the disaggregated data.

4.5.1 Pro Rata Method for Large Deviations
For some regions the deviation between the estimated and the target levelized costs
can be quite large. While deviation is expected, large deviations may indicate broader
issues in the OECD electricity production and, more likely, the electricity sector in
the GTAP database. For instance, the target estimate of capital requirements for
electricity in Cambodia derived from the levelized costs and production data is 75.9
million USD; however, the GTAP database reports only 1.8 million USD of capital
is allocated to the entire electricity sector. Obviously, there is some discrepancy in
reporting between the top-down and bottom-up type datasets.
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To accommodate for largely disparate data, an additional bound constraint is
added to the Stage 2a formulation which bounded the estimated capital and O&M
levelized costs for each generation technology to n and (1/n) times the target levelized
cost value threshold. Fuel costs are excluded from these bounds because these are
generally directly mapped to fuel input costs in GTAP (e.g. coal to ‘CoalBL’) and
the costs are highly variable across regions which limits the relevance of using an
average of available levelized cost data as an initial estimate. A single capital and
O&M levelized cost to a generation technology which deviates by n or (1/n) times
the target estimate results in an unsuccessful completion. The number of successful
completions in total share of GWh terms are shown in Figure 4.2. Beyond a certain
threshold (x-axis) it may be better to allocate each levelized cost using an ad hoc
method. The threshold chosen is 10 because at this point over 95% of the global
GWh produced converges using the SPCE method.4
The pro rata method is used for those regions that do not converge by
allocating each costs by the production weighted levelized costs described by for each
unsuccessful region recalling Equation 3.1.
This does not speciﬁcally preserve the cost structure, but the data is so disparate
in these regions the any modeling of these regions individually is suspect to begin
with.
The jump in GWh converging from a bound of 9 to 10 in Figure 4.2 is due to the
convergence of Russia at a bound of 10. The GTAP value of capital in Russia is much
lower than the value implied by the target levelized cost of capital. Later, this section
discusses how the GTAP database construction may be able to leverage the levelized
cost data to eliminate such large discrepancies moving forward while recognizing the
limitations in the target cost data as well.
4

With a threshold of a 10 or 1/10 times deviation from the original levelized cost value the following
22 regions cannot be reconciled: Oman, Rest of Oceania, Brunei Darussalam, Laos, Rest of South
Asia, Argentina, Ecuador, Honduras, Estonia, Lithuania, Belarus, Rest of Former Soviet Union,
Georgia, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Rest of West Asia, Guinea, Rest of West Africa, Kenya,
Madagascar, Malawi, and Rest of Southern Africa. These regions produce less than 3% of the world’s
electricity and in most cases would be aggregated into larger regions.
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Figure 4.2.: Share of total GWh which converge using the SPCE procedure with the
bound of deviation from target LCOE data
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4.5.2 Deviation from Target Levelized Cost Data
It is worth reiterating that the procedure described above implies that the GTAP
values, as an aggregate measure, and the electricity production values are a more
trustworthy source than levelized cost, as a stylized representative of actual costs
determined from a number of assumptions. This is why we ﬁx the GTAP, U0 , and
the estimated GWh production, Qg , values and target the levelized costs, L0 .
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Table 4.2.: Percent deviation from non-ﬁxed target shares of levelized cost in the total cost (i.e. cost structure) of each
speciﬁc generating technology in the United States. The average absolute deviation for non-ﬁxed values is 16.7%.
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Table 4.1.: Percent deviation from non-ﬁxed target levelized cost for each generating technology for the United States. The
average absolute deviation for non-ﬁxed values is 21.3%.
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Table 4.3.: Percent deviation from non-ﬁxed target relative cost intensity (i.e. row share) normalized by GWh for each
levelized cost and generating technology in the United States. The average absolute deviation for non-ﬁxed values is 12.3%.
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Table 4.1 shows the percentage deviation of the estimated levelized costs from
the target levelized costs in the United States. The average deviation for non-ﬁxed
levelized costs is 20.9%. The estimated levelized cost for ‘NuclearBL’ and ‘CoalBL’
are larger than the target levelized cost while the majority of others are lower. It
is also evident that the O&M cost in the GTAP data is much larger than the cost
implied by O&M in the levelized cost; the deviation is highest for O&M costs and
the balanced estimates are all larger than the target levelized costs. The histogram
in Figure 4.3 shows how these deviations are distributed for all regions, and Figure
4.4 shows the diﬀerent between OECD and non-OECD countries.
Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 show the deviation from the cost structure and relative
cost intensity for the United States, respectively. Again, the disparity between the
target levelized costs and the GTAP data in O&M is the primary source of deviation
in cost structure. However, the relative fuel costs seem to be the primary source of
deviation in the row share. The eﬀective tax has no deviation because the taxes are
allocated on a row share basis. The average deviation is 16.7% and 12.3% for cost
structure and row share, respectively.
Deviations can be attributed to two primary factors: i) discrepancies in the values
implied by the diﬀerent data sets and ii) assumptions made in the procedure itself.
An example is the O&M levelized costs for the United States (discernable in all
three deviation tables). While the error in fuel and tax estimates are relatively
low, the estimated levelized costs for O&M are much higher than the values in
the IEA/NEA dataset (Figure 4.3). This indicates that the O&M costs implied
by original GTAP dataset are much higher than the IEA/NEA data. However,
this deviation can also be attributed to our assumption of the cost structure of
the transmission and distribution sector. If this assumption is altered to include
a larger share of O&M in the total cost of transmission and distribution, some of the
‘excess’ O&M in generation will be absorbed by the sector. The own-use cost has a
high deviation because the target for transmission and distribution was constructed
from the ‘similar-to-communications-sector’ assumption and targets for generating
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Figure 4.3.: Histogram of deviation between estimated levelized cost and target
levelized costs for all regions. For each distribution, the deviation of the median from
one indicates bias and larger standard deviation indicates larger deviation between
the disaggregate data and original GTAP data.
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plotted on a log-scale.
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technologies were constructed from GWh data, and the targets do not necessarily
sum to the total own-use for electricity in the GTAP data. While the error values for
the United States and some other OECD countries are relatively low, the errors can
be quite high for regions where the GTAP and IEA electricity production data are
questionable and where the levelized cost is derived through averages.
Figure 4.3 shows that O&M costs are skewed to the right which indicates that
GTAP, in general, has more O&M cost than the levelized cost data. However, at the
left-hand extremum for both investment and O&M costs, Figure 4.3 shows that for
some regions and technologies there is signiﬁcantly less value in the GTAP data than
what is implied by the levelized cost data. In other words, the estimated levelized costs
are lower than the target data set. This could be partly a result of averages from
mainly OECD countries used as levelized cost in developing and other low-income
countries where no data are available (see Figure 4.4). For instance, a low-income
country may face signiﬁcantly less labor costs, which is a major component of O&M
costs. Another disparity could be between the assumptions of parameters used to
construct the levelized costs and similar assumptions in the GTAP database. The
nature of the deviations, shown in Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4, implies that the levelized
cost data can be improved greatly. Furthermore, high-ﬁdelity cost data could also
lead to improvements in the construction of the GTAP electricity sector itself.

4.5.3 Main Result
All of the original 62 costs were disaggregated using the method described above,
and the results are then aggregated to 21 sectors for analysis (See Appendix A
in Peters (2015)for sectoral mapping). Table 4.4 shows the input values to the
disaggregated sectors for the United States. The values are the sum of sources and
type dimensions. With the exception of capital subsidies to solar power (‘SolarP’) and
balancing of the capital across the other users, the hidden dimensions are allocated
in identical proportions.
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Figure 4.4.: A histogram comparing deviation between estimated levelized costs and
target levelized costs for OECD countries and non-OECD countries. The larger mass
of OECD regions around one indicates a closer match between disaggregate data and
original GTAP data.
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scaled to OECD counts (1,111 non-ﬁxed values) for comparison.
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The fuel sectors (i.e. coal, gas, gas distribution, oil, and petroleum products)
are allocated to the corresponding generating technology. Coal enters ‘CoalBL’, Oil
enters ‘OilP’ only as there is no GWh generated from oil technology as base load in
the United States. Gas and gas distribution enter in equal proportion to ‘GasBL’
and ‘GasP’. However, the proportion of gas fuels in ‘GasP’ to gas fuels in ‘GasBL’ is
greater than the proportion of GWh in ‘GasP’ to ‘GasBL’ due to a higher levelized
cost of fuel for peak gas production. The opposite is true when looking at capital
to the gas generating technologies because ‘GasBL’ is more capital intensive than
‘GasP’. A portion of petroleum products also enter ‘GasBL’ and ‘GasP’ in order to
reach the levelized cost target (i.e. the total gas inputs in GTAP were insuﬃcient).
The petroleum and coal products sector in GTAP contains many diﬀerent energy fuels
(e.g. coke, reﬁnery gas, diesel), so it is diﬃcult to distinguish the actual composition
of this sector. As discussed previously, some of these energy fuels may very well enter
alternative types of production other than strictly oil technologies. These also enter
in ﬁxed proportion between gas technologies. Similarly, the relative levelized cost
intensities between technologies is preserved when we look at the other levelized costs
and generating technologies as well.
The probability tables, Pt and Pg , used in the disaggregation can be found in
Appendix B. Focusing on two O&M sectors which had no additional assumptions
beyond relative cost intensity between technologies, chemicals & rubber and
non-ferrous metals, we see that the relative costs are similar across the technologies.
The ratio of value of chemicals and rubber to non-ferrous metals is approximately
10.7 for each technology.
However, general assumptions can be made about many O&M sectors. First, water
transport is allocated strictly to ‘CoalBL’ (i.e. Pt (GEN ) = 1 and Pg (CoalBL) =
1), since coal is generally the only fuel source which is transported domestically by
waterway in the United States. Second, a 2/3 probability of Pt (T &D) was made
for various sectors in the services set under the assumption that a majority of the
sales, customer service, etc. of the utilizes fall under these sectors in transmission
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and distribution. This is a simple and somewhat arbitrary value, but demonstrates
the ability to add expert intuition into the methodology. A similar method can be
adopted to redistribute skilled and unskilled labor. This may require a balancing
act between relative probabilities between types of labor within a technology and
across technologies. The complex allocations of these two labor types in generation
demonstrate how some of these assumptions may sacriﬁce transparency of the ﬁnal
results. These results show that the skilled to unskilled labor ratio is higher for
‘NuclearBL’ and renewable sources (i.e. ‘WindBL’ and ‘SolarP’) than fossil-fuel based
generating technologies.
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-

-

-

-
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24.0
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-
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-
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-
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7.0
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0.0

0.3

-

-

-

-

-

8.36%

33,037.9

545.0

26,577.0

1178.0

250.0

58.8

154.0

69.0

269.6

2,862.1
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739.0

-

15.4
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-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

1.92%

7,605.7

72.0

2,140.0

546.0

116.0

27.3

71.6

32.0

124.8

1,327.0

92.2

342.6

-

7.1

6.7

36.3
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0.9

0.0

0.3

2,651.0

-

-

-

-

10.29%

40,681.6

2,770.0

3,002.0

687.0

146.0

34.3

90.0

80.5

156.7

1,669.5

116.0

431.1

-

9.0

8.4

45.7

14.9

1.2

0.0

0.4

10,316.0

-

17,150.0

3,953.0

-

Cost of inputs to electricity sectors in millions of 2011 US$

10.3%

445,135

Total electricity production by generating technology in GWh
1,872,215

Coal

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

0.0%

0

HydroP

May not sum to totals due to rounding.

Note: Rows 1-5 are associated with fuel costs, 6-22 with O&M costs, 23 with capital, and 24 with eﬀective tax. Own-use is not shown here.

21.68%

456.0

Share

-4,753.0

1,787.6

17 Cons. & machinery

18 Tech aspros

5,210.0

25,801.0

16 Services

85698.5

1,319.0

15 Retail

24 PTAX

4,062.0

14 Air & land trans.

Total input cost

23,626.0

-

13 Water transport

70.3

65.8

95.5
102.1

12 Ferrous metals

358.0

1.7

11 Non-ferrous metals

170.0
520.0

9 Paper & textiles

13.2

8 Non-metal minerals

10 Chem. & rubber

9.1

1.1

7 Mining

2.8

4.0

6 Agriculture & food

-

12.9

5 Oil & coal products

-

-

-

821,405

Share

Nuclear

Total production

TnD

1,264.6
0.32%

1.63%

-7.0

1,129.0

28.5

6.1

0.7

3.7

1.7

6.5

69.4

4.8

17.9

-

0.4

0.3

1.9

0.6

0.0

0.0

0.0

-

-

-

-

-

0.1%

6,153

Solar

6,429.1

142.0

298.0

176.0

37.4

8.8

23.1

20.7

40.3

428.1

29.7

110.7

-

2.3

2.2

11.7

3.8

0.3

0.0

0.1

5,081.0

13.0

-

-

-

0.7%

31,416

OilP

100%

395,376.4

14,369.0

129,967.0

22,271.5

17,209.3

775.6

5,988.6

1,701.6

5,090.4

60,895.8

3,755.9

11,500.9

1,371.0

290.8

272.0

1,481.1

484.1

37.5

3.0

11.4

23,623.9

13.0

26,398.0

6,084.0

61,781.0

100%

4,326,625

Total

Table 4.4.: Example result in the GTAP-Power database: an electricity-detailed disaggregation of the GTAP electricity
sector for the United States in 2011. A 24 sector consolidation of the full 63 sectors. Source: Peters (2015)
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Figure 4.5.: The share of GWh produced by each technology in GTAP-Power for the
same ten largest fuel-based electricity sectors plus Brazil as Figure 4.6 (ordered left to
right by share of non-fuel based technology share). The non-fuel based technologies
represented with diagonal lines (i.e. Nuclear, Wind, HydroBL, Other, HydroP, and
Solar) are only implicitly represented by ‘Capital’ in the original GTAP database.

Moving from the US electricity to the global level, Figure 4.5 shows that non-fuel
based technologies play a large role in the electricity production for many countries
(i.e. nuclear, wind, hydroelectric, solar, and other). In the original GTAP database,
these technologies would be agglomerated with the rest of the capital in the electricity
sector. With the electricity-detail in GTAP-Power, it is possible to distinguish these
very diﬀerent technologies in a CGE database and provide a better representation of
the sector to model of electricity, energy, and climate policies using social accounting
and CGE methods.
Looking just at the fuel-based technologies in Figure 4.6, we see the share of
fuel-based technologies as well as the import/domestic share varies greatly between
countries. Further, Figure 4.6 shows that almost all of Korea’s coal and gas power uses
imported fuels. The source of the imports are countries that use a signiﬁcant amount
of fuels in their own electricity sector (e.g. Russia, US, China, Australia). These

100
100%
Oil
(Imp.)

90%
80%

Gas
(Imp.)

70%

Coal
(Imp.)

60%
50%

Oil
(Dom.)

40%
30%

Gas
(Dom.)

20%

Coal
(Dom.)

10%
0%
Korea

Japan

Germany Brazil

India

Saudi
Arabia

China

USA

South
Africa

Russia Australia

Figure 4.6.: The share of domestic and imported fuels used in the electricity sector for
the ten largest fuel-based electricity sectors (ordered left to right by import intensity)
plus Brazil. Both the fuel and source composition diﬀer greatly between countries.
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Figure 4.7.: Korea produces more than 32% of its electricity from imported fuels.
These charts show the composition of Korea’s coal and gas imports.

two charts show that energy trade is partly driven by domestic electricity sectors.
GTAP-Power allows energy trade to be understood in greater detail.

4.6 A Look Back at the GTAP Database Construction
There may exist some opportunity to reconcile the aggregate electricity value
implied by the disaggregated levelized cost data with those from original aggregate
GTAP electricity sector. Table 4.5 below shows the aggregate value of inputs to the
electricity sector in the United States implied by the disaggregated data compared
to those in the GTAP aggregate electricity database. The latter is a constraint
on disaggregation, so it is also identical to the aggregate electricity sector in the
GTAP-Power database. This section presents ideas, as opposed to guidelines, on how
such a reconciliation might be performed in subsequent versions.
On one hand there is the bottom-up data constructed from levelized costs and
production levels. Recall that due to the heterogeneous reality of electricity markets
these levelized costs can be misleading in many ways (Joskow, 2011; Hirth et al., 2014).

102
Table 4.5.: Deviation between total aggregate inputs to the electricity sector implied
by the disaggregate data (used as targets) and the original values in the GTAP ‘ely’
sector (used as consistency constraints) for the United States.
Total aggregate inputs to electricity (millions of 2011 US$)
LCOE

Disaggregate data

GTAP ‘ely’ sector (uc )

Deviation

Inv

131,763

129,967

1.4%

Fuel

112,309

117,899

-4.7%

Own-use

26,002

26,002

0.0%

O&M

92,575

133,139

-30.5%

Tax

14,370

14,370

0.0%

Total

377,020

421,378

-10.5%

On the other hand the aggregate GTAP electricity sector is constructed from targets
that are derived from various sources, namely contributed I–O tables and IEA energy
data. Even in the long-run, it is unlikely that the I–O tables contributed by the GTAP
community will include all or even some of the electricity sub-sectors described here.
Many contributions may not even include a separated electricity sector. Therefore,
the new electricity sectors described here will likely remain a disaggregation of an
aggregate electricity sector in the main GTAP database construction.
Therefore, despite the known limitations, there may be opportunity to use the
levelized cost data to create targets for the aggregate electricity sector in GTAP,
especially where quality data may not exist to target the sector otherwise. This would
help reconcile the bottom-up and top-down perspectives of the electricity sector.
There are at least three distinct cases in a possible aggregate electricity
reconciliation exercise. For each GTAP region: i) the levelized cost data are more
“trustworthy” than the GTAP target, ii) the GTAP target is more “trustworthy”
than the levelized cost data, or iii) they are equally “trustworthy” (or equally
“untrustworthy”). In the ﬁrst two cases, it may be best to simply use the target
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the researcher deems more “trustworthy”. However, there should be some additional
introspection when these deviate by such large margins.
The third case may be more interesting. Typically, the quality of the data follows
the collection eﬀorts of the region and both the bottom-up and top-down data are
either “trustworthy” or “untrustworthy,” rather than the two cases described before.
Still diﬀerences inevitably arise, as shown for the United States in Table 13. In this
case, there might be two options based on the cost structure component of the data. If
the cost structure of the aggregate GTAP electricity sector is “trustworthy”, a simple
average of the two data sources for each input cost to the aggregate electricity sector
could suﬃce. What might be a more likely case, is that the top-down total value in
the electricity might be accurate since it can be easily constructed from a price of
electricity and total production (demand-side), but the cost structure is created from
assumption rather than data. Here, the targets for inputs to the aggregate electricity
can be constructed by taking the total electricity sector value from the top-down data
and imposing the aggregate cost structure (GWh-weighted average levelized cost plus
T&D) implied by the bottom-up data.
These methods might help decrease the gap between the bottom-up and top-down
modeling using the GTAP-Power database. This section documents ideas gathered
from this particular disaggregation exercise and not necessarily the path GTAP will
continue in the future.

4.7 Conclusions and Path Forward
Chapters 2–4 discussed advances in the construction of global economic databases.
A novel matrix balancing method that preserves important economic relationships is
developed in Chapter 2. The new method outperforms commonly-used methods when
the bottom-up cost data are more reliable than the total sub-sector cost data. Chapter
3 shows that this can have important consequences in modeling using a balanced
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database. These are used in this chapter to develop the GTAP-Power database, the
foremost publicly-available electricity-detailed general equilibrium database.
GTAP-Power is a disaggregation of the GTAP electricity sector into transmission
and distribution, base load generating technologies, and peak generating technologies
for use in CGE models.

The method leverages available data and reasonable

assumptions to construct the database in a replicable and transparent manner.
Application to CGE and integrated assessment models which are built on the GTAP
database is straightforward.
The resulting electricity-detailed GTAP-Power database can be used by
researchers to advance modeling of electricity, energy, and climate policies using social
accounting and CGE methods.
An additional motivation for this work is to identify strengths and limitations
in database construction for consistency and continuous improvement in the GTAP
community. There are many limitations to this work that oﬀer opportunity for
continuous improvement given additional data sources. Some of these are listed below:
1. Stage 1 of the methodology disaggregates the power sectors by fuel into power
sectors by load-type (i.e. base and peak load). The base-peak split in this stage
could be improved or, given data, these could split into distinct technologies (e.g.
steam, combined-cycle, combustion turbine). The latter case would give much
better estimates of cost structures as well as allow for more detailed modeling.
2. The assumptions on the cost structure of transmission and distribution greatly
inﬂuence the results for the generation technologies.
3. Additional coverage of levelized cost data would reduce deviation between the
original data sets.
4. The levelized costs used in this version are for new generating capacity. In
GTAP many countries have capital values much lower than those implied by
the levelized costs and production data. This may be due to depreciated (old)
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generating capacity in the country. Adjusting for this may bring estimates of
levelized capital costs more in line with the GTAP data.
5. Coverage of production and input taxes for speciﬁc electricity technologies is
currently limited.
6. As discussed in Section 4.6, the disaggregated data could be used as an
additional data source for the GTAP ‘ely’ sector. This might help reduce the
deviations between the bottom-up and top-down models.
By making the disaggregation method transparent and publicly-available, the
intent is to continuously improve the method and foundational data via the social
accounting and CGE research community.
Despite these limitations, the GTAP-Power database contains the most detailed
representation of electricity technologies in any publicly-available global CGE
database. Furthermore, the database is a freely available database extension with
a subscription to the main GTAP database. As opposed to many other databases
and models of this type, the disaggregation is fully documented and accompanied by
an example version of the software used to produce the database. This allows and
encourage continuous improvement on the assumptions, methodologies, and data in
the research community.
An electricity-detailed CGE database is the foundation for researching electric
power in the global economy. The following chapter describes a model which leverages
this database to give a highly-detailed representation of the electricity sector in global
economic modeling.
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CHAPTER 5. A DETAILED REPRESENTATION OF THE ELECTRICITY
SECTOR FOR ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM MODELS

This chapter formulates a detailed representation of the electricity sector
conducive to partial and general equilibrium modeling that explicitly and
endogenously captures capacity utilization,
interdependency.

capacity expansion,

and their

Independent and joint validations of these two interdependent

mechanisms in a partial equilibrium setting lend support to the predictive ability
of the model.

The validated electricity sector representation is also the most

important feature of a general equilibrium version, termed the electricity-detailed
general equilibrium (EDGE) model; although this particular extension is not discussed
in this dissertation.
Electricity generation, as opposed to capacity, is the relevant economic good
in balancing supply and demand in the power sector. The magnitude and mix
of generation from diﬀerent technologies has important implications for long-run
sustainability issues such as mitigating greenhouse gas emissions and moderating
energy consumption.

Changes in electricity generation result from two distinct

economic mechanisms: i) construction of new capital, termed capacity expansion,
or ii) increases or decreases in operation of existing capital, termed capacity
utilization. Long-term returns on capital investment in electric power technologies
drive expansion, while utilization is the substitution in response to prevailing
economic conditions, especially fuel prices, which is also termed fuel-switching.
The two mechanisms are interrelated in that capital rents partly depend on how
much generation is produced per unit of capacity (i.e.

capacity factor) and

short-term factor utilization may be counterbalanced by long-term expansion. These
joint mechanisms are often overlooked in long-term projections of the evolution of
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electricity generation in both technologically-rich, partial equilibrium optimization
(bottom-up) and globally consistent general equilibrium (top-down) models.
Bottom-up models are technologically-rich and use exogenous projections of
capital, fuel, operating, maintenance, and other costs to drive changes in total
capacity of electricity generating technologies. Capacity factors for each technology
also tend to be treated exogenously implying that existing capacity is unable to adjust
to prevailing economic conditions, and new capacity must operate at a preordained
level.

One major criticism is that price projections are exogenous despite the

possibility that both demands for fuel and their corresponding prices are partly
determined by changes in the electricity sector. Endogenously determined capacity
factors suggest the need for endogenously determined prices for the technologies.
Top-down, namely CGE, models have endogenously determined prices, but
typically characterize the substitution of technologies in generation (GWh) as a single
mechanism, which treats factor utilization and capacity expansions implicitly. This
ignores a key distinction in how diﬀerent economic and policy shocks impact the
electric power sector. For instance, fuel price shocks (e.g. decline in gas prices
as a result of the shale boom) can be adjusted for in the short-term with existing
infrastructure, prior to construction of new capital and decommissioning of old. On
the other hand, subsidies to capital (e.g. US solar and wind investment tax credits)
impact only new capital investments.
In sum, bottom-up models capture technology-level, extensive and sector-level,
intensive margins given sector-level, extensive margins, but often fail to capture
complete market price responses; although several models include supply responses
for input prices. Top-down models focus on the sector-level in terms of generation,
but blur the lines between intensive and extensive margins at the technology-level
(See Table 5.1).
The question addressed here is how to represent capacity utilization and
expansion that endogenously respond to economic conditions in a manner consistent
with existing partial and general equilibrium modeling frameworks. This chapter
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Table 5.1.: Intensive and extensive margins for electric power at technology and
sector-level
Intensive margin

Extensive margin

Technology-level

Capacity factor utilization

Capacity expansion

Sector-level

Technological substitution

Total generation expansion

formulates a partial equilibrium model that explicitly and endogenously captures
these interdependent mechanisms. A corollary contribution is a novel implementation
of a variant of the constant elasticity of substitution function which ensures
aggregate output quantity (i.e. total GWh) is equal to the sum of input quantities
(i.e. individual GWh for each technology) for the electric power sector (van der
Mensbrugghe and Peters, 2015). Model estimates for annual capacity utilization,
given exogenous capacity growth are validated against observations between 2002
and 2012. Next, a more complete validation exercise is undertaken combining both
capacity utilization and endogenous expansion from 2007 to 2018. These validation
exercises, often overlooked in large-scale modeling, demonstrate the predictive power
of the electricity sector representation in a equilibrium modeling with capacity
utilization, expansion, and their interdependency.
Identical to the sectors in GTAP-Power, the electricity generating technologies
explored in this work are: nuclear, coal, gas, oil, hydro, wind, solar, and other (which
is comprised of biofuels, geothermal, and other less-prevalent technologies). Gas
and oil power is separated into base and peak load because combined-cycle plants
are competitive in providing base load power, and combustion turbine plants are
competitive in providing peak load power. Similarly, hydroelectric plants are split in
to base and peak load because they can potentially be used for either or both types
of load provision. Base and peak load technologies are designated by a “BL” and “P”
suﬃx, respectively.
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Instead of including the full general equilibrium linkages, the following sections
describe a partial equilibrium model of the US electricity sector, which uses the
GTAP-Power data with equations that are conducive to general equilibrium modeling.
The complete economy-wide, general equilibrium supply schedule is replaced by
upward supply curves for coal, oil, gas, and O&M, and the demand schedule is
replaced by a downward sloping demand curve (see Figure 5.1).

In the model

prices are shifted to replicate observations and run simulations, but supply and
demand are still price responsive and can capture rebound eﬀects. Also, household
income is exogenous (i.e. not impacted by electricity prices and tax), and there
is no international trade. These simpliﬁcations allow for a controlled analysis and
validation of the US electricity sector model – the relevant sector in this dissertation.
The analysis lends credibility to the US electricity sector results as part of a complete
general equilibrium analysis.

Capital

O&M

Gas

Oil

Coal

Ely

Figure 5.1.: The white part of the matrix represents the partial equilibrium model described in Chapter 5 with supply
curves for coal, gas, oil, O&M, and capital. The light gray areas signify the full GTAP CGE linkages which have greater
sectoral detail as well as supply and demand schedules across all sectors, households, and government rather than simple
supply curves. Integrating the electricity-detail in GTAP requires introducing the full sectoral detail for inputs as well as
the demand for electricity for each user (i.e. ﬁrms, household, and government)

PTAX

Capital

O&M n

O&M 1

Ely

gdt

gas

p_c

oil

coa

GTAP CGE model
Electricity-detailed computational equilibrium model
PROD_COMM 1 TnD Nuclear Coal GasBL OilBL HydroBL Wind Other GasP OilP HydroP Solar PROD_COMM n HOU GOV

110

111
5.1 Conceptual Framework
The development of the model focuses on the following accounting relationship:
qtg = ct · α · qtc

(5.1)

where qtg is the quantity of GWh generated by technology t, ct is the capacity factor
(i.e. ratio of actual production to capacity) for technology t, qtc is the quantity of
capacity (in GW), and α is the number of hours (one calendar year  8,760 hours).
Equation 5.1 can be log-linearized (in percentage change terms) as follows:
qtg = 
ct + qtc

(5.2)

where qtg is the percentage change (henceforth denoted by the lowercase letter and hat)
in generation, 
ct is the percentage change in capacity factor, and qtc is the percentage
change in total capacity. Therefore, the quantity of generation from each technology
can be increased (decreased) by increasing (decreasing) the capacity factor and/or
the total capacity. The representation explicitly represents capacity utilization (
ct )
and expansion (
qtc ) in the generation of electricity.
The associated equations, which describe the economic equilibrium model, are
also written in percentage change form following the ORANI tradition (Dixon, 1982),
and the non-linear model is solved as such using the GEMPACK software (Harrison
et al., 2014). Level variables are not accented (as in equation 5.1), percentage change
variables are written in lowercase with hat accents (e.g. qtg as in equation 5.2), and
aggregate variables are written in uppercase (e.g. level and percentage change in total
g , respectively).
generation would be Qg and Q

5.2 Electricity Production
The production of electricity from existing capacity follows the standard GTAP
production structure. Intermediate inputs (e.g. fuels) and an aggregate value-added,
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Figure 5.2.: Total electricity generation is determined by the dual capacity utilization
and capacity expansion mechanisms and their interdependency. The two mechanisms
are linked by the capacity factor for existing and new capacity (
ct ), returns to capacity
c
(
pk,t ), and the net change in capacity (
qt ).

comprising capital and operating and maintenance (O&M), are Leontief inputs to
production. Capital and O&M can substitute in the value-added nest, speciﬁed by
a cost-minimizing constant elasticity of substitution (CES) parameter, σtva . This
behavior is described by the following equations:
qit = −
ait + 
ct
qit = −
ait + 
ct − σtva · [
pit − 
ait −

∀i ∈ IN T


sva
pit − 
ait )] ∀i ∈ V A
it · (

(5.3)
(5.4)

i∈V A

where qit is the percentage change in demand for input i by technology t, pit is the
percentage change in price of input i in technology t, and 
ait is the percentage change
in technological eﬃciency of input i in technology t. The variable sva
it is the value
share of input i in total value-added for technology t. The sets IN T and V A contain
the intermediate and value-added inputs, respectively.

5.3 Capacity Factor Utilization
The annual capacity factor is the ratio of annually generated electricity to the
available capacity in a year. Since demand ﬂuctuates on a daily and seasonal basis
with dynamic marginal values of electricity, the annual capacity factor is an aggregate
measure of the technology’s annual supply response. That is, some technologies might
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have a large capacity factor for a brief period during peak hours, but the annual
capacity factor might be low since it is not a competitive technology during normal
hours (e.g. oil power). Base load technologies tend to have higher annual capacity
factors than technologies that only operate during peak loads.
The possibilities for capacity utilization adjustment is based on two determinants:
i) ﬂexibility of the technology itself and ii) substitution between ﬂexible technologies.
Flexibility is the ability of a technology to increase and/or decrease operations of the
plant in response to the prevailing economic conditions, characterized by technical
speciﬁcations of technology. Although ﬂexible technologies can quickly increase or
decrease operations, they are not perfectly substitutable due to factors such as space,
time, and contract lead time (Hirth et al., 2014), so their substitutability is estimated
and validated against historical observations.
Flexibility and substitutability of these technologies are discussed conceptually
and integrated into the empirical model in their respective sections, Section 5.3.1 and
Section 5.3.2. This work focuses on annual factor utilization, but both the conceptual
and empirical components can be applied to smaller time intervals without loss in
generality, provided appropriate data exist.

5.3.1 Capacity Factor Flexibility
The capacity factor can adjust to prevailing economic conditions only if the
existing capacity of a technology is ﬂexible in meeting demand. The capacity factor
can be derived by dividing generation by the capacity-hours reported for a year.
Figure 5.3 shows annual capacity factors have changed over time in response to
overall demand and prevailing economic conditions.
A ﬂexible technology has the ability to adjust generation levels from built capacity
- shown by a slope diﬀerent than zero (i.e. Coal, Oil, GasBL, and GasP). GasP
shows only slight ﬂexibility because it comprises a large percentage of peak power.
Therefore, small changes in capacity factor are large changes in generation; oil and
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Figure 5.3.: Annual capacity factors from 2002–2012 EIA (2015b). The slope of
the trend lines indicate the technology’s ﬂexibility in the face of changing economic
conditions over time. Black lines represent the ﬂexible technologies, while the gray
trend lines represent the inﬂexible technologies.

solar do not produce much in comparison. The inﬂexible technologies (i.e. Nuclear,
Hydro, Wind, Solar, and Other) show little response to changing economic conditions.
The only variability they exhibit is a result of normal annual operational ﬂuctuations
(e.g. plant shutdowns, maintenance); annual rainfall in the case of hydro power; wind
in the case of wind power; and sunlight in the case of solar power. These types of
non-economic ﬂuctuations are not captured in this model.
The capacity factor can be represented by supply curves (for each technology)
with capacity factor on the x-axis and price of technology-speciﬁc capital on the
y-axis (Figure 5.4). As the capacity factor expands, it becomes increasingly costly
to produce each unit of electricity. The increase in the cost of electricity is due to
expensive short-term capital improvements. It is inﬁnitely expensive to operate at
full capacity (i.e. capacity factor of 100%) due to the non-economic requirements
for plant maintenance. Flexible technologies (i.e. coal, gas, and oil power) can
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adjust production without much additional capital expenditure (elastic supply) by
increasing O&M inputs. Inﬂexible technologies cannot adjust production except with
exceedingly large capital expenditure (inelastic supply).
pk,t

pk,t1

pk,t0

ct=Qtg/Qtc
ct0

ct1

1
Qtg=Qtc

Figure 5.4.: Generic supply curve for a ﬂexible electricity generating technology. An
inﬂexible technology would be a vertical line intercepting the x-axis at the capacity
factor value.

Supply for inputs to electricity production are represented in the model by simple
elasticities of supply. Intermediate inputs and O&M are mobile inputs, but capital is
technology-speciﬁc. These equations can be written as:
qi = μsi · pi
qi = qit

∀i ∈ M OBL

and pi = pit

qit = μsit · pit + qtc

(5.5)

∀i ∈ M OBL

∀i ∈ N M OB

(5.6)
(5.7)

where μsi and μsit are the supply elasticities for mobile (M OBL) and non-mobile,
technology-speciﬁc (N M OB) inputs, respectively.

The set M OBL includes

intermediate inputs and O&M while set N M OB is only for capital, which is ﬁxed in
the short-term (i.e. μsit = 0). Chetty et al. (2011) ﬁnds a labor supply elasticity of
0.30, which is used for O&M. Brown (1998) ﬁnds long-run supply elasticities of coal,
oil, and gas to be 1.86, 0.51, and 0.76, respectively. These estimates are pre-shale oil

116
and gas boom, and we might expect the supply of oil and gas to be more elastic due to
the ability to drill shale wells much more quickly than conventional, capital-intensive
wells. The sensitivity of the model results to these parameters can be tested using
systematic sensitivity analysis.
Flexible technologies can adjust capacity utilization by substituting O&M for
capital improvements. For example, plant operators can adjust labor hours (e.g.
paying overtime) and the frequency of normally scheduled maintenance.

The

parameter σtva (in equation 5.4) is calibrated such that the returns to capital roughly
match the change in capacity factor. That is, the returns reﬂect the change in
production (i.e. generation) per unit of capital (i.e. capacity). Figure 5.5 shows
the capacity factor supply curves for ﬂexible technologies which are drawn out by
shifting demand for the technology. A higher CES parameter between value-added
corresponds with greater ﬂexibility.
30
20

pk,t

10
0

-10
-20
-30
0

10
Coal

20

30
Oil

40
50
60
70
Capacity factor (%)
GasBL
GasP

80

90

100

Other

Figure 5.5.: Capacity factor supply curves for ﬂexible electricity generating
technologies. Data points represent results from shocks to other substitutable
technologies to shift demand for the relevant technology. The selection of the shocks
were designed to map out the response over a wide range of possible shocks.

The supply curves distinguish ﬂexible and inﬂexible technologies.

Inﬂexible

technologies are excluded from Figure 5.5, but would be vertical lines at their
current capacity factor. The parameters should ideally be estimated in conjunction
with capacity expansion since they related to the long-run returns to capital. The
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selection of parameters here (i.e. inelastic supply for inﬂexible technology and elastic
supply for ﬂexible) is suﬃcient for the capacity utilization to ensure that only ﬂexible
technologies respond to the prevailing economic conditions.

5.3.2 Substitution of Existing Capacity
Substitution of generation in total electricity production in both partial and
general equilibrium modeling is often represented with CES parameters where
generation from diﬀerent technologies are directly substituted based on cost
minimizing assumptions Paltsev et al. (2005); Wing (2006); Château et al. (2014).
However, this representation treats the dual mechanisms of factor utilization and
capacity expansion implicitly. Also, the standard CES production function does not
preserve quantities. That is, due to the CES production speciﬁcation, the derived
generation from each individual technology may not sum to the aggregate generation
of electricity. The CES assumes inputs are heterogeneous despite the fact that both
are measured in GWh terms. The heterogeneous input assumption is well-suited for
many problems, but can be problematic for interpreting the modeling results when
corollary impacts ﬂow from the quantity of electricity generation (e.g. emissions):
how can they not sum? What is the correct total change in GWh? What is the
impact?
Therefore, another contribution in this work, beyond the dual mechanism for
changes in electricity generation, is a variant of the CES which preserves quantities
(GWh) in the aggregate output and sum of disaggregate inputs, termed here as QCES.
The variant has been implemented in the context of labor (Dixon and Rimmer,
2003) and land (Giesecke et al., 2013) markets and requires a slightly diﬀerent
conceptual justiﬁcation from the standard CES. This section discusses the conceptual
justiﬁcation and implements the QCES speciﬁcation for capacity factor adjustment
in the electricity sector.
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5.3.2.1 Standard CES Substitution
CES is the most common speciﬁcation for the supply of electricity in both partial
and general equilibrium models (Paltsev et al., 2005; Wing, 2006; Château et al.,
2014). Electricity generating technologies substitute with one another in some form
of nested CES where the nesting attempts to control for some of the operational
considerations of the electricity sector (e.g. load type). Substitution is based on cost
minimization with a CES production constraint. The formulation for a single nest is
as follows:



min
C=
g
qt

pgt · qtg

(5.8)

t

subject to:

Qg =



 ρ1
(θt · qtg )ρ

(5.9)

t

σ=

1
ρ−1

(5.10)

where C is the cost function characterized by the sum of the cost per unit production
from each technology, pgt , multiplied by the total production of that technology, qtg .
Total production of electricity, Qg , is characterized by CES production where θt are
the share parameters, and ρ is the CES exponent, which is easily transformed to the
familiar CES parameter, σ, describing the constant elasticity of substitution amongst
inputs.
Implemented in log-linearized form, derived demands for each technology are given
by the following equation (Dixon, 1982; McDougall, 1992):

g − σ ·
qtg = Q

pgt −




svt · pt

(5.11)

t

where svt is the value share of technology t in the total production nest. Again,
the hat accent refers to the percentage change in the variables.

The standard

CES speciﬁcation is attractive for both partial and general equilibrium analysis for
several reasons. First of all, while the assumed CES production function is largely
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arbitrary (outside of the fact other common production speciﬁcations, such as Leontief
and Cobb-Douglas, are special cases of the more general CES speciﬁcation), the
cost minimization objective seems appropriate for electricity aggregators choosing
which technologies to employ.

Also, only a single parameter, σ, is required to

characterize substitution (svt is given by the data). This point is important for
calibrating large-scale models which already require a vast number of equations and
corresponding parameters (i.e. supply, demand, and substitution parameters).
However, the standard CES function does not preserve additivity of the inputs in
the output. This point is harmless in the case of transforming fundamentally diﬀerent
goods into a new good (e.g. capital and labor) or in the case of diﬀerent qualities
across inputs where the units of the aggregate and the inputs are identical (e.g.
quality-adjusted labor (Bowles, 1970)). However, this is not the case for electricity
in which units of production for each technology and the units of the aggregate are
identical and of the same quality.1
This motivates the implementation of the QCES described by Dixon and Rimmer
(2002, 2003, 2006) below; however, QCES ﬁrst requires a slightly modiﬁed theory
regarding the structure of the electricity sector than the standard CES (van der
Mensbrugghe and Peters, 2015).

5.3.2.2 Quantity-Preserving CES (QCES) Substitution
Supply must equal demand instantaneously in an electricity network. As a result,
the values of electricity produced with diﬀerent generation technologies (from the
system operator perspective) are not stationary over any period of time due to: i) the
nature of demand, which can ﬂuctuate by the minute, hour, day, and season and ii)
the operational constraints of technologies that may prevent ﬂexibility in responding
to the ﬂuctuating demand. While it may be intuitive to think of cost minimization as
1

Although values of electricity produced from diﬀerent technologies may be heterogeneous in supply
due to time, space, and contract lead-time (Hirth et al., 2014), the qualities of the produced electricity
from each are identical.
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in the standard CES, the average cost of producing electricity is an incomplete idea
in that it does not reﬂect the complete cost to the system operator because of costs
incurred by operational constraints, which are diﬃcult to identify and incorporate
into the market prices. For instance, the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland (PJM)
market in the United States refers to these costs as: day-ahead and balancing
operating reserves, reactive services, synchronous condensing, and black start services.
The purpose of identifying and categorizing these costs is “to reﬂect the impact of
physical constraints in market prices to the maximum extent possible (Monitoring
Analytics, 2015, p.g. 142)” mainly for the purposes of reliability of instantaneously
adjusting supply (and having reserves) to meet the unpredictable demand (Monitoring
Analytics, 2015).
Recognizing that average costs of generation are incomplete, there is an
unobserved utility of supply that reﬂects of the usefulness of the supply from diﬀerent
technologies in meeting the speciﬁc nature of the demand which balances of average
cost of generation, reliability costs, and costs incurred from operational constraints.
Therefore, the problem of the system operator is two-fold.

First, the total

production from each technology, qtg , must meet the total electricity demand observed
over some period of time, Qg . Second, the operator maximizes the utility of the
supply where the utility is deﬁned as a CES function with revenue obtained from each
generation technology. That is, the system operator gets some positive contribution
to overall utility from revenue obtained from certain technologies. Here, revenue,
rather than the technologies, is substitutable.
The QCES speciﬁcation maximizes the CES utility subject to the sum of electricity
produced from each technology equaling the total electricity demand, as shown below:

max
U=
g
qt



 ρ1
(pgt · qtg )ρ

(5.12)

t

subject to:
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Qg =

qtg

(5.13)

t

σ=

1
1−ρ

(5.14)

The observed mix of revenue from various electricity generation technologies is
then the mix which optimally satisﬁes the complex nature of demand given by the
unobserved utility. Note also that the QCES parameter is related to the CES exponent
in a slightly diﬀerent manner than in the standard CES case (Equation 5.10).
The log-linearized description is nearly identical to the standard CES speciﬁcation
(equation 5.11) except the price index is based on the quantity shares, sqt , rather than
the value shares svt (van der Mensbrugghe and Peters, 2015).

qtg

g − σ ·
=Q

pgt

−




sqt

· pt

(5.15)

t

Because sqt comes from observable data, implementation of the QCES into partial and
general equilibrium models is straightforward. Perfect substitution, σ = ∞, would
imply that a small increase in revenue for a unit of utility (e.g. price or quantity per
“util” decreases) in a technology would result in all electricity being produced from
that technology, just as we would observe in the traditional CES with production as
inputs. Leontief, σ = 0, implies that the same proportion of revenue is required for a
change in utility or change in total electricity since utility is homothetic in quantities.
A nested CES-type structure is commonly used in CGE analysis of electricity
production. The motivation of this work to incorporate economy-wide linkages, so a
commensurate representation is used here. The important consideration in creating
a reasonable the production structure is capturing imperfect substitution between
technologies, especially regarding the dispatchability and the load type (base versus
peak). Château et al. (2014) does not include electricity technologies. Instead, capital
and fuels are imperfectly substitutable, coal and liquids (i.e. crude oil, reﬁned oil,
and gas) are imperfectly substitutable, and liquids are imperfectly substitutable.
McDougall and Golub (2008) characterizes a similar nested substitution between
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fuels and between fuels and capital. However, both of these ignore non-fuel-based
technologies in electricity production. Pant (2007) uses a technology bundle approach
with speciﬁc generating technologies, but does not consider any dispatchability and
base versus peak load characteristics in the substitution between the technologies.
Paltsev et al. (2005) uses a nesting between non-dispatchable and dispatchable (i.e.
fossil fuels) and then substitution between the dispatchable fossil fuels. Variable
technologies (i.e. solar and wind) are accompanied by a peak-load dispatchable
technology (e.g. gas or oil power). The parameters in the nesting structure are
neither estimated nor calibrated.
The capacity utilization model here uses a nested QCES production structure to
represent substitution between technologies. Capacity factor utilization is represented
as a nested derived demand system for the technologies represented in Figure 5.6.
Base and peak load technologies are distinguished from one another to reﬂect
the additional operational aspect of the electricity sector. QCES parameters are
calibrated across several time periods for base and peak load (i.e.

σ bl and σ pl ,

respectively) separately. The substitution between base and peak load (i.e. σ g )
and between transmission and distribution (T&D) and total generation are assumed
equal to zero (i.e. Leontief).

5.3.2.3 Calibrating the Quantity-Preserving CES Parameters
The QCES parameters for the United States are calibrated across several time
periods (i.e. 2002–2012) for the base and peak load nests in Figure 5.6 from equations
5.16 and 5.17, respectively, where the percentage change variables are for annual time
steps. The error terms,

bl

and

pl ,

are minimized independently using an ordinary

least squares estimator.

g − σ bl ·
qtg = Q

pgt −


t


sqt · pt

+

bl

for t ∈ EBL

(5.16)
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Figure 5.6.: Production structure for capacity utilization. Composite sectors are in
italics.

qtg

g − σ pl ·
=Q

pgt

−




sqt

· pt

+

pl

for t ∈ EP L

(5.17)

t

where EBL and EP L are the sets of base and peak load technologies, respectively.
Therefore, the relevant data are annual generation for each technology, qtg , and annual
costs of generation by technology, pgt . The variable Qg can be constructed by summing
qtg across all technologies, and sqt is constructed by by share-weighting qtg over the
EBL and EP L sets. EIA (2015b) and other EIA databases have annual data on qtg
from 2002 to 2012. Moving from annual level variables to annual percentage change
variables is straightforward.
Changes in annual costs of generation by technology are constructed from the
following equation:
pgt =



cit · pit

(5.18)

i

where cit is the share of the cost of input i (i.e. fuel, O&M, and capital) in producing
using technology t (i.e. cost structure), and pit is the percentage change in price of
input i in technology t. Cost structures for each technology are taken from the
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GTAP-Power database (Chapter 3). Annual values for pit are required for each
technology to determine pgt ; alternatively, annual changes in price pit from the base
levelized cost estimates in Chapter 2 are required to determine pgt . BLS (2015) has
data on labor costs, pO&M,t , in the total electric power sector, and uniform changes,
pO&M,t , are applied across all technologies. The impact on total price will depend
on the share of O&M in the cost structure of the particular technology. Fuel prices
for coal, oil , and gas (measured in real price per MMBTu observed in the electricity
sector) are also available from EIA (2015b) for the relevant time period. Capital
costs are assumed to be constant since we are investigating short-term changes in
generation from factor utilization only (
pk,t = 0).
The multi-period calibration procedure estimates annual QCES parameters for
base and peak load technology substitution to be 0.462 and 0.472, respectively. More
observations would be needed to econometrically estimate these parameters (here n =
10). It is worth noting that general equilibrium modeling takes the perspective that
prices and quantities are endogenously determined, as opposed to exogenous prices
in this estimation, and the greater concern are the feedbacks in the structure of the
economy. It may be worth varying the parameter in the CGE model using systematic
sensitivity analysis to represent the uncertainty (Arndt, 1996). For example, an
increase in substitution would make utilization more elastic. More observations would
be required to be certain of the “true” parameter value (if a “true” parameter value
even exists).
Of greater interest than the signiﬁcance of the parameter values is how well
these parameter values characterize factor utilization in an economic model. While
the lack of econometrically supported parameters in these models is one of the
major criticisms of DeCanio (2003), the detailed representation of electricity and
the validation exercises addresses two other major criticisms. The following section
describes the capacity utilization validation.
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5.3.3 Capacity Factor Utilization Validation
The parameters mapping the ﬂexibility of supply from existing capacity, σtva , and
parameters describing substitution between existing capacity, σ bl and σ pl , are now
speciﬁed in the capacity utilization version of the model with exogenously speciﬁed
capacity expansion (i.e. expansion is controlled in these simulations). The model is
subjected to shifts to the main determinants of factor utilization (i.e. fuel prices)
and some important longer-term determinants of demand and supply (i.e. per capita
income, population, and technical eﬃciency of the electricity sector). The following
total electricity demand equation and zero-proﬁt condition, combined with derived
demands and supply response for inputs (Equations 5.3–5.7) and derived demands
for electricity generating technologies (Equations 5.16–5.18), complete the equilibrium
model for capacity utilization:
g = −
ag + y + p
op +
Q



su · μu · Pg

(5.19)

u

Pg =



sqt · pgt

(5.20)

t

where 
ag is the percentage change in technical eﬃciency of electricity use, y is the
percentage change in gross national income per capita, p
op is the percentage change
in population, su is the end-use share of total electricity demanded by user category
u (comprised of industrial, commercial, and residential), μu is the demand elasticity
for electricity by user, and Pg is the aggregate price of demanded electricity.

5.3.3.1 Baseline Factor Utilization Validation
The model validation uses a base year of 2007 from which the power sector is
shifted retrospectively to 2002 and prospectively to 2012.2 The results for the change
in capacity factor for each technology are then compared to the observed capacity
2
The baseline validation was initially performed with the GTAPv8 database with a base year of
2007. Using a base year of 2007 is advantageous because it allows for validation before and after
structural change in fuel prices brought on by the shale oil and gas boom in the US.
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factors over that same time period. The deviations from the observed values are
expected to become more pronounced as the deviation from 2007 increases because
of the compounding inﬂuence of other uncontrolled longer-term determinants as well
as the interaction between existing and new capacity (which is introduced in the full
model later). Still, the capacity utilization validation lends conﬁdence in the model’s
ability to capture the response of existing electricity generation technologies in the
aggregate region to economic and policy shocks.
Table 5.2.: Shocks to key drivers of capacity factor from 2002–2012. 2007 is the
reference year for GTAPv8. In percentage change from reference year. All are
exogenous shifts except 
ag , which is an output from the model.
Exogenous shifts (percentage deviation from 2007)
g

Model Output
qtc


ag

y

p
op

pcoal

pgas

poil

pO&M

Q

2002

-9.844

-4.517

-18.622

-42.304

-46.322

7.177

-7.176

2.290

2003

-7.612

-3.693

-18.526

-14.592

-31.962

4.250

-6.581

3.550

2004

-4.863

-2.797

-15.680

-8.009

-34.339

5.870

-4.479

3.230

2005

-2.602

-1.897

-7.648

22.566

-4.662

-2.729

-2.438

1.310

2006

-1.181

-0.947

-1.820

0.369

-10.653

0.366

-2.214

2007

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

2008

-0.947

0.950

12.602

22.148

45.969

2.442

-0.899

2009

-4.639

1.839

20.647

-35.582

-5.395

6.760

-4.966

4.900

2010

-2.728

2.695

21.922

-31.942

26.491

10.082

-0.762

1.310

2011

-1.723

3.483

24.440

-38.820

60.409

13.766

-1.362

2.750

2012

-0.384

4.276

21.407

-56.569

57.157

14.019

-2.622

7.060

EIA (2015)

Year

Table 5.2 shows the exogenous shifts imposed in the model.

1.930
-0.756

Population

consistently increases from 2002 to 2012. Coal prices increase from 2003 to 2008
and are relatively ﬂat otherwise. Gas prices increase from 2002 to 2009 then fall
sharply as the US shale oil and gas boom, which began in 2007, takes shape. Oil
prices generally increase over the time period but with large ﬂuctuations. Fuel prices
per MWh of electricity generated are shown in Figure 5.7.
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Figure 5.7.: Fuel prices per MWh of electricity produced (nominal dollars)

2,000
1,750

Terawatt-hours

1,500
1,250
1,000
750
500
250

2002
2003
Coal (Obs)
Coal (Model)

2004
2005
GasBL (Obs)
GasBL (Model)

2006
2007
OilP (Obs)
OilP (Model)

2008

2009
2010
GasP (Obs)
GasP (Model)

2011
2012
Total Gas (Obs.)
Total Gas (Model)

Figure 5.8.: Validation of capacity factor portion of model. Model results are
represented by large markers and are not connected because they are each shifted
separately from the 2007 base year. Observed values are gray, dashed lines.

The model results correlate well with the observed values (see Figure 5.8 and
Table 5.4)3 ; however, there are two important time periods with larger deviations
3

Model results are represented by large markers and are not connected because they are each shifted
separately from the 2007 base year. That is, 2007 to 2008, 2007 to 2009, etc. This representation is
used in the charts throughout.
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between the observed generation and the model results. First, between 2002 and
2005 the model projects too little coal generation and too much gas generation in
base load power, and the model projects too little oil generation in peak load power.
Second, between 2011 and 2012 the model projects too much coal generation and too
little gas generation in base load. This may be partly due to attempts by the federal
government to regulate mercury as well as structural change in coal contract duration
(leading to increasing substitutability from coal with time).
In March 2005, the Clean Air Mercury Rule (CAMR) issued by the US
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sought to permanently cap and reduce
mercury emissions from power plants by 70%. This was later vacated in 2008, but it
signaled that the federal government was targeting mercury emissions by coal and
oil-ﬁred generation. In the context of the model, prior to 2005 the actual cost
(excluding the cost of prospective regulation) of coal and oil power may actually
be lower than the shifts imposed on the 2007 economy.4 This would explain some of
the deviation between the observed and model results between 2002 and 2005.
Subsequently in March 2011, the EPA announced the Mercury and Air Toxics
Standards (MATS) which aimed to reduce mercury emissions from coal and oil
emissions more aggressively by up to 91%. This standard would contribute to a
higher actual cost (including prospective regulation) of coal and oil power than in the
model shifts after 2011.5 This might explain part of the deviation in years 2011 and
2012.
While neither the CAMR nor MATS is law at the time of writing this dissertation,
several utilities have already installed equipment to limit mercury emissions in
anticipation of such legislation (EIA, 2014). The regulations also may have signaled
to the electric power industry that they should have higher future cost expectations
for coal-ﬁred generation; this permeates the validation.
4

The projected annualized compliance cost of CAMR and CAIR (a related measure for sulfur oxide
and nitrous oxide) is $2.5 billion or about 1.5 $/MWh (USD 2007) (EPA, 2005)
5
The projected annualized compliance cost of MATS is $9 billion for coal-ﬁred generation or about
4.7 $/MWh (USD 2007) (EPA, 2011)
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In addition, the elasticities of substitution used in the validation were calibrated
on an annual basis to control for interactions with capacity expansion. However, the
long-term elasticity of substitution in base load power might be greater because of
the decreasing term of coal contracts. In the US electricity sector 93% of coal in 2011
was purchased on contracts longer than one year with a median around three or four
years which limits substitutability by contractually obligating coal generation. Only
44% of gas was purchased on long-term contracts in 2011 (Macmillan et al., 2013).
The trajectory of observed and model estimates for gas and coal in base load power
in Figure 5.8 seems to imply that, in fact, the two became more substitutable around
2010 which is about three years after the shale oil and gas boom, when natural gas
prices dropped signiﬁcantly compared to coal (Figure 5.7). The greater substitution
observed after 2010 is partly a result of allowing long-term coal contracts to expire or,
at least, allowing renegotiation due to a drop in natural gas prices. The elasticity of
substitution will likely increase as longer-term coal contracts expire and are replaced
by shorter-term contracts or even spot prices.

5.3.3.2 Policy-Adjusted Factor Utilization Validation
Top-down models are generally limited to price-based policies, and structural
change is represented implicitly via elasticities (Hourcade et al., 2006).

Both

limitations make the aforementioned federal and industry policies a challenge to
introduce in the model. Instead, monetary costs of meeting mercury regulations
and a higher elasticity of substitution after the signiﬁcant drop in gas prices in 2009
are used to adjust for the aforementioned federal and industry policies. These coarse
adjustments should help to explain some of the gap between the baseline validation
and the observed values.
Table 5.3 shows the new shifts which are used in addition to the shifts the
validation described in Table 5.2 along with alternate elasticities of substitution for
base load power to account for the reduction in coal contract duration. We assume
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that the average coal contract duration is three years with expiration uniformly
distributed over those three years.6

Although in reality contracts have diﬀerent

beginning and end points as well as duration, we assume that coal contracts will
expire, shorten, or be signiﬁcantly renegotiated beginning in 2008 as a result of the
sharp decrease in gas price (i.e. one-third expire in 2008, one-third in 2009, and
one-third in 2010). This implies that the estimated annual elasticity of substitution
for base load power would double in 2009 and triple in 2010 (i.e. all the number
of contracts now are expired or available for renegotiation) where it remains in the
long-term.
Table 5.3.: Additional shifts to key drivers of capacity factor from 2002 - 2012. 2007
is the reference year for GTAPv8. In percent change from reference year. All are
exogenous shifts except 
ag , which is an output from the model.
Additional exogenous shifts

6

Model Output

Year


tccoalbl


tcoilp

σ bl


ag

2002

-7.5

-7.5

0.462

2.570

2003

-7.5

-7.5

0.462

3.840

2004

-7.5

-7.5

0.462

3.520

2005

-7.5

-7.5

0.462

1.580

2006

-

-

0.462

1.930

2007

-

-

-

-

2008

-

-

0.462

-0.756

2009

-

-

0.924

4.350

2010

-

-

1.386

0.926

2011

-

-

1.386

2.270

2012

23.5

23.5

1.386

5.770

An average of three years is consistent with volume-weighted state average contract lengths in
Macmillan et al. (2013). Kozhevnikova and Lange (2009) report an average coal contract duration
of 4.40 years between 1979 and 1999, but contract durations have been decreasing since that study
period due to the fall in gas price (EIA, 2015c).
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Figure 5.9.: Reﬁnement of capacity factor validation using additional insights. Model
results are represented by large markers and are not connected because they are each
shifted separately from the 2007 base year. Observed values are gray, dashed lines

Figure 5.9 shows the results of the validation after the regulation and parameter
adjustments. The numerical value of the reﬁned shifts and parameters are crude
estimates since the regulations were not passed, and there is insuﬃcient data to
estimate how the elasticity of substitution in the electricity sector may have changed
in response to a decoupling of oil and gas prices and the subsequent fall in gas
prices. However, these insights are shown to be an important aspect in modeling the
evolution of electricity. Table 5.4 shows that these qualitative insights improve the
correlation between the observed generation and the model predictions. Therefore,
these retrospective insights are retained in the subsequent analysis.
There still remains a large diﬀerence in the predictions for coal and gas in base
load and between oil and gas in peak load generation from 2002 to 2005. This may be
indicative of the threat of future regulation of mercury in coal and oil power imposed
a higher expected future cost of these generation types than that of just the expected
upgrade costs to meet CAMR regulations. Coal has been a target for regulators for
some time.

132
Table 5.4.: Comparison of correlation between observations and model predictions
for the baseline and the policy-adjusted validation.
Baseline

Policy-adjusted

Gain

CoalBL

0.743

0.947

+0.204

GasBL

0.899

0.950

+0.051

OilP

0.845

0.847

+0.002

GasP

0.923

0.924

+0.001

Total Gas

0.953

0.956

+0.003

5.3.4 Summary of Capacity Utilization
This section presented the capacity utilization portion of the electricity-detailed
model and shows that it performs well with exogenous capacity. The substitution
across generation types using existing capacity results in a change in the rates of
returns to each technology. For instance, if the capacity factor of gas power increases
(
ct ) more than other technologies, then gas power will have a higher return per unit
of existing capacity (
pk,t ). This increases the value of the technology in the capacity
expansion stage. Furthermore, a higher capacity factor in a ﬂexible technology might
crowd-out some of the returns from inﬂexible technologies. For instance, if gas power
becomes inexpensive, nuclear power may see diminished returns on its capital. These
rental rates partly determine the amount of investment and expansion in each type
of capacity in the following section. Both the capacity factor and the rates of return
from the utilization portion are passed on to the capacity expansion portion of the
model, which is presented and analyzed in the following section.

5.4 Capacity Expansion
It is important to deﬁne the diﬀerence between nominal (or nameplate) capacity
and eﬀective generating capacity. Nominal capacity refers to the actual MW of
capacity installed, while eﬀective capacity refers to the capacity that can reasonably
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be used to provide electricity generation (i.e. weighted by the capacity factor). Since
generation is what balances supply and demand, eﬀective capacity is important for
decision-making in expansion. In the electricity-detailed model the percentage change
in quantity of capital (i.e. qtc ) directly maps to percentage changes in nominal capacity.
Recall the motivating relationship in equation 5.2, the capacity factor is given as:

ct = qtg − qtc

(5.21)

where 
ct is the percentage change in capacity factor for technology t, qtg is the
percentage change in generation by technology t, and qtc is the percentage change
in nominal capacity for technology t. The relationship between nominal and eﬀective
capacity is given by:
qte = qtc · ct

(5.22)

where qte and qtc are the eﬀective and nominal capacity, respectively. The total eﬀective
capacity changes can be decomposed into additional and retiring capacity. The rate
of nominal retirements are a function of the changes in returns to capacity, pct , and the
annual rate of retirements deﬁned by the inverse of the technical lifetime of existing
plants. This captures the “economic lifetime” of the plant where a plant may extend
its lifetime if the rate of return is higher or shorten if the returns become lower.7
qtcr =

(100 − pct )
· rt · t
100

qter = qtcr · cft

(5.23)
(5.24)

where qtcr and qter are the percentage change in nominal and eﬀective capacity for
technology t due to retirements, respectively. The coeﬃcient cf t links the change in
capacity utilization to the eﬀective capacity (cf t ≡
7


ct
100

− 1). This coeﬃcient factor is

Data prior to 2014 is given as net capacity changes rather than distinguishing between additions
and retirements.
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one of the three linkages between capacity utilization and capacity expansion shown
in the original conceptual model in Figure 5.2.
Additional eﬀective capacity is the sum of the net eﬀective capacity and total
retired eﬀective capacity net of changes in total capacity utilization from all
technologies.
g − C
=Q
ea −
Q



sqt · qter

(5.25)

t

 is the percentage change in total capacity factor and Q
ea is the required
where C
additional eﬀective generation in the sector, and sqt is the share of electricity generated
by technology t. This accounting condition is in generation (eﬀective capacity) terms
to ensure additional capacity meets the generation-based requirements.
We can determine the eﬀective capacity additions for each technology according
to the following equations:
ea
sqt · qtea = sat · Q

(5.26)

qtca = cf t · qtea

(5.27)

where qtea and qtca are the eﬀective and nominal capacity additions, respectively. The
coeﬃcient sat is the share of eﬀective capacity additions allocated to each technology
t.
These shares are derived using a multinomial logit (MNL) model where the utility
Ut is solely a function of the change in rate of return on the capital in technology t,
that is Ut = α · Ptc where the coeﬃcient α, marginal impact on utility from rate of
return, is assumed identical across generation types and can be calibrated to data.8 .
8

This highly-constrained MNL model is validated later. Given additional data, an alternate MNL
model could estimated with econometrics
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The variable Ptc is the level of rate of return on new capacity and is linked to rental
rates of existing capacity by the following equation.9 .
pct = pk,t + 
at − 
tct

(5.28)

where pct is the percentage change in rate of return of new capacity, pk,t is the
percentage change in rental rate of existing capacity due to change in capacity factor
which comes from the capacity utilization portion of the model, 
at is the percentage
change of technological eﬃciency of new capacity (compared to existing capacity),
and 
tct are capital taxes/subsidies for new capacity.
This speciﬁcation results in the following equation for sat :
c

eα·Pt
sat =  α·P c
t
te

(5.29)

Thus, the resulting long-term capital growth, capacity expansion, is:
qtc = qtca − qtcr

(5.30)

This is the third linkage by which capacity expansion feeds back into capacity
utilization for ﬂexible technologies because net changes in capacity will impact the
utilization rates of the sector.

5.5 Joint Capacity Utilization and Expansion Validation
The purpose of the joint capacity utilization and expansion validation is to test
how the model performs in predicting both total capacity expansion as well as
contributions from each generating technology given changes in capital rents from
capacity utilization – as shown in the previous validation.
9

Here it is assumed that the original rate of return is equal amongst existing capacity. This seems to
be a reasonable assumption with a base year of 2007. Prior to 2007 there was little variation, which
some exception, in capacity growth (i.e. no large diﬀerence in rate of return). This assumption may
need to be changed in the future with renewables and gas displacing coal and oil power.
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The foremost diﬃculty in validating capacity expansion arises from the lag
between planning period to expected service (i.e. lead time) and the changes in
economic conditions during that time. Tidball et al. (2010) reports a roughly four
year lead time from capacity order to expected service; nuclear and coal may be
longer, but do not play a big role in capacity expansion from 2007 to 2018.10 In
reality, there is no natural experiment where an economic shock takes place and the
external environment does not evolve while constructing planned capacity. This is
especially true in light of the economic recession from 2007–2009 and the decline in
gas prices as a result of the US shale oil and gas boom.
This is not to say that a validation is not possible; instead, a validation relies on
qualitative discussion of factors leading to the departures between the model outputs
and observations. The model results are based on shifts from the 2007 base year,
similar to the capacity utilization validation. Nuclear and hydroelectric power are
assumed not to expand in the validation, because both are highly constrained by
regulation and resource availability, respectively and do not respond as quickly to
economic variables. The other technologies are compared to observed capacity from
2007 to 2013 and planned capacity from 2014 to 2018 (EIA, 2015b). We present three
validation exercises, each with slightly diﬀerent assumptions to reinforce conﬁdence
in the model results.
The intent of the ﬁrst validation, termed “targeted total capacity”, is to test
how the model performs in predicting contributions from each generating technology
by controlling for total capacity expansion. Here, capacity expansion in time t is
based on the three driving factors: i) technology available during planning at time
t − 4, ii) assumed perfect information on input prices at time of expected service
t, and iii) a projection of generation needs that controls for actual total capacity
growth. The ﬁrst assumption is reasonable because materials must be purchased
well in advance of expected service; therefore, the technological eﬃciency and capital
10
Project lead times vary by technology. Tidball et al. (2010) report an average time from order to
expected service of 6 years for nuclear power plants, 4 for coal, 4 for hydroelectric, 2-4 years for gas
(depending on technology), 3 for wind, and 2-3 for solar.
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costs of the generating units are based on the planning year, time t − 4. However, the
latter two assumptions may be more contentious, so they are relaxed further in the
subsequent two validation exercises: “planning year prices” and “projected capacity
needs” validations, respectively.

5.5.1 Targeted Total Capacity Validation
In this validation exercise, the shifts and parameters from Tables 5.3 from the
capacity utilization validation and 5.5 below are imposed on the model.
Table 5.5.: Shocks to key drivers of “targeted total capacity” validation from 2007 to
g , are exogenously given to target observed total capacity
2018. Total generation, Q
expansion. Policy-adjusted shifts and parameters from Table 5.3 are included in the
validation but not shown in this table.
Exogenous shifts (percentage deviation from 2007)
Year

Planning (t − 4)

Service (t)


tcsolarp

y

p
op

pcoal

pgas

poil

pO&M

g
Q

2008

30

-0.947

0.950

12.602

22.148

45.969

2.442

0.000

2009

20

-4.639

1.839

20.647

-35.582

-5.395

6.760

2.100

2010

10

-2.728

2.695

21.922

-31.942

26.491

10.082

2.700

2011

-

-1.723

3.483

24.440

-38.820

60.409

13.766

3.600

2012

-10

-0.384

4.276

21.407

-56.569

57.157

14.019

5.200

2013

-20

0.994

5.069

17.643

-45.807

43.594

11.419

1.400

2014

-25

1.396

5.853

17.643

-45.807

43.594

12.382

1.400

2015

-30

2.061

6.852

17.643

-45.807

43.594

13.346

1.000

2016

-33

2.727

7.729

17.643

-45.807

43.594

14.309

1.000

2017

-36

3.392

8.606

17.643

-45.807

43.594

15.272

0.800

2018

-40

4.058

9.482

17.643

-45.807

43.594

16.236

0.600

Figure 5.10 shows that the validation controls for total capacity expansion using
g , shown in the ﬁnal column of Table 5.5. The
the total generation projections, Q
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economic recession from 2007–2009 stiﬂed electricity demand. We can observe some
of the lagged eﬀects in Figure 5.10. Because the recession was not foreseen and
capacity expansion occurs over a 3–5 year time frame, capacity continued to enter
service after these years despite the lack of electricity demand and true capacity needs.
The forecasts were revised during the recessions causing the capacity to decrease from
2012–2013 before rising again after the recession ended. These confounding factors
show the need to control for total capacity growth in this validation. In the broader
context, it shows that the electricity sector is highly dependent on linkages in the rest
of the economy and reinforces the motivation of this dissertation to understand the
role of electricity in the context of the economy as a whole.
1,100

Gigawatts
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Total Capacity (Obs)
Total Capacity (Model)
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2016

2017

2018

2019

Figure 5.10.: The “targeted total capacity” validation controls for total capacity
expansion. Model results are for each year are changes from the 2007 baseline.

As hypothesized earlier, the “targeted total capacity” validation using service
year input prices over-predicts the observed capacity growth in gas power. This is
because the model gives the optimal capacity expansion given service year prices,
while investment decisions would actually be made in the planning years (≈ t − 4)
when prices of gas were relatively higher (see Figure 5.7). This deviation is represented
by the shaded area in Figure 5.11a. Similarly, because gas and coal are highly
substitutable (shown in the capacity utilization module) we observe a faster decline
in coal capacity – represented by the shaded area in Figure 5.11b. In years after the
fall in gas prices the model predictions for gas power and the predictions for the rate
of coal retirements more closely mirror those of the observations. This validation fails
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(a) Gas capacity expansion in “targeted total capacity” validation. Model results are for
each year are changes from the 2007 baseline.
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(b) Coal capacity expansion in “targeted total capacity” validation. Model results are for
each year are changes from the 2007 baseline.

Figure 5.11.: Gas prices unexpectedly fell beginning in 2008, so due to assumption
of input prices at service year instead of input price at planning year, the model
over-predicts expansion of gas capacity. The model predicts a more immediate turn
from new coal capacity while there is some lag in the observed data.

in a predictable way which lends support for the validity of the capacity expansion in
response to fuel prices. The “planned year prices” validation uses planned year prices
and corrects for some of the deviation in gas power.
Another point to note regarding coal retirements is that they may not respond
immediately to economic stimuli. In this model the base annual rate of retirement
is the technical rate of retirement (inverse of technical lifetime).

The rate of

retirement increases if the returns to capacity decline, and vice versa, to reﬂect the
economic lifetime (see Equation 5.23). In reality, coal retirements may not be so
price responsive. The annual rate of retirements and planned retiremetns observed
in the data from 2007 to 2018 is roughly 1.1% of total capacity which implies an
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economic lifetime of nearly 90 years, well over their technical lifetime (roughly 60
years), despite decreasing returns to capacity. This may be due to the fact that
many of these plants are already paid oﬀ and environmental policies preclude the
construction of replacement coal plants. There is also uncertainty whether the recent
decline in gas prices will continue over the long-term. Coal power operators may elect
to produce electricity using existing plants as long as possible, even by co-ﬁring with
gas or biomass, to hedge against future fuel price uncertainty and to avoid costly
capacity expansion. It may be useful to treat coal power retirements exogenously
in long-run analysis, especially in analyzing environmental policy where coal is a
signiﬁcant contributor.
One of the most important trends in the US electricity sector is the expected rise
in renewables in response to both technological change and GHG policy. Figure 5.12
shows the model performs fairly well for both technologies despite the rapid growth
observed from 2007 onward which is diﬃcult to predict with certainty. Correlations
for each technology are shown in Table 5.6.

5.5.2 Planning Year Prices Validation
As we observed in Figure 5.11a using service year prices leads to over-predictions of
capacity expansion toward gas power. The “planning year prices” validation attempts
to correct for some of this by using planning year prices (t − 4). This might better
reﬂect the initial planning decisions, but neglects the opportunity to adjust capacity
expansion plans during the construct phase (e.g. canceling contracts). We might
expect reality to lie somewhere in between the two price assumptions. Figure 5.13
shows that using planning year prices in the model provides a better ﬁt to the observed
capacity growth. It also shows an outlier in 2012 (i.e. 2008 prices). This is because
the model is sensitive to fuel prices. As mentioned, there could have been some
year-to-year adjustment in response to reduced gas prices after 2008 (i.e. canceling
other contracts and more gas capacity planning in 2009 and after that would have
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(a) Wind capacity expansion in “targeted total capacity” validation. Model results are for
each year are changes from the 2007 baseline.
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(b) Solar capacity expansion in “targeted total capacity” validation. Model results are for
each year are changes from the 2007 baseline.

Figure 5.12.: The model does well to predict capacity expansion in renewable power.
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come into service in 2012). Generally, equilibrium analysis is useful for long-run
planning, so any price shock used in a normal equilibrium modeling scenario would
be expected to be a sustained shock and this outlier does not discredit the model’s
long-run predictive power.
The “planning year prices” validation in combination with the “targeted total
capacity” validation reinforces the assertion that the electricity-detailed model can
reasonably predict the contributions to total capacity expansion from individual
generating technologies.
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Figure 5.13.: Gas capacity expansion in the “planning year price” validation. Using
planning year input prices corrects for the over-prediction using service year prices,
but does not allow for year-to-year planning adjustments. Model results are for each
year are changes from the 2007 baseline.

5.5.3 Projected Capacity Needs Validation
The “targeted total capacity” validation controls for total capacity expansion;
however, in a practical modeling scenario the total capacity expansion would be
endogenously derived based on the growth in electricity demand. The “projected
capacity needs” validation uses a four-year rolling average of generation predictions
to endogenously determine total capacity expansion.
The intent of using a four-year average for projected generation is to control for
year-to-year variations such as the drop in electricity demand during the economic
recession from 2007–2009. Figure 5.14 shows that observed electricity generation was
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almost always below the EIA AEO predictions. Viewed in light of the long-term
planning horizon in capacity expansion, an over-expansion in the sector would be
expected until roughly four years after the recession in 2007–2008; this is observed in
Figure 5.10.
Because the AEO projections consistently over-estimated generation needs from
2008–2014 we would expect the model to also over-estimate the actual capacity
expansion to some extent. The shaded area labeled “A” in Figure 5.15 shows this
to be largely the case. We also observe some deviation for years 2017 and 2018 (the
shaded area labeled “B” in Figure 5.15. This is likely due to the fact that planned
capacity for 2018 in the EIA data does not account for all the total capacity needs,
since it is not necessary to plan four years in advance for some technologies (e.g.
wind, solar) which is also why we also observe a plateau in planned expansion of
these technologies in 2017 and 2018 as well (Figure 5.12).
The “projected capacity needs” validation shows that the model can reasonably
predict total capacity expansion over the long-run, given reasonable projections in
total electricity generation.
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Figure 5.14.: Model results for each year are changes from the 2007 baseline.

144
1,150
B

Gigawatts

1,100
1,050
A
1,000

Total Capacity (Obs)
Total Capacity (Model)

950

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

Figure 5.15.: Model results for each year are changes from the 2007 baseline.

5.5.4 Overall Validation
The intent of the three validation exercises is to test the ability of the model to
reasonably predict total capacity expansion as well as the individual contribution from
individual technologies. Figure 5.6 shows that all of the validations show high levels of
correlation between the model predictions and the observed values for contributions
from individual technologies with some exceptions. The “other” power sector is poorly
correlated. This may be because the technologies which comprise this aggregate
group (e.g. geothermal, municipal waste, biogas) are resource constrained, similar to
hydroelectric and nuclear, and do not respond as quickly to economic conditions as
other technologies.
The ﬁrst validation exercise, “targeted total capacity” validation showed that
the model reasonably predicts the contributions to total capacity expansion for each
technology. There were expected deviations for gas power expansion because of the
service year fuel price assumption, which was relaxed in the subsequent “planning
year price” validation.
The shale gas boom and subsequent drop in gas price was largely not predicted by
the power sector planners. Therefore, the “targeted total capacity” validation that
uses prices at time of service would be expected to overestimate the initial shift to
gas power from coal power. This hypothesis is clearly apparent in the results; that
is, the “targeted total capacity” fails in an expected way given additional qualitative
information. The “planning year price” validation instead used input prices from
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Table 5.6.: Comparison of correlation between the targeted total capacity (TTC),
planning year prices (PYP), and predicted capacity needs (PCN) validations. Each
validation has limitations arising from the assumptions, but each lends support to
the overall validity of the model. *The low value in correlation here is due to a single
outlier.
TTC

PYP

PCN

Coal Power

0.916

0.942

0.924

Total Gas

0.898

0.919

0.926

Total Oil

0.978

0.929

0.972

Wind

0.974

0.976

0.901

Solar

0.967

0.626*

0.941

Nuclear

-

-

-

Hydroelectric

-

-

-

Other

0.489

-0.130

0.225

Total Capacity

0.999

0.999

0.908

the planning year, t − 4. This validation no longer shows the initial overestimate of
gas power, but still is not quite reasonable because it does not allow for year-to-year
adjustment (e.g. canceling contracts) once price changes are realized during the
construction period. The “planned year prices” validation shows correlation gains for
gas and coal power which numerically supports the observations in Figures 5.11 and
5.13. Reality is likely somewhere in between these alternate input price assumptions.
In a modeling scenario, a price shock would be imposed with the presumption it
is a long-term price change; both validations serve to support conﬁdence in price
response. Also, the low correlation for solar in the “planning year prices” validation
is due to a single outlier discussed in the previous section. The correlation increases
to 0.85 when that outlier is removed. This demonstrates the sensitivity of the model
and raises some concern regarding ﬂuctuating input prices but is of less concern in
long-run analysis.
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The “targeted total capacity” validation controls for total capacity so the shares
of capacity growth by technology can be seen clearly; however, in a normal modeling
scenario the total capacity needs would need to be endogenously derived from some
economic shock (e.g projection of generation needs or preferably from projections of
income, population, and technical eﬃciency). Therefore, the ﬁnal validation, termed
the “projected capacity needs” validation, assumes the projected generation for year
t to be the average of predictions for year t from the EIA Annual Energy Outlook
(AEO) for years t − 5 to t − 2. The four-year rolling average of projections controls
some of the confounding year-to-year adjustment mentioned above and returns total
capacity expansion which is shown to correlate well with observations with predictable
deviations. The “projected capacity needs” validation shows a high level of correlation
between model predictions and observations of total capacity expansion.

5.6 Summary
The electricity-detailed partial equilibrium model presented in this chapter ﬁts
well in the space between bottom-up models which do not capture endogenous price
feedbacks and economy-wide impacts and top-down models which have insuﬃcient
detail in the electricity sector for many relevant technology and policies. The model
captures important mechanisms for substitution of electricity generating technologies:
capacity utilization, expansion, and their interdependency. Both utilization and
expansion are validated against observations of generation and capacity in the United
States and perform quite well - especially compared to other economy-wide capable
models that are rarely validated in practice. The capacity utilization validation
showed strong correlation for generation changes with existing capacity (See Figures
5.8 and 5.9 and Table 5.4). The capacity expansion validation showed an ability to
predict contributions to total capacity expansion for individual technologies as well
as an ability to capture total capacity changes (see Table 5.6). These lend support
for the predictive power of the electricity-detailed partial equilibrium model.
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Therefore, we can conclude that the model overcomes two key criticisms of global
economic models oﬀered by DeCanio (2003) who argues that: i) models are rarely
validated against actual observations, and ii) models do not have suﬃcient sector-level
detail. Despite the demonstrated predictive power, more work may be needed to
rigorously estimate the parameters selected for the current version of the model,
which will hinge on the availability of longer time series of data.
The following chapter shows the applicability of the model in answering a question
for which it is well-suited. What are the diﬀerent electricity generation mixes resulting
from a carbon tax and from a wind and solar investment subsidy used to meet the
US Environmental Protection Agency’s Clean Power Plan?
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CHAPTER 6. ON THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR RESPONSE TO THE CLEAN
POWER PLAN: CARBON TAX VERSUS INVESTMENT SUBSIDY

While it has been shown that electricity is an important factor in economic
development, the sector outputs potentially harmful greenhouse gas (GHG). An
estimated 41%, or 12.5 billion tons, of the worldwide CO2 emissions from fuel
combustion comes from electricity and heat production (IEA, 2012). The US EPA
estimated the electric sector was responsible for about one-third of US GHG (CO2
equivalent) emissions in 2011. In addition to the direct greenhouse gas emissions
from electricity production, the life-cycle extends to the upstream (e.g. exploration,
transportation, construction) and downstream sectors (e.g. decommissioning, waste
management). Mitigating climate change by reducing carbon emissions is on the
minds of policymakers worldwide, and the electricity sector is critical to successful
mitigation policy.
On August 3, 2015, the US EPA announced the Clean Power Plan (CPP) to reduce
carbon pollution. The ﬁnal rule promotes ﬂexibility in meeting carbon targets by
focusing on emission performance that reﬂects the “best system of emission reduction”
based on three building blocks for supply-side management: improved plant-level
(namely coal-ﬁred power) eﬃciency, switching from coal to gas power with existing
plants, and constructing more renewable power (EPA, 2015). The second building
block pertains to capacity factor adjustment and the third to capacity expansion.
Therefore, the partial equilibrium model detailed in Chapter 5 is ideally-suited to
study these two interacting mechanisms for meeting requirements of the CPP under
the backdrop of the dynamic energy landscape in the United States. Recall that
bottom-up models neglect economy-wide impacts and largely consider both fuel prices
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and capacity factor to be exogenous while typical top-down models lack the necessary
detail to study these dual mechanisms in the electricity sector.
Table 6.1.: Connecting the EPA CPP building blocks to model mechanisms
determining changes in electricity generation (EPA, 2015).
Description from EPA (2015)

Model
Mechanism

Building
Block 1

reducing the carbon intensity of electricity
generation by improving the heat rate of
existing coal-ﬁred power plants

Building
Block 2

substituting increased electricity generation
from lower-emitting existing natural gas plants
for reduced generation from higher-emitting
coal-ﬁred power plants

Capacity
utilization (
ct )

Building
Block 3

substituting increased electricity generation
from new zero-emitting renewable energy
sources (like wind and solar) for reduced
generation from existing coal-ﬁred power plants

Capacity
expansion (
qtc )

Technical
productivity (
agt )

Previous drafts of the Clean Power Plan rule included a fourth building block:
more eﬃcient electricity use.

Increasing end-use eﬃciency may have signiﬁcant

potential in oﬀsetting total electricity demand in the United States (Wang and
Brown, 2014). The focus of this work is on endogenous supply-side responses (i.e.
capacity utilization and expansion); both supply and demand eﬃciency are considered
implicitly as the diﬀerence between gross national income and an exogenous projection
of electricity demand (Equation 5.19).
The intent of the rule is to give individual states ﬂexibility to meet their
state-speciﬁc targets. The basic options are to establish a carbon trading system
within or across state boundaries (i.e. addressing building blocks 2 and 3) or establish
subsidies or regulations for new capacity (i.e. addressing building block 3 only). While
the CPP is aimed at individual states, the emission target is at the national-level.
The CPP, when fully implemented, aims to reduce carbon pollution from the US
electricity sector by 32% below 2005 levels.
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In order to give some perspective of the CPP target, it is necessary to observe
some important trends in the US electricity sector, especially in terms of some changes
in CO2 intensity, presumably due in part by the same mechanism discussed in the
CPP building blocks. Figure 6.1 shows that CO2 intensity remained fairly constant
from 1989–2007, and decreases signiﬁcantly after 2007 (see area A in Figure 6.1).
This could a result of fuel-switching from coal to gas power (coal being almost twice
as carbon intensive as gas) as observed in Figure 5.9, but could also be a result of
the increase in renewable capacity as observed in Figure 5.12 or several other factors
such as general increasing carbon eﬃciency. If we use the total generation projection
from the EIA Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) 2015 report (EIA, 2015a) combined
with electricity sector-wide projections for CO2 intensity using data from 1989–2013,
we observe a reduction of 8.2% in total CO2 emissions from the 2005 baseline. If
we instead use a projection of CO2 intensity using data from just 2007–2013, where
we observe a decoupling in generation and emissions, the reduction of total CO2
emissions are over 44% from the 2005 baseline. While reality likely lies somewhere in
the middle, Figure 6.1 shows that the momentum from current economic conditions
(e.g. low gas prices, renewable policies, and end-use eﬃciency) will likely reduce the
magnitude of policy interventions needed to meet the CPP target.
The analysis begins by establishing the baseline for 2030 based on current input
prices, policies, and projections of future generation requirements. That is, given
the current US energy-economic landscape with low gas prices, renewable policies,
and increasing electricity end-use eﬃciency, how close to (or how far from) the 32%
target will we end up in 2030. What we ﬁnd is that from increasing returns to gas
capacity due to the increasing capacity utilization observed in Chapter 5 and the
opposite trend in coal, emissions are projected to decrease almost 28% from 2007
levels without additional policy instruments.
Still, policy instruments may be needed to make up the full CPP CO2 target.
Sections 6.2 and 6.3 contrast the impacts of a carbon tax (equivalent to carbon
trading mechanism) with an investment subsidy for only wind and solar power (W+S
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Figure 6.1.: CO2 emissions by source for the US electricity sector from 1989 to 2010,
and as total emissions from 2011 to 2013 (EIA, 2015b). We observe decreasing CO2
intensity from 2007 onward (A). The total generation projection for 2030 is based on
EIA AEO 2015 (EIA, 2015a), and the two total CO2 projections are based on CO2
intensity projections using linear regressions with diﬀerent periods of the emission
data (1989–2013 and 2007–2013).

investment subsidy scenario) to meet carbon reduction targets, and also compares
the resulting generation mixes in each scenario. Section 6.4 concludes.

6.1 Baseline for 2030
The baseline scenario is used to provide a basis for analyzing the carbon tax and
the W+S investment subsidy scenarios. The scenario projects the electric power
sector to 2030 using projections for total generation needs using the most recent EIA
AEO (EIA, 2015a), as well as population (US Census), labor costs as a proxy for
O&M costs (BLS, 2015), and income per household using simple regressions. With
the exception of large shocks such as the US economic recession discussed in Chapter
5, growth rates for these projections are quite stable. We shift fuel prices, taxes,
and technology to 2014 levels. The fuel prices still have a supply response. Given
recent ﬂuctuations in fuel prices resulting from the shale oil and gas boom and the
more recent decline in oil prices (2015), no change may be a satisfactory projection.
Further, empirical evidence on endogenous technological change suggests that the
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price of fuels remains fairly constant in real terms over the long-term, albeit with high
year-to-year variability (Stuermer and Schwerhoﬀ, 2013). Current federal investment
subsidies for wind and solar (i.e. 30% capital subsidy) are included in the baseline
simulation. Because technology is assumed to remain at 2014 levels, the results may
be conservative estimates for relatively new technologies (e.g. wind and solar) that
are improving at a faster rate than traditional technologies. These exogenous shifts
to the 2007 base year are shown in Table 6.2.
Table 6.2.: Shocks to 2030 for baseline scenario based on projections or 2014
observations. Eﬀective taxes from mercury regulation (Table 5.3) and technology
(Table 5.5) are also shifted using 2014 levels. Years 2014 (fuel price year) and 2018
(last year of joint validation) used for reference.
Exogenous shifts (percentage change from 2007)
Projections

2007–2014 change

Model Output

Year

y

p
op

g
Q

pO&M

pcoal

pgas

poil


ag

2007

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

2014

1.396

5.853

1.400 12.382 17.643 -45.807 43.594

5.360

2018

4.058

9.482

0.600 16.236 17.643 -45.807 43.594

9.015

2030 12.044 20.004 12.853 27.765 17.643 -45.807 43.594

17.423

Furthermore, coal and oil capacity are assumed to not expand economically
due to regulatory constraints (e.g. mercury and carbon regulations). Nuclear and
hydroelectric capacity are assumed to not expand economically due to regulatory and
resource constraints, respectively.
There will be additional retirements which will need to be replaced with additional
capacity. Looking back at the results we observed the joint validation in Chapter 5
and because we are using the same fuel price shifts, it is reasonable to assume that
most of the expansion in the 2030 baseline will also come from the gas, solar, and
wind technologies. We can also hypothesize that because capacity utilization changes
in 2030 should roughly match those from the projected capacity validation for 2018
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due to identical fuel price shifts, returns to capacity should be roughly similar and
expansion would probably be in roughly similar shares, despite the highly non-linear
system of equations. This hypothesis does not consider confounding factors from the
capacity expansion.
The results shown in Figure 6.3 and 6.4 support the above hypothesis. We observe
that capacity utilization of ‘GasBL’ increases over 60% while coal power utilization
decreases due to the lower relative price of gas. The story is similar for the reduced
utilization for oil power. Interestingly, we also observe a slight decrease in utilization
of ‘GasP’ which is likely a result of the tremendous growth in solar.
Utilization, in turn, aﬀects the returns to capacity. Pressure from increasing
utilization and capacity expansion in ‘GasBL’ and expansion of wind puts pressure
on inﬂexible technologies that cannot adjust economically (i.e. nuclear and hydro).
Signiﬁcant retirements of both coal and oil capacity (decreasing supply) keeps returns
fairly high for remaining plants, despite their lower utilization rates and inability to
expand.
The interdependency of utilization and expansion are nicely demonstrated for
‘GasBL’ in Figures 6.3 and 6.4. Returns to ‘GasBL’ fall moving out to 2030 due to
signiﬁcant expansion in capacity. With high returns in 2018, ‘GasBL’ encompasses
23% of total capacity expansion, but due to the large expansion some of the returns
are “crowded-out” and the share reduces to 15% in 2030.
As we observe in the validation exercises in Chapter 5, there is strong switching
from coal power to gas power. Also, additional coal plants retire with time. As
a result, total carbon emissions from the US electricity can be expected to drop
approximately 27.7%. Total carbon emissions from coal and oil power reduce by 48%
and 60%, respectively, but is partly oﬀset by a 72% increase in emissions from gas
power. Figure 6.2 shows carbon emissions by source in 2030 compared to 2005.
Interestingly, the baseline scenario projects that with no additional policies the
CPP goals will almost be met by 2030 (27.7% of the 32.0% target).
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Figure 6.2.: Contributions to total CO2 emissions by fuel-type in the United States
in 2005 and model projections for 2030. Emissions from coal and oil reduce by 48%
and 60%, respectively, but is partly oﬀset by a 72% increase in emissions from gas
power. CO2 emissions for other power technologies is small.

155

Percentage change in capacity
utilization

80

2018

60
2030

40
20
0
-20

Nuclear Coal

GasBL Wind

Hydro Other

GasP

Oil

Solar

-40
-60
-80

(a) Capacity utilization changes from 2007–2018 compared to 2007–2030

Percentage change returns to
capacity

30

2018

20

2030

10
0
-10

Nuclear Coal

GasBL Wind

Hydro Other

GasP

Oil

Solar

-20
-30
-40

(b) Returns to capacity changes from 2007–2018 compared to 2007–2030

Figure 6.3.: Capacity utilization in 2018 and 2030 are roughly similar due to similar
fuel price shifts (dissimilar O&M price shifts). This results in returns to capacity
in 2018 and 2030 are roughly similar except for technologies that have diﬃculty
expanding economically due to policy (i.e. coal and oil) or resource and regulatory
constraints (i.e. nuclear and hydro).
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relatively small remainder must be achieved through further incentives through policy
interventions which are discussed in the following section.
The 27.7% reduction predicted here is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than other “business
as usual” (BAU) cases in both bottom-up and top-down literature. For example,
Bushnell et al. (2014) use a bottom-up, partial equilibrium model to analyze
diﬀerences between cap-and-trade and rate-based policies in a handful of western
US states. Their BAU case estimates a 10% increase in emissions from 2007–2030
due to increasing demand because the partial equilibrium model does not consider
increasing returns to capacity due to utilization changes, which would drive expansion
toward gas and away from coal, as in the model described here. This interdependency
between utilization and expansion is usually ignored in least cost optimization models.
As a result the policy intervention needed to meet the CPP target is larger than what
is found in the following chapter. On the other hand, Cai and Arora (2015) use a
CGE model with several generating technologies which substitute imperfectly, which
implicitly captures a combined utilization and expansion eﬀect. The 2030 baseline
in this study predicts an 11% decrease in CO2 emissions. However, characteristic of
most top-down models, the model does not consider important aspects of electricity
production (e.g. base versus peak markets), is not validated, and includes technologies
that do not currently exist in meaningful scale (e.g. carbon capture and storage).
Without considering the interdependency of utilization and expansion (as in many
bottom-up optimization models) estimates of emissions may be too high. Without
explicitly representing and validating these joint mechanism the numbers resulting
from top-down models should be met with appropriate caution. The representation
and validation of capacity utilization and expansion in this model lends credibility to
the estimate of CO2 emissions presented here and in subsequent sections.
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6.2 Policy Scenarios: Carbon Tax and W+S Investment Subsidy
The following policy scenarios target the full 32.0% reduction goal of the CPP in
the US electric power sector. First, a carbon tax on electricity generation technologies,
T CO2 , of $8.9 per metric ton of CO2 is imposed in order to reach the policy target.
Second, equivalent capital (i.e. capacity) subsidies, 
tct , of -27 are given to wind and
solar exclusively. The two policies are equivalent in that they are required meet the
additional 4% reduction needed to meet the full 32.0% reduction in CO2 emissions
from 2005 levels in 2030. These two alternative shifts are shown in Table 6.3 where
2 is the percentage change in CO2 emissions relative to the 2007 economy.
CO
Table 6.3.: Additional shifts to 2030 in addition to baseline shifts in Table 6.2 for
carbon tax and W+S investment subsidy policy scenarios. Both policy scenarios
choose shocks that meet the total CO2 reduction goal of the CPP, 32.0%.
Projections

Policies

Target

tcsolar tcwind

2
CO

Policy

Year


ag

TCO2

Carbon tax

2030

17.423

$8.9

-

-

-32.0

W+S investment subsidy

2030

17.423

-

-27

-27

-32.0

The two alternative policy scenarios would be expected to have diﬀerent impacts
on the economy due to targeting of speciﬁc technologies as well as how the shocks
impact the systems of equations which deﬁne the model economy.
First, the carbon tax targets CO2 directly by internalizing the cost of emissions
via the zero-proﬁt condition for the electricity generating technologies:
pgt =



cit · pit + γt · T CO2

(6.1)

i

where the ﬁrst term is the original zero-proﬁt condition in Equation 5.18 and the
second accounts for the carbon tax. The coeﬃcient, γt , is the CO2 emission factor
(thousand metric tons per GWh) for technology t. Table 6.4 shows that emission
factors are non-zero for coal, gas, oil, and other power, and vary in intensity. The
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carbon tax negatively impacts these technologies while positively impacting other
technologies on a relative basis. On the other hand, the W+S investment subsidy
positively impacts wind and solar while negatively impacting all other technologies
on a relative basis. Under both scenarios, fossil fuel technologies are hurt. The
diﬀerence is in non-fossil fuel technologies that do not receive subsidies (i.e. nuclear
and hydro power), which are impacted positively in the carbon tax but negatively
in the W+S investment subsidy scenario. This is because zero-emitting technologies,
like nuclear and hydro power, are relatively better options under a carbon tax, but are
not included in the wind and solar only subsidies so they are hurt in this case. Fossil
fuel technologies that are less impacted by the carbon tax than others (i.e. gas and
other power) are impacted diﬀerentially in the carbon tax case and uniformly (same
basis) in the W+S investment subsidy case. Therefore, the less carbon intensive
technologies are hurt more in the investment subsidy case.
Table 6.4.: CO2 emissions factors for each technology in the United States. EIA data
for 2007.
Nuclear Coal GasBL Wind Hydro Other GasP
γt

0

1.007

0.477

0

0

0.198

Oil Solar

0.477 1.031

0

The second diﬀerence between the two policy scenarios is how the policies enter
the system of equations that deﬁne the model economy. The primary linkages are
outlined below:
• The carbon tax, TCO2 , will impact the cost of electricity generation via
Equation 6.1.
• The costs of generation impact capacity utilization via Equations 5.17 and 5.16.
• Capacity utilization contributes to the returns to capital via Equation 5.4.
• Returns to capacity and tct contribute to additional capacity growth Equation
5.28 and Equation 5.29.
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• Total capacity changes feed back to the returns to capacity (Equation 5.7) and
cost of generation.
The carbon tax will mainly impact capacity utilization which impacts the returns
to capacity.

The investment subsidies for wind and solar will impact capacity

expansion and aﬀect utilization by crowding-out other technologies. The two diﬀerent
policies reinforces the need to capture the dual mechanisms for substitution in
generation: utilization, expansion, and their interdependency.
The following section follows the primary linkages listed above to interpret the
equilibrium electricity mix in 2030 in response to the two policy scenarios.

6.3 Policy Scenario Discussion
Figure 6.5 shows that the carbon tax increases fuel switching from coal to
gas power as compared to the baseline.

The relative impact on utilization is

correlated with the emission factor – more emissions per GWh more negative impact.
Interestingly, utilization of the technologies in the other technology category actually
switches from negative in the baseline to positive under the carbon tax because it
is relatively less aﬀected than fossil fuel technologies. As expected, the investment
subsidies for wind and solar crowd-out capacity utilization for all technologies that
are not subsidized in a more uniform manner than the carbon tax scenario. As a
result, fossil fuel technologies with lower emission factors (e.g. gas and ‘other’ power)
are hurt relatively more than in the carbon tax scenario, fossil fuel technologies with
higher emission factors (e.g. coal and oil power) are hurt relatively less (see Figure
6.5).
The story in utilization translates easily to the returns to capacity shown in
Figure 6.6.

The carbon tax drives coal capacity returns down while the W+S

investment subsidy drives wind capacity returns up. The high relative returns for
wind crowds-out capacity expansions in gas power which drives returns for gas
a little higher, but also crowds-out capacity expansion in solar power. Without
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Figure 6.5.: A carbon tax reduces capacity utilization for fossil fuels from the baseline
based on relative carbon content (1, 2) while a wind and solar investment subsidy
impacts utilization for all other ﬂexible technologies in a more uniform manner (1, 2,
3).

as much expansion in solar, ‘GasP’ remains an important part of the generation
mix for peak load, and we observe higher returns in the W+S investment subsidy
scenario. Inﬂexible, non-fossil fuel technologies (i.e. nuclear and hydro power) are
impacted positively in the carbon tax case, but hurt tremendously in the investment
subsidy case. This is a known phenomena where the policy essentially picks the
winning technologies, here mainly wind, and implicitly picks losers despite the losing
technologies’ ability to address the stated goal (i.e. reduction in CO2 emissions).
The resulting generation mix from the two policy scenarios diﬀer in three main
ways.

First, in the carbon tax scenario all non-fossil fuel technologies expand.

This includes nuclear and hydro which would also be expected to expand even
more if regulatory restrictions were reduced for nuclear or hydro resources made
available. Picking the winners (wind and solar) constrains the returns for these other
technologies. Recall, that the model limits movement in these technologies due to
their imperfect response to economic stimuli; still, the direction of change is important
especially when analyzing the results with this type of qualitative information (as
shown in the validation exercises in Chapter 5). Second, the diﬀerential taxation
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Figure 6.6.: Absolute returns for fossil fuels are reduced by the carbon tax and less
impacted by the wind and solar investment subsidies (4). Returns to other zero
emissions technologies that not subsidized are hurt by the investment subsidy scenario
(5).

of carbon emissions between gas and coal leads to additional fuel switching from
coal to gas power; however, there is a decrease in both gas and coal power in the
W+S investment subsidy scenario. Third, as expected wind expands more in the
subsidy case. Finally, there is signiﬁcant interdependence in capacity expansion
and utilization, as we observe with increasing utilization of ‘GasP’ (because of
crowding-out of expansion due to wind capacity returns) despite subsidies for solar
power expansion which also leads to a reduction in total solar power.
Recall that the CPP focuses on emission performance that reﬂects the “best
system of emission reduction” based on three building blocks for supply-side
management:

1) improved plant-level (namely coal-ﬁred power) eﬃciency, 2)

switching from coal to gas power with existing plants, and 3) constructing more
renewable power. Both policy scenarios address the third building block. Renewable
(i.e. nuclear, hydro, wind, and solar) capacity increases 5.0% with a carbon tax
and 7.9% with W+S investment subsidies. However, the story is slightly diﬀerent
for building block 2 – switching from coal to gas power with existing plants. The
baseline case with no additional CO2 emission policies shows that 41.39% of total
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Figure 6.7.: Power generation in 2030. A carbon tax allows some zero emission
technologies (i.e. boxes with vertical lines) to expand slightly while these are reduced
in the W+S subsidy case. The carbon tax allows for greater switching from gas to
coal (CPP building block 2) as compared to the W+S subsidy case. As expected
larger growth in wind and solar is observed with the subsidies.

electricity production from either coal and gas power comes from coal power. Coal
power’s share reduces to 39.94% with the carbon tax which indicates additional fuel
switching from the baseline. However, with subsidies to wind and solar the share of
coal power increases to 41.45% which indicates that expanding renewable capacity
(CPP building block 3) may compromise building block 2.
The cost of total electricity production increases 8.8% in the baseline scenario,
primarily due to increasing labor costs. The carbon tax increases the electricity
costs an additional 3.0%, which reduces total electricity demand, while the W+S
investment subsidy decreases electricity costs by 0.6%, increasing demand slightly
(see Figure 6.7). The total electricity cost may have important impacts in both tax
receipts and welfare analysis, which are not considered here.
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Another important point in this analysis is that the biggest contributor to
emissions in the US electricity sector comes from coal power; however, none of the
CPP building blocks explicitly call for retiring coal plants. Reducing electricity
generation from coal requires reducing utilization as well as reducing capacity.
Building block 2 helps drive retirements because diﬀerential relative prices (e.g.
inexpensive gas) and taxes (e.g. carbon tax) can drive down utilization of coal
which also reduces returns to capacity and increases retirements. Because the W+S
investment subsidy does not reduce the returns to coal power as much as the carbon
tax in absolute terms (Figure 6.6), the rate of coal retirements is lower (50.6%
reduction in coal capacity with a carbon tax and only 48.0% with the W+S investment
subsidies). As Chapter 5 notes, coal retirements may not be so price responsive, and
it may be worthwhile to treat coal retirements exogenously and perform sensitivity
analysis on the rates of retirement. In the absence of a carbon tax, subsidies might
be more eﬀective if they are designed to provide an additional incentive to retire coal
plants to ensure that both building blocks 2 and 3 are met simultaneously.

6.4 Conclusions and Future Work
This chapter applies the partial equilibrium model described in Chapter 5 using
the data for the US electricity sector constructed in Chapters 2–4. A carbon tax and
an investment subsidy scenario for solar and wind are compared to the baseline. The
results replicate well-known results regarding the eﬃciency of a tax versus selective
regulation (i.e. wind and solar investment subsidies, here).
One of the more interesting insights from this work is the baseline projection to
2030. Given current economic conditions, namely the assumption that gas price will
remain at 2014 levels in the long-run, almost 28% of the CPP target of 32% reductions
will be met without any additional policy intervention. This means the magnitude
of further policies (e.g. carbon tax and investment subsidies analyzed here) may be
much smaller than what we might expect. Additional research on the “break-even”
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cost of gas for meeting the CPP target as well as investigating economy-wide factors
that might aﬀect the price of gas such as the opening of LNG exports Levi (2012)
would be both timely and interesting. Increased demand for gas by the electricity
sector only increased the price of gas about 4.6%.
By capturing utilization, expansion, and their interdependency explicitly in the
model we can observe some additional interesting phenomena.

First, selective

investment subsidies hurt returns for other renewable generating technologies (e.g.
nuclear, hydroelectric power) that otherwise could contribute to the goal of emission
reductions. Selective piecemeal subsidies can also compromise the eﬀectiveness of
policies. Recall, that wind subsidies crowded-out investment in solar, which actually
resulted in more fossil-fuel production in the peak load. Second, focusing on the third
CPP building block (i.e. capacity expansion for renewables) might actually hurt the
second building block (i.e. fuel switching from coal to gas power with existing plants).
When pursuing a “best system for emission reduction”, as outlined in the EPA CPP
guidelines, it is important to combine capacity expansion policies with other policies
which might prevent emission oﬀsetting in fuel-switching. Third, perhaps the best
way to reduce emissions is by retiring coal capacity. This is done by reducing the
returns to capacity. The carbon tax reduces returns by encouraging fuel switching to
gas, but the investment subsidies only reduce coal power returns in relative terms,
which does not push coal power out of the electricity mix at as quickly of a rate.
This analysis gives guidance for designing a “best system of emission reductions”
to meet the CO2 emission reduction objectives of the CPP. However, policymakers
should also consider welfare and economy-wide eﬀects. Further, CO2 emissions have
implications beyond the just the US region via our shared global economy and
environment. Carbon leakage has been shown to be an important consideration for
reducing global emissions (Peters and Hertwich, 2008). Also, possible opportunities
for fuel exports (i.e. oil, gas, and coal) could open up the electricity sector to
important international price dynamics. The next steps in this line of research are
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to integrate the computation model as part of a global CGE model with relevant
sectoral and regional linkages.
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

The electricity sector plays a crucial role in the global economy. It is also a major
consumer of fossil fuel resources, a large producer of greenhouse gas emissions, and an
important indicator and causal factor for economic development. As such, the sector is
a primary target for policymakers seeking to address each of these issues. The sector is
also experiencing rapid technological change in generation (e.g. renewables), primary
inputs (e.g. horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing), and end-use eﬃciency. This
dissertation seeks to further our understanding of the role of the electricity sector
as part of the dynamic global energy-economy, which requires signiﬁcant research
advances in both database construction and modeling techniques.
The introductory chapter discussed how the advances presented in this dissertation
ﬁt within the current ﬁeld research that focuses on the electricity sector and its
economy-wide linkages. So called “bottom-up” partial equilibrium or simulation
models are capable of providing a technologically and operationally-detailed
representation of the electricity sector. However, the sector-level detail often sacriﬁces
inter-industry feedbacks (i.e.

fuel and other input prices are considered largely

exogenous) and inter-regional linkages. “Top-down” models, such as computable
general equilibrium, suﬀer from the opposite aﬄiction. That is, inter-industry and
inter-regional linkages are well represented at the expense of sector-level details.
The advances in database construction and representing electricity presented in this
dissertation lend capability and credibility to sector-speciﬁc modeling in a top-down
computational equilibrium framework.
Chapters 2–4 detail individual, but interrelated advances in CGE database
construction for global economic modeling. Chapter 2 described the need to balance
bottom-up, engineering-level data with top-down data used for global economic

168
analysis. Previous research that constructed electricity-detailed CGE databases fail
to document matrix balancing methods which balance these disparate data. The
chapter revisited the well-studied matrix balancing problem and formulates a share
preserving cross entropy (SPCE) method that is designed speciﬁcally for the type
of data in the electricity disaggregation. The solution to this method is equivalent
to the well-studied RAS method, but allows one of the constraints to be relaxed
without compromising the solution. This means the SPCE method is more ﬂexible
than RAS and is shown to perform better in the case where total costs of sub-sectors
is not known with absolute certainty, as in the case of the electricity data. Chapter 3
demonstrated that matrix balancing methods have a signiﬁcant impact on modeling
results and advocates for more documentation of these methods across researchers
in the future. GTAP-Power leverages these and other advances in constructing the
most electricity-detailed publicly-available CGE database (Chapter 4).
Chapter 5 described an electricity-detailed model that leverages the GTAP-Power
database to address two of the most criticized aspects of computational equilibrium
modeling: i) insuﬃcient sector-level detail and ii) lack of validation against observed
data. The model captures two aspects of electricity generation which is the relevant
metric for balancing supply and demand as well as determining externalities such as
GHG emissions. Capacity factor utilization, expansion, and their interdependency are
explicitly and endogenously determined, which advance the ﬁeld of both bottom-up
and top-down computational equilibrium model. The capacity utilization is validated
for the United States for the years 2002 and 2012 and shown to perform quite well,
especially in combination with qualitative information. A joint validation, which
links utilization with expansion, encompasses several distinct simulations which test
the models predictive ability from 2007 to 2018 and builds conﬁdence of the system
of equilibrium equations in modeling the US electricity sector. Thus, this chapter
addresses two fundamental criticisms of computational equilibrium modeling.
Chapter 6 used the GTAP-Power database for the United States and the validated
electricity-detailed model to analyze the US EPA Clean Power Plan. The 2030
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baseline scenario almost completely achieves the 32% CO2 emission reduction goal
of the CPP. Low gas prices, coal power retirements, and expansion in renewables
nets reductions of 27.7% with no additional policy interventions. A carbon tax and
a solar and wind investment subsidy are imposed on the baseline scenario to reach
the full 32% target of the CPP. A wind and solar investment subsidy picks winning
technologies at the expense of over renewable technologies. Interestingly, the results
show that the wind investment subsidy crowd-out expansion for solar capacity even
with the solar investment subsidy. Further, the investment subsidies can oﬀset some
of the potential baseline CO2 emission reductions from switching from coal to gas
power, which is one of the speciﬁc mechanisms, termed “building blocks” outlined in
the CPP. Finally, we observe that the carbon tax penalizes coal power in absolute
terms rather than in just relative terms by increasing returns of wind and solar. As a
result, coal capacity retires at a slower rate in the wind and solar investment subsidy
scenario.
Because coal is emissions intensive, retiring coal capacity is the key component
in emission reduction. An investment subsidy might be combined with another
mechanism to reduce returns to coal capacity to increase the rate of retirements.
In the absence of an economically eﬃcient carbon tax, the more tractable policy of
renewable investment subsidies should be designed in such a way to avoid “picking
winners” (e.g. subsidies for all zero and low-emitting technologies), oﬀsetting fuel
switching possibilities, and increasing returns to coal capacity.
Overall, the computational equilibrium model, which captures capacity utilization,
expansion, and their interdependency, is shown to be well-suited to analyze EPA’s
advice to pursue a “best system of emission reductions” given the complex nature of
the electricity system.
This dissertation focuses on advances in database construction and representing
electricity in economy-wide analysis.

The next steps involve integrating the

computational equilibrium model from Chapter 5 into a full CGE framework to
fully leverage the inter-industry and inter-regional capabilities. The CGE linkages
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will expand analysis to income and welfare impacts to more comprehensively analyze
carbon mitigation scenarios such as those proposed in Chapter 6. Further, trade
linkages will likely become of increasing importance for the US electricity sector as
traditional generating fuels (i.e. coal, gas, and oil) have potential for exports. There
are currently a handful of LNG export terminal permits approved for exporting
gas. There is legislation looking to remove the ban on petroleum exports. Also,
the shift from coal use in the US might lead coal producers to look for markets
overseas. Trade might have a signiﬁcant impact on fuel prices, which we have already
seen can greatly impact the US electricity sector, and vice versa (Chapter 5). The
electricity-detailed representation in Chapter 5 was validated for the United States,
but should be calibrated and validated for other regions. Integrating CGE linkages
will unlock many timely research vistas including, but not limited to, the impact of
diﬀerent combinations of national and global emission policies as well as the impacts
on fuel trade. This dissertation demonstrates the viability of electricity-detailed global
economic analysis going forward.
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Schäfer, A. and Jacoby, H. D. (2005). Technology detail in a multisector CGE model:
transport under climate policy. Energy Economics, 27(1):1–24.
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Appendix A. Capacity Flexibility, Utilization, and Expansion Analytics: Technology
Price Shock

Let us ﬁrst consider a simple model which characterizes capacity ﬂexibility,
utilization, expansion, and their interactions.

First, we have percentage change

g , determined by elasticity of demand, ηD , and the
in total electricity demand, Q
percentage change in aggregate cost of electricity, pg :
g = −ηD · pg
Q

(A.1)

The aggregate cost of electricity is subject to the following zero-proﬁt or aggregate
cost pricing condition:
pg =



θtg pgt

(A.2)

t

where θtg is the share of total electricity production from technology t in GWh, and
pgt is the percentage change in total cost of electricity generated using technology t.
Total cost of electricity using technology t is also given by a zero-proﬁt or aggregate
cost pricing condition:
pgt =



θit pit + δtp

(A.3)

i

where θit is the cost share of input i in producing electricity with technology t and
pit is the percentage change in input cost. Here, the cost of generating electricity
using technology t is subject to a price shock, δtp . This will allow us to determine the
eﬀect of parameter values on the responsiveness of the returns to capacity given an
exogenous price shock.
The derived demand equation allows for substitution between input prices given
by the constant elasticity of substitution between inputs, σi . A ﬂexible technology
has σi > 0 and an inﬂexible technology has σi = 0.
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qitD = qtg − σi (
pit − pgt )

(A.4)

where qtg is the percentage change in total generation using technology t. This is given
by the corresponding derived demand equation that allows for substitution between
technologies using existing capacity.
g − σt (
qtg = Q
pgt − pg )

(A.5)

where σt is a CES parameter that characterizes the ability of the electricity sector to
adjust generation via the utilization mechanism.
Finally, we represent the capacity expansion mechanism with the following
elasticity of supply, μt :
S
qkt
= μt · pkt

(A.6)

To make the system of equations analytically tractable, we assume that only
change in prices is in capital inputs of the technology that we are investigating (i.e
inﬁnite supply elasticity for other inputs and technologies). That is,
pit = 0 for all i = k

(A.7)

pgt = 0 for all t = s

(A.8)

and

where capital is designated k and the technology we are investigating is designated
s.

Therefore, we rewrite the original zero-proﬁt/average cost pricing equations

(Equations A.3 and A.2) as:
pgs = θks pks + δsp

(A.9)

pg = θsg θks pks + θsg δsp

(A.10)
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This is a simpliﬁcation of the electricity-detailed computational equilibrium model;
however, using this analysis, we can show the interdependencies between capacity
utilization and expansion.
We begin by equating capacity supply and demand for technology s using
Equations A.6 and A.4).
S
D
μs pks = qks
= qks
= qsg − σi (
pks − pgs )

(A.11)

Simplifying and distributing σi nets
μs pks = qsg − σi pks + σi pgs

(A.12)

and substituting qsg using Equation A.5 allows us to write:
g − σt pgs + σt pg − σi pks + σi pgs
μs pks = Q

(A.13)

g using Equation A.1 nets the following equation with only price
Replacing Q
percentage change variables and parameters.
μs pks = −ηD pg − σt pgs + σt pg − σi pks + σi pgs

(A.14)

Substituting with Equations A.9 and A.10 allows us to write the relationship in
terms of only the parameters, price shock, and returns to capacity:
μs pks = − ηD θsg θks pks − ηD θsg δsp − σt θks pks − σt δsp

(A.15)

+ σt θsg θks pks + σt θsg δsp − σi pks + σi θks pks + σi δsp
Collecting all the pks on the left hand side and δsp on the right hand side leads to
the following equations:
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μs pks + ηD θsg θks pks + σt θks pks − σt θsg θks pks + σi pks − σi θks pks

(A.16)

= −ηD θsg δsp − σt δsp + σt θsg δsp + σi δsp

pks (μs + ηD θsg θks + σt θks − σt θsg θks + σi − σi θks ) = −δsp (ηD θsg + σt − σt θsg − σi ) (A.17)
This leads us to deﬁne the response in returns to capacity, pks , as a function of
the price shock, −δsp , and relationships between the parameters. The following three
equations are equivalent; however, the parameters are rearranged to highlight various
relationships in the parameters which aﬀect the response of the returns to capacity
in response to the price shock.
pks = −δsp ·

ηD θsg + σt − σt θsg − σi
μs + ηD θsg θks + σt θks − σt θsg θks + σi − σi θks

(A.18)

ηD θsg + σt − σt θsg − σi
μs + θks · (ηD θsg + σt − σt θsg − σi ) + σi

(A.19)

pks = −δsp ·

pks = −δsp ·

μs +

ηD θsg + σt − σt θsg − σi
+ σt (θks − θsg θks ) + σi · (1 − θks )

ηD θsg θks

(A.20)

It is easy to see that for ηD θsg +σt −σt θsg −σi > 0 a negative price shock (i.e. cheaper
generation with technology s) results in higher returns to capacity. We are able to
draw out the following insights from the parameter terms in Equations A.18–A.20.
Recall that σi relates to the ﬂexibility of the technology, σt to capacity utilization,
and μs to capacity expansion.1
1. If μs increases (i.e. higher capacity expansion elasticity via MNL) then the
response of pks to δsp decreases (i.e. denominator in Equation A.18 increases). In
other words, returns to capacity is dampened by responsive capacity expansion
(e.g. low rate of retirement for the technology, high rate of total retirements,
1

The following assumes that ηD θsg + σt − σt θsg − σi > 0.
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high MNL parameter). This is one of the major linkages between utilization
and expansion.
2. If σi (i.e. ﬂexibility of the technology) increases then the response of pks to δsp
decreases. Equation A.20 shows the numerator decreases and the denominator
increases. The response of cost of capacity is oﬀset by substituting away from
capital by increasing labor and operations.
3. If there is greater opportunity to increase capacity utilization (i.e. σt increases),
returns to capacity will increase because the there will be more generation per
unit of capacity. The numerator increases more than the denominator (Equation
A.20).
4. If ηD increases then the response of pks to δsp increases. The numerator increases
more than the denominator (Equation A.20).
5. The greater the capital intensity of the technology (i.e. θks ), the less the response
of pks to δsp . The denominator increases more than the numerator in Equation
A.19.
6. The impact of the share of the technology in the generation mix (i.e. θsg ) depends
on the relationship of (ηD − σt ) (see corresponding terms in Equation A.19).
With high opportunity for capacity utilization changes (σt > ηD ), the greater
the share of the technology in the mix, the greater the response in returns to
capacity.

188
Appendix B. Capacity Flexibility, Utilization, and Expansion Analytics: Electricity
Demand Shock

Let us ﬁrst consider a simple model which characterizes capacity ﬂexibility,
utilization, expansion, and their interactions.

First, we have percentage change

g , determined by elasticity of demand, ηD , and the
in total electricity demand, Q
percentage change in aggregate cost of electricity, pg :
g = −ηD · pg + δ D
Q

(B.1)

The aggregate cost of electricity is subject to the following zero-proﬁt or aggregate
cost pricing condition:
pg =



θtg pgt

(B.2)

t

where θtg is the share of total electricity production from technology t in GWh, and
pgt is the percentage change in total cost of electricity generated using technology t.
Total cost of electricity using technology t is also given by a zero-proﬁt or aggregate
cost pricing condition:
pgt =



θit pit

(B.3)

i

where θit is the cost share of input i in producing electricity with technology t and pit
is the percentage change in input cost. Here, the cost of generating electricity using
technology t is subject to a demand shock, δtp . This will allow us to determine the
eﬀect of parameter values on the responsiveness of the returns to capacity given an
exogenous demand shock.
The derived demand equation allows for substitution between input prices given
by the constant elasticity of substitution between inputs, σi . A ﬂexible technology
has σi > 0 and an inﬂexible technology has σi = 0.
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qitD = qtg − σi (
pit − pgt )

(B.4)

where qtg is the percentage change in total generation using technology t. This is given
by the corresponding derived demand equation that allows for substitution between
technologies using existing capacity.
g − σt (
qtg = Q
pgt − pg )

(B.5)

where σt is a CES parameter that characterizes the ability of the electricity sector to
adjust generation via the utilization mechanism.
Finally, we represent the capacity expansion mechanism with the following
elasticity of supply, μt :
S
qkt
= μt · pkt

(B.6)

To make the system of equations analytically tractable, we assume that only
change in prices is in capital inputs of the technology that we are investigating (i.e
inﬁnite supply elasticity for other inputs and technologies). That is,
pit = 0 for all i = k

(B.7)

where capital is designated k and the technology we are investigating is designated
s.

Therefore, we rewrite the original zero-proﬁt/average cost pricing equations

(Equations B.3 and B.2) as:
pgs = θks pks

pg = θsg θks pks +


t=s

(B.8)

θtg θkt pkt

(B.9)
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This is a simpliﬁcation of the electricity-detailed computational equilibrium model;
however, using this analysis, we can show the interdependencies between capacity
utilization and expansion.
We begin by equating capacity supply and demand for technology s using
Equations B.6 and B.4).
S
D
μs pks = qks
= qks
= qsg − σi (
pks − pgs )

(B.10)

Simplifying and distributing σi nets
μs pks = qsg − σi pks + σi pgs

(B.11)

and substituting qsg using Equation B.5 allows us to write:
g − σt pgs + σt pg − σi pks + σi pgs
μs pks = Q

(B.12)

g using Equation B.1 nets the following equation with only price
Replacing Q
percentage change variables and parameters.
μs pks = δ D − ηD pg − σt pgs + σt pg − σi pks + σi pgs

(B.13)

Substituting with Equations B.8 and B.9 allows us to write the relationship in
terms of only the parameters, demand shock, and returns to capacity:
μs pks =δ D − ηD θsg θks pks − ηD
+ σt θsg θks pks + σt





θtg θkt pkt − σt θks pks

t=s

(B.14)

θtg θkt pkt − σi pks + σi θks pks

t=s

Collecting all the pks on the left hand side and δsp on the right hand side leads to
the following equations:
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μs pks + ηD θsg θks pks + σt θks pks − σt θsg θks pks + σi pks − σi θks pks
 g
 g
= δ D − ηD
θt θkt pkt + σt
θt θkt pkt
t=s

(B.15)

t=s

pks (μs + ηD θsg θks + σt θks − σt θsg θks + σi − σi θks ) = δ D + (σt − ηD )



θtg θkt pkt (B.16)

t=s

This leads us to deﬁne the response in returns to capacity, pks , as a function
of the demand shock, δ D , and relationships between the parameters. The following
three equations are equivalent; however, the parameters are rearranged to highlight
various relationships in the parameters which aﬀect the response of the returns to
capacity in response to the demand shock. Not that the denominator is identical to
the denominator in Appendix A which explored a technology-speciﬁc price shock.

δ D + (σt − ηD ) t=s θtg θkt pkt
pks =
μs + ηD θsg θks + σt θks − σt θsg θks + σi − σi θks

(B.17)


δ D + (σt − ηD ) t=s θtg θkt pkt
pks =
μs + θks · (ηD θsg + σt − σt θsg − σi ) + σi

(B.18)


δ D + (σt − ηD ) t=s θtg θkt pkt
pks =
μs + ηD θsg θks + σt (θks − θsg θks ) + σi · (1 − θks )

(B.19)
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